EMPLOYMENT http://zimlii.org/ en Zimbabwe Rural Districts Council Workers Union v Nyanga Rural District Council and 2 Others (118 of 2022) [2022] ZWHHC 118 (25 February 2022); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/harare-high-court/2022/118 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Zimbabwe Rural Districts Council Workers Union v Nyanga Rural District Council and 2 Others (118 of 2022) [2022] ZWHHC 118 (25 February 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1573" hreflang="en">Orders</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1598" hreflang="en">Inherent Powers of The Court</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2177" hreflang="x-default">Conduct and ethics (LEGAL PRACTITIONER)</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2260" hreflang="x-default">enforcement</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Sandra Muengwa</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 03/17/2022 - 07:41</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwhhc/2022/118/2022-zwhhc-118.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=90772">2022-zwhhc-118.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwhhc/2022/118/2022-zwhhc-118.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=749712">2022-zwhhc-118.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p class="MsoHeader"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">HH 118/22</span></span></p> <p class="MsoHeader"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">                                                                                                                                                                                  HC 4627/21</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="FR" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="FR"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ZIMBABWE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCILS WORKERS’ UNION </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="FR" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="FR"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">versus</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="FR" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="FR"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">NYANGA RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="FR" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="FR"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">and</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="tab-stops:right 451.3pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DANGAREMBIZI M N.O.                                                                                                         </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">and </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ELEVEN OTHER CASES</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAFUSIRE J &amp; CHILIMBE J</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HARARE, 25 February 2022</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Chamber application</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAFUSIRE J</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[a]        <u>Introduction</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]        In November 2021 there was a deluge of chamber applications to this court for the registration of determinations or awards issued by designated agents employed by the National Employment Council for Rural District Councils [RDC]. In all of them, the applicant was the Zimbabwe Rural District Council Workers’ Union, a trade union. The first and second respondents would respectively be the particular rural district council concerned and the respective designated agent who would have issued the determination. Except for the names of the RDCs; the names of the designated agents, and the amounts of the awards, the applications were identical in all other respects. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]        Some of those applications were disposed of in one way or the other by the different judges to whom they had been allocated. In due course administrative measures were incepted to have the rest of them dealt with by a single judge. Such an approach is sound administrative practice. Among other things, it curtails or minimises the potential for embarrassment, the uncertainty and the inconsistency that may arise when different judges from the same court issue conflicting or contradictory decisions on similar matters.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]        Upon perusing the applications I noticed something odd. My brother CHILIMBE J and I set out to investigate. In chronological order of case numbers, the applications to which this judgment relates are:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><u><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Case No [HC]</span></span></u></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            <b><u>RDC</u></b>               <b><u>Designated Agent</u></b>                  <b><u>Award [RTGS$]</u></b></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">i/          7208/20                       Mutasa            Ruziwa W                               3 679-80</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ii/         4627/21                       Nyanga            Dangarembizi M                     850 393-44</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">iii/        4770/21                       Mazowe          Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      743 855-20</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">iv/        5242/21                       Mazowe          Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      Food hampers </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">v/         5244/21                       Mazowe          Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      101 490-31      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">vi/        5485/21                       Chirumhanzi    Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      681 781-42      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">vii/       5487/21                       Gutu                Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      104 987-58      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">viii/      5521/21                       Bulilima           Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      343 791-50      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ix/        6174/21                       Mazowe          Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      28 107 158-80</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">x/         6178/21                       Kusile              Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      360 433-11</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">xi/        6594/21                       Nyaminyami    Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      534 582-75      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">xii/       6789/21                       Pfura               Washington Ruziwa                658 540-58</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[b]        <u>Nature of the applications</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]     The applicant wants the various awards by the designated agents registered by this court. Upon such registration the awards should become orders of this court for enforcement purposes. Curiously, there is no provision anywhere in our statute books governing such a procedure. The applicant and its legal practitioners confess as much. It is stated that the applications are made in terms of s 14 of the High Court Act [<i>Chapter 7:06</i>], as read with s 63(3a) of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>]. But these provisions do not say that the High Court can, upon application, register awards by designated agents of employment councils for enforcement purposes. The applicant’s standard form affidavit in support of the applications has these averments:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">10.     I am advised that the route taken by the 2<sup>nd</sup> respondent [i.e. the designated agent] meant that his determination became final and binding on all the parties including the 1<sup>st</sup> respondent [i.e. the RDC].</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">11.       However, it is common cause that the 2<sup>nd</sup> respondent does not have the mechanism and competence for the execution of his decision.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">12.       Therefore, the Applicant hereby makes an Application to this Honourable Court for an order to register this determination as an order of this Court for the purpose of enforcement.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">13.       This court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought as a court of inherent jurisdiction on all civil matters in this jurisdiction. This is, more so, due to the fact [<i>that</i>] there is no specific enactment dealing with the registration of such determinations by any other court</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.” </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]        At the heart of these applications is the nature and extent of the expression ‘inherent jurisdiction’ and whether it applies to situations such as the present where no legislative provision exists to govern such an approach. But before I delve into our findings, it is necessary to comment, albeit briefly, on a side aspect concerning the conduct of the applicant’s legal practitioners.    </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[c]        <u>Conduct of applicant’s legal practitioners</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]        The applications were all made via the chamber book. The rationale, as stated in the founding affidavits, was that the relief sought was merely procedural. I took no issue with that. Nobody else did. But given that the situation was manifestly a novel one, and having formed a <i>prima facie</i> impression that the applications were unprocedural, I decided to invite the applicant’s legal practitioners for a hearing in chambers. I wanted to share my concerns and hear them out. So, I set the matters down for hearing on 13 December 2021 at 10:00 hours and notified them through the Registrar well in advance. This approach is permissible in terms of r 60(8)(a) of the High Court Rules, 2021.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[7]        The legal practitioners did not turn up. Exactly a month later, they wrote to the Registrar attaching some heads of argument which they said they had prepared in response to a query raised by myself. That was presumptuous. I had raised no query. I had merely pointed out that the relief sought seemed incompetent. I had given no further particulars. These would be the business of the proposed hearing. No excuse was given or any apology tendered or any explanation extended on the failure to attend the hearing. Evidently, the heads of argument were intended to anticipate or second-guess my concerns. But they missed the point. They went no further than merely attempting to interpret the Constitutional Court case of <i>Isoquant Investments (Pvt) Ltd t/a as ZIMOCO v Darikwa CCZ</i> 6/20 [hereafter referred to as “<b><i>the ZIMOCO judgment</i></b>”]. But that case did not deal with the issue arising from these applications. The issue arising from these applications is this: despite its inherent jurisdiction, can this court register awards from other adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory authorities such as designated agents from employment councils in the absence of legislative authority? Does the exercise of power by a court of inherent jurisdiction extend to every situation where there may be a lacuna in the law? Is inherent jurisdiction limitless?  These issues are the substance of this judgment and that of my brother CHILIMBE J below. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[d]       <u>The concept of inherent jurisdiction of a court</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[8]        The concept of inherent jurisdiction of a court is a complex one. Virtually all the legal systems of the world have at one time or the other grappled with it, but with varying degrees of success. Its precise boundaries are incapable of demarcation. There is considerable literature around the concept. Plainly, no judgment of any court can ever be the last word on it. It is a common law concept. Some academics discern theoretical differences between the inherent <u>jurisdiction</u> of a court and its inherent <u>power</u>. They say that the terms are sometimes conflated. Others believe they mean the same thing and are interchangeable: see, for instance, an article by a New Zealand academic, Ferrere M R <i>The Inherent Jurisdiction and its Limits</i>, Otago Law Review [2013] Vol 13, Number 1. My brother CHILIMBE J deals with these aspects in somewhat greater detail. But widespread opinion seems to regard the concepts as converging, the distinction being just a matter of semantics: see Ferrere, <i>ibid</i>, p 111. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[9]        Section 176 of our Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the High Court have inherent power to protect and regulate their own processes and to develop the common law, or the customary law, taking into account the interests of justice and the provisions of the Constitution. But the Constitution does not define ‘inherent power’. Therefore, it can only be understood in accordance with the common law definition. The functional definition of inherent jurisdiction which the various jurisdictions around the globe have employed is said to have been coined by I H Jacob, <i>The Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction</i> (1970) 23 CLP 23, quoted by Ferreira, <i>ibid</i>, at p 108. It is:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">… [the] residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[10]      From case law in the different legal systems of the world and the relevant literature on the point, my summary of the principles emerging from the concept ‘inherent jurisdiction’, or ‘inherent power’, is this:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Inherent jurisdiction is the residual power drawn upon by a superior court of inherent jurisdiction, in the interests of justice, to provide a solution or a remedy in circumstances where there is none available or readily discernible from statute or the common law</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">. For example, in 1976 England, the birth place of the common law [as opposed to the civil law of Roman origin], came up with what became known as Anthony Piller orders, after the case of <i>Anthon Piller KG v Manufacturing Process Ltd </i>[1976] Ch 55 (CA). This is an order granted <i>ex parte</i> for the preservation of evidence in civil litigation where a party is authorised to enter his or her opponent’s premises to search and remove property in circumstances where the opponent is likely to destroy such evidence. This procedure was neither prescribed by statute nor formed part of the common law.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="text-align:justify; margin-left:48px"> </p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">A court’s power to exercise inherent jurisdiction is not unlimited. The power is exercised in the most exceptional circumstances</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.  Sometimes it is best for a court, after identifying the lacuna in the law, to leave it to Parliament to promulgate relevant laws to fill the gap. Thus in the English case of <i>Al Rawi v The Security Service</i> [2011] UKSC 34; [2012] 1 AC 531, the United Kingdom Supreme Court refrained from exercising its inherent jurisdiction to resort to what is called a “closed material procedure”. In terms of this procedure a court would, in the public interest, permit limited discovery by one party to a civil suit of certain privileged evidence by making discovery only to the court and to what are termed “special advocates. “Special advocates” are counsel cleared by the government to examine such evidence on behalf of the opposing party who himself or herself is not permitted access to it. Whilst such a procedure was permitted by statute in certain criminal proceedings for the purposes of preventing the disclosure of sensitive information that could undermine national security, it was not provided for in civil proceedings. Accepting that a court’s jurisdiction is not unlimited, and believing that such a procedure would violate certain fundamental common law rights of a litigant, the House of Lords left it to Parliament to craft the relevant law. Parliament obliged, albeit two years later, see: Ferrere, <i>ibid</i>, at p 117.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="text-align:justify; margin-left:48px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Inherent jurisdiction is primarily a procedural concept which the courts should not invoke to make changes in substantive law. Changes to substantive law is the duty of the Legislature</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">: see W H Charles, <i>Inherent Jurisdiction and its Application by Nova Scotia Courts: Metaphysical, Historical or Pragmatic?</i> (2010) 33 Dalhousie LJ 63, 64<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a>.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="text-align:justify; margin-left:48px"> </p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">A judge does not have an unfettered power to do what he or she thinks to be fair as between the parties. A court’s resort to its inherent jurisdiction must be employed within a framework of principles relevant to the matters at issue</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">: W H Charles, <i>ibid</i>. Ferrere, at p 121, refers to a Canadian case of <i>Gillespie v Manitoba (Attorney-General)</i> (2000) 185 DLR (4<sup>th</sup>) 214 in which the court, refusing to extend the exercise of inherent jurisdiction in certain situations, said in the course of its judgment:</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="margin-left:72px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">… the inherent jurisdiction is not a kind of ‘ubiquitous judicial prerogative.’ Indeed, it is not a prerogative at all. The Divine Right of Kings is dead; it has not passed to judges. In a democracy such as ours, judges have a distinct function which enables them to command others, but the power to do so must be exercised within the Constitution and the law</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The ultimate aim of the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is to ensure that justice is done. On the one hand its exercise cannot contravene legislative intent. But on the other, only explicit legislative intention will suffice to ousting it</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">: <i>Derdale Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Econet Wireless (Pvt) Ltd &amp; Ors</i> 2014 (2) ZLR 662 (H).</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[11]      The above list is by no means exhaustive. Very broadly, and put differently, inherent jurisdiction is the ability of a court to craft solutions to particular problems out of necessity in certain situations. Such a power stems from a realisation that the Legislature cannot codify all the solutions to human problems in advance of their occurrence. It is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise: see <i>Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher</i> [1949] 2 All ER 155 (CA) at 164. But even if it were, no Act of parliament is drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity as to cover all situations or to completely eliminate ambiguity. Therefore, the right of a court to draw on its inherent jurisdiction and the power thrust upon it by the Constitution to, among other things, develop the common law, enable it to provide solutions in certain situations where not do so would lead to an injustice. But this is done within certain limits. Among other things, where there is a possible solution or remedy available, the court will not always resort to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction is not an excuse for a court to assume despotic power and clothes itself with legislative capability to craft new laws. It is in the light of these principles that the present applications are considered. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[e]        <u>The applicant’s case</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[12]      In terms of the Labour Act dispute resolution in employment situations at the shop floor outside a particular company or organisation is entrusted to labour officers appointed in terms of s 121, and designated agents appointed in terms of s 63. Labour officers have jurisdiction over all disputes referred to them. Employment or designated agents only have power in respect of disputes arising from their particular industries or undertakings. The contrast between the powers of labour officers and those of designated agents in the adjudication process is extensively discussed in the <i>ZIMOCO</i> judgment. Very broadly, the crisp difference between their powers is that, in the context of the present applications, labour officers, at the end of the dispute settlement process, can only issue “draft rulings” which are subject to confirmation by the Labour Court. On the other hand, designated agents do not issue draft rulings which have to be confirmed by the Labour Court. Their rulings are final. If ever they have to be referred to the Labour Court, it will be only by way of an appeal or review. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[13]      The applicant’s case, as I have understood it, and in my own formulation, is that on the authority of the <i>ZIMOCO</i> judgment, and in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, this court is empowered and obliged to register determinations of designated agents because they are final, requiring no further processes to clothe them with validity. They are already valid. But designated agents lack authority to enforce their determinations. They cannot go to the Labour Court to have them registered because that court, as a creature of statute, cannot entertain them when no such power is conferred by the founding Act. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[14]      The applicant’s argument is persuasive. But I think it is contrived. The focus of the <i>ZIMOCO</i> judgment was completely on a different issue altogether. What the applicant wants done is not for the court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction <u>to adjudicate on a matter</u>. The applicant’s matters have been adjudicated upon already. What the applicant wants done is for this court to adopt and incorporate as its own, by the process of registration, a ruling which it has not itself given and in circumstances in which neither the common law nor statute provides for such a process. It is not my understanding of the common law that the adoption and incorporation of rulings by adjudicating or quasi-adjudicating authorities outside the purview or authority of this court has ever been a common law function of a court of inherent jurisdiction anywhere in the world. Registration of awards is merely procedural. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[15]      In our context, the power to register rulings by other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies is expressly provided for and regulated by statute. CHILIMBE J elaborates more on this. If it were not, where would one draw the line? Granted, designated agents are creatures of statute who are clothed with extensive statutory powers. The only problem is that such statutory provisions do not go so far as to explain what one does with their rulings. If designated agents are creatures of statute, I think their own progeny (in the form of awards) ought properly be governed by statute as well</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[16]      I do not understand the applicant’s reference to s 14 of the High Court Act and s 63(3a) of the Labour Act. Section 14 of the High Court Act enjoins this court, at its discretion, to determine future or contingent rights of any interested person even if that person cannot claim any relief consequent upon such determination. On the other hand, s 63(3a) of the Labour Act empowers a qualified designated agent to redress, or attempt to redress, any dispute which is referred to them or which has come to their attention if it is a dispute arising in the undertaking or industry in which their employment council is registered. The designated agents are then empowered to exercise certain powers as are reposed in the labour officers, and to follow certain steps as labours officers are required to follow. As to how far the designated agents go in the exercise of such powers is what was extensively spelt out in the <i>ZIMOCO</i> judgment. But as to what steps are to be followed after they have redressed a dispute was not dealt with in that judgment or, as far as I know, any other. So the reference by the applicants to the provisions of these two Acts is unhelpful.       </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[f]        <u>Conclusion and disposition </u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> [17]     As shown above, a court’s power to exercise inherent jurisdiction is not unlimited. I do not believe that the authority given by the Constitution in s 176 for superior courts to develop the common law extends to the power to <u>invent</u> new laws. It is a power to extend principles of the common law to novel situations as may arise from time to time. It is not a power to legislate. I believe this is an appropriate situation, as the UK Supreme Court did in the <i>Al Rawi</i> case above, to defer to Parliament to legislate. It can easily make simple amendments to the Labour Act by providing for the enforcement of rulings by designated agents. It seems to me to have been an oversight in the first place.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[18]      I consider that that the applicant is not without a remedy. The determinations by the designated agents can form the basis of proceedings for judgments from this court in much the same was as liquid documents are. In closing, whilst I consider the matter as novel and borderline, on a proper analysis of the concept of inherent jurisdiction, this is a case where it would be inappropriate for the court to extend its power to cover these applications. In the premises, the applications are dismissed. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">25 February 2022</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><img id="Picture_x0020_2" 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" style="width:60.75pt; height:27.75pt" /></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHILIMBE J</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[19]      I have read the judgment of my brother MAFUSIRE J. I concur. The sole issue in these applications is the registrability with this court for enforcement purposes of determinations by designated agents from employment councils. There is no specific statutory provision dealing with this aspect. The scope and purpose of activities of an employment council are defined in section 62(1) (a) of the Labour Act. Among other matters, an employment council is designed to support collective bargaining engagements between employers and employees. An employment council is also mandated to prevent or resolve any disputes as may occur within the undertaking. In short, an employment council is a forum for employers and employees to harmonise conflicting interests in the labour space, such harmony being essential for the effective functioning of specific undertakings, and in this case, rural district councils. They are an arm of local government.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[20]      The employment council deploys, in discharging its functions, the designated agent. He or she is an officer appointed by the employment council. He or she is invested with authority to redress, or attempt to redress, disputes as may occur within the undertaking. In the present proceedings, the applicant was aggrieved by the conduct of the rural district councils in question. The grievance arose from the non-remittance of union dues by those councils. The applicant sought an order to compel these councils to remit union dues from those of their employees who were not members of the applicant. The applicant was successful in this regard, before the designated agents. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> [21]     The determinations handed down by the designated agents outline the factual backgrounds as well as the basis of the awards. Essentially, the applicant had negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), on behalf of all employees of those rural district councils. Those CBAs awarded increases in the employees` salaries and benefits. In terms of the constitution of the National Employment Council, the applicant became entitled to a contribution equivalent to 25% of the value of the collective bargaining package. These contributions were due from those employees of the rural district councils that were not members of the applicant. The responsibility to deduct and remit the dues fell on the rural district councils. Thus, the applicant secured, in default of contestation by each of the respective rural district councils, the various awards set out in Para 3 of the judgment by my brother.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[22]      Armed with those default awards, the applicant has now approached this court seeking to register them for purposes of enforcement. The applicant acknowledges that there is no specific statute providing for the registration of a designated agent`s determination. The result is that the applicant is armed with a batch of awards validly issued by quasi-judicial tribunals vested with statutory authority to issue such awards. However, the applicant is unable to progress these awards to execution. Effectively, the applicant seems to be suggesting that unless this court registers the awards then it will be burdened with orders which are in effect a <i>brutum fulmen</i>. Implicit in their approach is the argument that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to issue designated agents with authority to dispose of matters, but deny the resultant orders legal effect.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[23]      In <i>Isoquant Investments (Private) Limited t/a ZIMOCO v Memory Darikwa</i> CCZ 6/20<u>,</u> MALABA CJ stated as follows at pages 29-30:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p class="Default" style="margin-right:19px; margin-bottom:13px; margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><span style="color:black"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Section 63(3a) allows a designated agent, upon authorisation by the Registrar of Labour, to either redress or attempt to redress any dispute which is referred to the designated </span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">agent or has come to his or her attention.</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> …….What is key in understanding what a designated agent can or cannot do is to understand the meaning of the phrase “redress any dispute”, used in s 63(3a) of the Act…….. When used as a verb, the word “redress”, according to the Oxford English Dictionary means to remedy or set right an undesirable or unfair situation. A designated agent authorised by the Registrar of Labour redresses a dispute referred to him or her. He or she offers a remedy or sets right an unfair situation. A final decision was made by a designated agent after hearing evidence on the dispute from the parties. It was a decision made by an impartial arbiter after hearing evidence from both parties. It disposed of the issue for determination</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-right:19px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[24]      Once a designated agent disposes of a dispute through redress, the next question is how does the beneficiary or claimant awarded entitlement under that designated agent`s redress execute such an award? Naturally, this being a labour matter, one would assume that the Labour Act has mechanisms or a framework for the execution of determinations by the designated agents whom it not only created but invested with authority. Sections 92B<span style="color:black"> and 95(5a) t</span>he Labour Act provide for the registration of determination issued (92B), or confirmed (93(5b)) by the Labour Court with either the magistrates` court or he High Court for enforcement purposes. The destination court for registration of these determinations depends on the jurisdictional size or value of the judgment in question. It is clear that the registration of orders in terms of this provision relates only to orders made by the Labour Court. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-right:19px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[25]      Parts XI and XII of the Labour Act also create various other mechanisms for dispute resolution. These are additional to the main adjudicative functions of the Labour Court. They are also additional to the dispute resolution mechanism provided for under section 63(3a) relating to designated agents, as already noted. Thus Parts XI and XII of the Act create room for labour officers to refer labour disputes for resolution by compulsory arbitration. The awards obtained under that procedure can again be registered with the magistrates` court or the High Court for purposes of execution in terms of section 98 (13) of the Labour Act.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-right:19px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[26]      <span style="color:black">T</span>he Arbitration Act [<i>Chapter 7:15</i>], in Article 35, provides for the registration of arbitral awards with this court. Among others, these are awards resulting from disputes resolved by arbitration after referral in terms of the Labour Act. No provision is made for the registration of awards or determinations by the designated agents. Sections 2A and s 3 of the Labour Act, read together with the Act`s short title, encapsulate the purpose of the Act as follows: to advance social justice and democracy in the workplace by giving effect to the fundamental rights of employees; providing a legal framework within which employees and employers can bargain collectively for the improvement of conditions of employment; the promotion of the participation by employees in decisions affecting their interests in the work place, and securing the just, effective and expeditious resolution of disputes and unfair labour practices. It is also expressly provided that the Act shall be construed in such manner as best ensures the attainment of its purpose and that it shall prevail over any other enactment inconsistent with it. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[27]      However, notwithstanding such exhortations in the Labour Act, it is not correct to conclude that its seemingly over-arching purpose directly or implicitly provides for the general registration of all awards made pursuant to the Act. In <i>Chingombe &amp; Another v City of Harare &amp; Ors SC 177/20</i>, the court examined the above provisions and commented as follows at Para 26:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span style="color:black">“</span></span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="color:black">A perusal of the section makes it clear to the reader that the intended purpose is to ensure that <u>employees</u> are accorded the legal framework <u>for the enforcement of their rights within the workplace</u> as guaranteed by law. However, for present purposes s 2(1) (f) is the pertinent provision as it seeks to ensure the securing of a just, effective and expeditious <u>resolution of disputes</u> and <u>unfair labour practices</u></span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span style="color:black">.” (<i>Emphasis added</i>)</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[28]      Thus it may be concluded that where the legislature intended to facilitate the registration of orders for purposes of execution, it explicitly created specific mechanisms in the Labour Act for the registration of such awards. These mechanisms are, as stated, provided for in s 92B, 93(5a) dealing with registration of the Labour Court`s own judgments, and s 98 (2) as read with s 98 (14) and (15), dealing with resolutions of disputes in terms of the Arbitration Act. From the foregoing, it appears that the Legislature deliberately excluded the designated agent`s award from registration.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[29]      Away from the Labour Act, there are other instances in which the Legislature has created mechanisms for the registration of awards or determinations by quasi-judicial authorities. There is the registration and transferability of maintenance orders in terms of section 18 and 20 of the Maintenance Act [<i>Chapter 5:09</i>]. The Mines and Minerals Act [<i>Chapter 5:09</i>] firstly vests, in s 345, mining commissioners with judicial powers to adjudicate disputes arising from mining and mineral rights and exploitation. Secondly, it explicitly grants authority to these quasi-judicial officers to issue writs of execution in the form used by the magistrates’ courts for the recovery of monies awarded by them by way of costs. The messenger of courts is enjoined to treat such writs in the same manner as he would those writs issued by the magistrates’ courts under that court`s normal scope of adjudicative functions. Part V of the Consumer Protection Act [<i>Chapter 14:14</i>] provides for the resolution of consumer disputes through consumer protection officers. These officers` powers and authority are similar to those of labour officers appointed in terms of the Labour Act. Section 60 of that Act sets out the procedure for disposing of disputes or complaints through arbitration and s 60 (10) and (11) provide for the registrability and effect thereof of arbitral awards.  </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[30]      It goes without saying therefore that where quasi-judicial bodies are granted authority to resolve disputes, or address matters within the sphere of that authority, the extent of that authority is always circumscribed by statute. The process of enforcement of any subsequent awards made by such authority are also spelt out with clarity. For example, in the case of military courts as set out in terms of the defence statutes such as the Defence Act [<i>Chapter 11:02</i>], the authority  even extends to the imposition of sentences of imprisonment including capital punishment. Accordingly, it seems logical that where no specific provision is made for the registration of orders, as in the instance of the designated agents, that power cannot be created by assumption or deduction. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[31]      <i>In casu</i>, the applicant seeks to persuade the court that in the absence of specific provisions relating to the registration of the designated agents` orders with a particular court for enforcement purposes, then the High Court must exercise its inherent jurisdiction and accept registration of these orders. In <i>Derdale Investment (Pvt) Ltd v Econet Wireless (Pvt) Ltd &amp; Ors </i>2014 (2) ZLR 662 (H), DUBE J (as she then was) had occasion to examine the issue of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court at length. Relevant portions of her judgment read:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The High Court is a superior court of record and has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters. It has unlimited original jurisdiction which it exercises unless its jurisdiction is specifically ousted. It has concurrent jurisdiction and may exercise its jurisdiction over matters which other courts have jurisdiction. …………………………………. The High Court also has inherent power conferred upon it by s 176 of the Constitution to protect and regulate its own process and to develop the common law or the customary law. </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">……………………………………………………………</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The concept of inherent jurisdiction has its roots in the English common law that a superior court has <u>the inherent jurisdiction to hear any matter that comes before it</u> unless that authority is expressly excluded or limited by some statute or rule of law. The concept of inherent jurisdiction is described by Jerold Taitz in “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” (Cape Town, South Africa; Juta Publishers, 1985) as follows, </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">‘The inherent jurisdiction of the supreme court may be described as the unwritten power without which the court is unable to function with justice and good reason. As will be observed below, such powers are enjoyed by the court by virtue of its very nature as a superior court modelled on the lines of an English superior court….’ </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4 ed. (London, Butterworth’s), inherent power is defined as follows;</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> ‘In sum, it may be said that the inherent jurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine, and has been defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties <u>and to secure a fair trial between them</u>’</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> In <i>Martin Sibanda and Anor v Benson Chinemhute and Anor </i>HH 131/04 MAKARAU J gives a graphic distinction between a court of inherent jurisdiction and one without and remarks thus, </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">‘I have always visualised the difference between a court of inherent jurisdiction and one without as two buildings open to the citizenry. One has all its doors and windows open to all and for all reasons (and in all seasons), apart from those expressly and clearly forbidden entry by statute. Where a point of entry is hitherto non-existent for a member of the public in the form of procedure, one is inherently created in the interests of justice. This is the court of inherent jurisdiction. The sentry manning the building is less stern and less demanding than his counterpart at the gates of the other building. This other building representing the court without inherent powers is generally closed up apart from a few windows to allow access to those expressly defined in the statute creating the court, on certain terms and for certain specified purposes. <u>Where the statute does not create a point of entry, the court cannot open one for anyone. I</u>n this country that distinction boils down to classification of courts on the basis of superior courts and inferior courts.’ </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">……………………………………………………………………………….</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> The mischief behind the concept is to ensure that justice is done between the parties by ensuring that due process of law is observed, proceedings are fair and are conducted in accordance with real and substantial justice</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[32]      A fairly extensive assessment of the subject of inherent jurisdiction was also  conducted by Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrero in his article <i>The Inherent Jurisdiction and its Limits</i>, published in the New Zealander University of Otago`s Otago Law Review [2013 Vol 13 Number 1. The<u> </u>author traced the history of the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction from its roots in English common law, to its application in various jurisdictions including England, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and Australia. The critical guidance to draw from the surveyed authorities and principles have been summarised in the judgement by my brother. The High Court, as a superior court, does enjoy inherent jurisdiction. It has the intrinsic authority to exercise such jurisdiction. What the authorities also say is that this jurisdiction is not open-ended, unfettered or limitless. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[33]      The Singaporean Appeal Court decision of <i>Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 v Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd [2010] SGCA 39 [1</i>] stated that: </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">… ‘Inherent power’ should not be used as though it were the joker in a pack of cards, possessed of no specific designation and used only when one [does] not have the specific card required.</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">”<i> </i></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Another scholar, J. Farley in his article titled <i>Minimize Codification by Expanding Use of Inherent Jurisdiction </i>[(2007) 27 Lawyers Weekly 13, 13], sounded similar cautions stating that:<i> </i></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">….Inherent jurisdiction is not palm tree justice. Rather, as an element related to the common law, it should be used sparingly (cautiously), but as often as truly required.</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The High Court can hear matters, conduct trials, inquiries, determine matters, uphold or overrule preliminary or interlocutory issues, quash proceedings and orders in reviews and appeals respectively as well as carry out a wide array of other activities in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It must exercise the usual caution in the discharge of its discretionary mandate. This ensures that it stays true to its judicial function and avoids going on “<i>a frolic of its own”</i> (see <i>Mubaiwa v Chiwenga</i> SC 86/20).</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[34]      The applicant confined its focus to the court`s “<i>inherent jurisdiction</i>”. It is necessary to examine whether the court may grant the relief sought under its “<i>inherent powers</i>”. TSANGA J explained the distinction in <i>Machote v Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund</i> HH 813-15 in the following way:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Jurisdiction of a court essentially refers to the authority that a court has to hear and determine a dispute that is brought before it. This is in distinction to the court’s <i>“inherent power</i>” to do something as dealt with by s 176 of our Constitution. In terms of this section, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the High Court all have <i>inherent powers </i>‘to protect and regulate their own process and to develop the common law or customary law taking into account the interests of justice and the provisions of this Constitution.’ Such <i>inherent powers </i>can thus be inherent procedural powers or inherent substantive powers and are exercised on the premise that the court in question already has jurisdiction in the first place. Thus regulation of process as exhorted by s 176 would be largely an exercise of inherent procedural powers while development of common law and customary law as per s 176 would be largely an exercise of inherent substantive powers. Respondent’s argument was founded on the <i>jurisdictional authority </i>of the High Court in terms of s 171 (a) to hear and determine a civil matter, in this instance a labour dispute</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[35]      From the above, the court must have recourse to its inherent powers in circumstances where there is no other tool, mechanism or option open to a litigant. As indicated earlier, the designated agent`s determinations are not covered with a specific statutory roadmap providing for their instantaneous registration with this or any other court for purposes of execution. Such omission by the Legislature may have been deliberate. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[36]      It is necessary to recognise further, that whenever awards or orders are registered with a court for enforcement purposes, specific guidelines are set out to lead the registering court on the qualifying criteria. There are different considerations associated with registration of orders, especially from the checks or due diligence which the registering court must carry out. In many instances, the guidelines or considerations differ depending on the source, the nature, effect or purpose of the order .As an example, the Civil Matters Mutual Assistance Act [<i>Chapter 8:02</i>], which deals with the registration of foreign judgments, the registration of orders obtained elsewhere is a matter revolving around authenticity, verification, transmission and reliability of such orders. Thus, where a court takes it upon itself to register an order issuing from another tribunal, the integrity of the order has to be scrupulously scrutinised. For a registering court to be able to do so, it needs to be guided by the relevant statute providing for the registration of the award or order. Sections 18 and 20 of the Maintenance Act, for instance, are quite detailed and deal with matters relating to family, child rights and support concerns and safeguards. Rule 77 of the High Court Rules sets out detailed guidelines to be followed by the court when registering foreign judgments for purposes of execution. This means that considerations which a registering court ought to take into account are a matter of legislative prescription.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[37]      Following on the analogy of MAKARAU J in the <i>Sibanda</i> case above (relating to buildings and their special entry points) it seems this court exercises such jurisdiction mindful of the specialities of those points of entry. The court has various platforms for litigants to prosecute their claims. These platforms include trials, applications, petitions, appeals, reviews and many others. Even in these specific instances, the court recognises and accords those litigants with urgent and pressing requests the right to “jump the queue” under appropriate circumstances. By the same token, those litigants who enjoy the privilege of statutory approval will be permitted to follow a simple procedure of registering their awards obtained in other fora. If such applicants pass the prescribed procedures they will walk away armed with writs of execution in their favour. Litigants may also approach the court armed with indisputable evidence of rights and entitlements such as acknowledgements of debts, bonds, guarantees or indemnities. Such litigants are directed to a special “entry point” through which they may pursue their debtors and obtain relief with expedition. Similarly, persons in possession of various certificates of title, possession or ownership can also vindicate their rights to property and entitlement through following certain simple procedures.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[38]      In all these instances, the Legislature did not privilege such litigants, (notwithstanding their possession of strong proof of entitlement), with the right to register their claims and walk away with an order to execute. They must litigate.  In this instance, the designated agent`s award becomes but another version of an advantageous positioning of a litigant. The applicant can found the basis to approach the court and seek relief under any of the truncated processes without going through the lengthy cycles of full blown litigation such as trials.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[39]      Notwithstanding my conclusion on the application, I would not say it was obviously the intention of the Legislature to relegate a statutorily appointed adjudicator`s award to the status of a debt collector`s IOU, bounced cheque, dishonoured promissory note and other debt instrument as used in commerce. The authority of the designated agent is indisputable. The Constitutional Court endorsed that position beyond doubt in the <i>Isoquant Investments</i> (or <i>ZIMOCO</i>) decision. Evidently it was the deliberate decision of the Legislature, mindful of the need to attain industrial justice, to set up dispute resolution mechanisms by making provision for the appointment of designated agents and clothing them with certain adjudicatory powers. But registration of awards by a court is something quite different. There is no statutory authority for it. That seems to leave the determination by a designated agent at the level of a liquid document or some such instrument of debt. In my view, there is an obvious need for the Legislature to step in and correct the anomaly. In the premises I would also dismiss the applications. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">25 February 2022</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> _____________________</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Lawman Law Chambers, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">legal practitioners for the applicant</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <div>  <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a> Referred to by Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere, <i>The Inherent Jurisdiction and its Limits</i>, Otago Law Review [2013] Vol 13, Number 1 at p 120 </span></span></p> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-8992843d5d642654ce7c1d9b98ffe4969bb6ae67280e3663e55c681d39b11a5a"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p class="MsoHeader"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">HH 118/22</span></span></p> <p class="MsoHeader"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">                                                                                                                                                                                  HC 4627/21</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="FR" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="FR"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ZIMBABWE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCILS WORKERS’ UNION </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="FR" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="FR"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">versus</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="FR" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="FR"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">NYANGA RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="FR" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="FR"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">and</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="tab-stops:right 451.3pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DANGAREMBIZI M N.O.                                                                                                         </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">and </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ELEVEN OTHER CASES</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAFUSIRE J &amp; CHILIMBE J</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HARARE, 25 February 2022</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Chamber application</span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MAFUSIRE J</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[a]        <u>Introduction</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]        In November 2021 there was a deluge of chamber applications to this court for the registration of determinations or awards issued by designated agents employed by the National Employment Council for Rural District Councils [RDC]. In all of them, the applicant was the Zimbabwe Rural District Council Workers’ Union, a trade union. The first and second respondents would respectively be the particular rural district council concerned and the respective designated agent who would have issued the determination. Except for the names of the RDCs; the names of the designated agents, and the amounts of the awards, the applications were identical in all other respects. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]        Some of those applications were disposed of in one way or the other by the different judges to whom they had been allocated. In due course administrative measures were incepted to have the rest of them dealt with by a single judge. Such an approach is sound administrative practice. Among other things, it curtails or minimises the potential for embarrassment, the uncertainty and the inconsistency that may arise when different judges from the same court issue conflicting or contradictory decisions on similar matters.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]        Upon perusing the applications I noticed something odd. My brother CHILIMBE J and I set out to investigate. In chronological order of case numbers, the applications to which this judgment relates are:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><u><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Case No [HC]</span></span></u></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            <b><u>RDC</u></b>               <b><u>Designated Agent</u></b>                  <b><u>Award [RTGS$]</u></b></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">i/          7208/20                       Mutasa            Ruziwa W                               3 679-80</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ii/         4627/21                       Nyanga            Dangarembizi M                     850 393-44</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">iii/        4770/21                       Mazowe          Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      743 855-20</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">iv/        5242/21                       Mazowe          Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      Food hampers </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">v/         5244/21                       Mazowe          Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      101 490-31      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">vi/        5485/21                       Chirumhanzi    Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      681 781-42      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">vii/       5487/21                       Gutu                Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      104 987-58      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">viii/      5521/21                       Bulilima           Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      343 791-50      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ix/        6174/21                       Mazowe          Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      28 107 158-80</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">x/         6178/21                       Kusile              Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      360 433-11</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">xi/        6594/21                       Nyaminyami    Munyaradzi Dangarembizi      534 582-75      </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">xii/       6789/21                       Pfura               Washington Ruziwa                658 540-58</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[b]        <u>Nature of the applications</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]     The applicant wants the various awards by the designated agents registered by this court. Upon such registration the awards should become orders of this court for enforcement purposes. Curiously, there is no provision anywhere in our statute books governing such a procedure. The applicant and its legal practitioners confess as much. It is stated that the applications are made in terms of s 14 of the High Court Act [<i>Chapter 7:06</i>], as read with s 63(3a) of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>]. But these provisions do not say that the High Court can, upon application, register awards by designated agents of employment councils for enforcement purposes. The applicant’s standard form affidavit in support of the applications has these averments:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">10.     I am advised that the route taken by the 2<sup>nd</sup> respondent [i.e. the designated agent] meant that his determination became final and binding on all the parties including the 1<sup>st</sup> respondent [i.e. the RDC].</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">11.       However, it is common cause that the 2<sup>nd</sup> respondent does not have the mechanism and competence for the execution of his decision.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">12.       Therefore, the Applicant hereby makes an Application to this Honourable Court for an order to register this determination as an order of this Court for the purpose of enforcement.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">13.       This court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought as a court of inherent jurisdiction on all civil matters in this jurisdiction. This is, more so, due to the fact [<i>that</i>] there is no specific enactment dealing with the registration of such determinations by any other court</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.” </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]        At the heart of these applications is the nature and extent of the expression ‘inherent jurisdiction’ and whether it applies to situations such as the present where no legislative provision exists to govern such an approach. But before I delve into our findings, it is necessary to comment, albeit briefly, on a side aspect concerning the conduct of the applicant’s legal practitioners.    </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[c]        <u>Conduct of applicant’s legal practitioners</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]        The applications were all made via the chamber book. The rationale, as stated in the founding affidavits, was that the relief sought was merely procedural. I took no issue with that. Nobody else did. But given that the situation was manifestly a novel one, and having formed a <i>prima facie</i> impression that the applications were unprocedural, I decided to invite the applicant’s legal practitioners for a hearing in chambers. I wanted to share my concerns and hear them out. So, I set the matters down for hearing on 13 December 2021 at 10:00 hours and notified them through the Registrar well in advance. This approach is permissible in terms of r 60(8)(a) of the High Court Rules, 2021.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[7]        The legal practitioners did not turn up. Exactly a month later, they wrote to the Registrar attaching some heads of argument which they said they had prepared in response to a query raised by myself. That was presumptuous. I had raised no query. I had merely pointed out that the relief sought seemed incompetent. I had given no further particulars. These would be the business of the proposed hearing. No excuse was given or any apology tendered or any explanation extended on the failure to attend the hearing. Evidently, the heads of argument were intended to anticipate or second-guess my concerns. But they missed the point. They went no further than merely attempting to interpret the Constitutional Court case of <i>Isoquant Investments (Pvt) Ltd t/a as ZIMOCO v Darikwa CCZ</i> 6/20 [hereafter referred to as “<b><i>the ZIMOCO judgment</i></b>”]. But that case did not deal with the issue arising from these applications. The issue arising from these applications is this: despite its inherent jurisdiction, can this court register awards from other adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory authorities such as designated agents from employment councils in the absence of legislative authority? Does the exercise of power by a court of inherent jurisdiction extend to every situation where there may be a lacuna in the law? Is inherent jurisdiction limitless?  These issues are the substance of this judgment and that of my brother CHILIMBE J below. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[d]       <u>The concept of inherent jurisdiction of a court</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[8]        The concept of inherent jurisdiction of a court is a complex one. Virtually all the legal systems of the world have at one time or the other grappled with it, but with varying degrees of success. Its precise boundaries are incapable of demarcation. There is considerable literature around the concept. Plainly, no judgment of any court can ever be the last word on it. It is a common law concept. Some academics discern theoretical differences between the inherent <u>jurisdiction</u> of a court and its inherent <u>power</u>. They say that the terms are sometimes conflated. Others believe they mean the same thing and are interchangeable: see, for instance, an article by a New Zealand academic, Ferrere M R <i>The Inherent Jurisdiction and its Limits</i>, Otago Law Review [2013] Vol 13, Number 1. My brother CHILIMBE J deals with these aspects in somewhat greater detail. But widespread opinion seems to regard the concepts as converging, the distinction being just a matter of semantics: see Ferrere, <i>ibid</i>, p 111. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[9]        Section 176 of our Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the High Court have inherent power to protect and regulate their own processes and to develop the common law, or the customary law, taking into account the interests of justice and the provisions of the Constitution. But the Constitution does not define ‘inherent power’. Therefore, it can only be understood in accordance with the common law definition. The functional definition of inherent jurisdiction which the various jurisdictions around the globe have employed is said to have been coined by I H Jacob, <i>The Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction</i> (1970) 23 CLP 23, quoted by Ferreira, <i>ibid</i>, at p 108. It is:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">… [the] residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[10]      From case law in the different legal systems of the world and the relevant literature on the point, my summary of the principles emerging from the concept ‘inherent jurisdiction’, or ‘inherent power’, is this:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Inherent jurisdiction is the residual power drawn upon by a superior court of inherent jurisdiction, in the interests of justice, to provide a solution or a remedy in circumstances where there is none available or readily discernible from statute or the common law</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">. For example, in 1976 England, the birth place of the common law [as opposed to the civil law of Roman origin], came up with what became known as Anthony Piller orders, after the case of <i>Anthon Piller KG v Manufacturing Process Ltd </i>[1976] Ch 55 (CA). This is an order granted <i>ex parte</i> for the preservation of evidence in civil litigation where a party is authorised to enter his or her opponent’s premises to search and remove property in circumstances where the opponent is likely to destroy such evidence. This procedure was neither prescribed by statute nor formed part of the common law.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="text-align:justify; margin-left:48px"> </p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">A court’s power to exercise inherent jurisdiction is not unlimited. The power is exercised in the most exceptional circumstances</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.  Sometimes it is best for a court, after identifying the lacuna in the law, to leave it to Parliament to promulgate relevant laws to fill the gap. Thus in the English case of <i>Al Rawi v The Security Service</i> [2011] UKSC 34; [2012] 1 AC 531, the United Kingdom Supreme Court refrained from exercising its inherent jurisdiction to resort to what is called a “closed material procedure”. In terms of this procedure a court would, in the public interest, permit limited discovery by one party to a civil suit of certain privileged evidence by making discovery only to the court and to what are termed “special advocates. “Special advocates” are counsel cleared by the government to examine such evidence on behalf of the opposing party who himself or herself is not permitted access to it. Whilst such a procedure was permitted by statute in certain criminal proceedings for the purposes of preventing the disclosure of sensitive information that could undermine national security, it was not provided for in civil proceedings. Accepting that a court’s jurisdiction is not unlimited, and believing that such a procedure would violate certain fundamental common law rights of a litigant, the House of Lords left it to Parliament to craft the relevant law. Parliament obliged, albeit two years later, see: Ferrere, <i>ibid</i>, at p 117.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="text-align:justify; margin-left:48px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Inherent jurisdiction is primarily a procedural concept which the courts should not invoke to make changes in substantive law. Changes to substantive law is the duty of the Legislature</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">: see W H Charles, <i>Inherent Jurisdiction and its Application by Nova Scotia Courts: Metaphysical, Historical or Pragmatic?</i> (2010) 33 Dalhousie LJ 63, 64<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a>.</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="text-align:justify; margin-left:48px"> </p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">A judge does not have an unfettered power to do what he or she thinks to be fair as between the parties. A court’s resort to its inherent jurisdiction must be employed within a framework of principles relevant to the matters at issue</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">: W H Charles, <i>ibid</i>. Ferrere, at p 121, refers to a Canadian case of <i>Gillespie v Manitoba (Attorney-General)</i> (2000) 185 DLR (4<sup>th</sup>) 214 in which the court, refusing to extend the exercise of inherent jurisdiction in certain situations, said in the course of its judgment:</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="margin-left:72px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">… the inherent jurisdiction is not a kind of ‘ubiquitous judicial prerogative.’ Indeed, it is not a prerogative at all. The Divine Right of Kings is dead; it has not passed to judges. In a democracy such as ours, judges have a distinct function which enables them to command others, but the power to do so must be exercised within the Constitution and the law</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <ul><li style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The ultimate aim of the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is to ensure that justice is done. On the one hand its exercise cannot contravene legislative intent. But on the other, only explicit legislative intention will suffice to ousting it</span></span></b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">: <i>Derdale Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Econet Wireless (Pvt) Ltd &amp; Ors</i> 2014 (2) ZLR 662 (H).</span></span></span></span></span></li> </ul><p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[11]      The above list is by no means exhaustive. Very broadly, and put differently, inherent jurisdiction is the ability of a court to craft solutions to particular problems out of necessity in certain situations. Such a power stems from a realisation that the Legislature cannot codify all the solutions to human problems in advance of their occurrence. It is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise: see <i>Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher</i> [1949] 2 All ER 155 (CA) at 164. But even if it were, no Act of parliament is drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity as to cover all situations or to completely eliminate ambiguity. Therefore, the right of a court to draw on its inherent jurisdiction and the power thrust upon it by the Constitution to, among other things, develop the common law, enable it to provide solutions in certain situations where not do so would lead to an injustice. But this is done within certain limits. Among other things, where there is a possible solution or remedy available, the court will not always resort to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction is not an excuse for a court to assume despotic power and clothes itself with legislative capability to craft new laws. It is in the light of these principles that the present applications are considered. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[e]        <u>The applicant’s case</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[12]      In terms of the Labour Act dispute resolution in employment situations at the shop floor outside a particular company or organisation is entrusted to labour officers appointed in terms of s 121, and designated agents appointed in terms of s 63. Labour officers have jurisdiction over all disputes referred to them. Employment or designated agents only have power in respect of disputes arising from their particular industries or undertakings. The contrast between the powers of labour officers and those of designated agents in the adjudication process is extensively discussed in the <i>ZIMOCO</i> judgment. Very broadly, the crisp difference between their powers is that, in the context of the present applications, labour officers, at the end of the dispute settlement process, can only issue “draft rulings” which are subject to confirmation by the Labour Court. On the other hand, designated agents do not issue draft rulings which have to be confirmed by the Labour Court. Their rulings are final. If ever they have to be referred to the Labour Court, it will be only by way of an appeal or review. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[13]      The applicant’s case, as I have understood it, and in my own formulation, is that on the authority of the <i>ZIMOCO</i> judgment, and in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, this court is empowered and obliged to register determinations of designated agents because they are final, requiring no further processes to clothe them with validity. They are already valid. But designated agents lack authority to enforce their determinations. They cannot go to the Labour Court to have them registered because that court, as a creature of statute, cannot entertain them when no such power is conferred by the founding Act. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[14]      The applicant’s argument is persuasive. But I think it is contrived. The focus of the <i>ZIMOCO</i> judgment was completely on a different issue altogether. What the applicant wants done is not for the court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction <u>to adjudicate on a matter</u>. The applicant’s matters have been adjudicated upon already. What the applicant wants done is for this court to adopt and incorporate as its own, by the process of registration, a ruling which it has not itself given and in circumstances in which neither the common law nor statute provides for such a process. It is not my understanding of the common law that the adoption and incorporation of rulings by adjudicating or quasi-adjudicating authorities outside the purview or authority of this court has ever been a common law function of a court of inherent jurisdiction anywhere in the world. Registration of awards is merely procedural. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[15]      In our context, the power to register rulings by other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies is expressly provided for and regulated by statute. CHILIMBE J elaborates more on this. If it were not, where would one draw the line? Granted, designated agents are creatures of statute who are clothed with extensive statutory powers. The only problem is that such statutory provisions do not go so far as to explain what one does with their rulings. If designated agents are creatures of statute, I think their own progeny (in the form of awards) ought properly be governed by statute as well</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[16]      I do not understand the applicant’s reference to s 14 of the High Court Act and s 63(3a) of the Labour Act. Section 14 of the High Court Act enjoins this court, at its discretion, to determine future or contingent rights of any interested person even if that person cannot claim any relief consequent upon such determination. On the other hand, s 63(3a) of the Labour Act empowers a qualified designated agent to redress, or attempt to redress, any dispute which is referred to them or which has come to their attention if it is a dispute arising in the undertaking or industry in which their employment council is registered. The designated agents are then empowered to exercise certain powers as are reposed in the labour officers, and to follow certain steps as labours officers are required to follow. As to how far the designated agents go in the exercise of such powers is what was extensively spelt out in the <i>ZIMOCO</i> judgment. But as to what steps are to be followed after they have redressed a dispute was not dealt with in that judgment or, as far as I know, any other. So the reference by the applicants to the provisions of these two Acts is unhelpful.       </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[f]        <u>Conclusion and disposition </u></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> [17]     As shown above, a court’s power to exercise inherent jurisdiction is not unlimited. I do not believe that the authority given by the Constitution in s 176 for superior courts to develop the common law extends to the power to <u>invent</u> new laws. It is a power to extend principles of the common law to novel situations as may arise from time to time. It is not a power to legislate. I believe this is an appropriate situation, as the UK Supreme Court did in the <i>Al Rawi</i> case above, to defer to Parliament to legislate. It can easily make simple amendments to the Labour Act by providing for the enforcement of rulings by designated agents. It seems to me to have been an oversight in the first place.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[18]      I consider that that the applicant is not without a remedy. The determinations by the designated agents can form the basis of proceedings for judgments from this court in much the same was as liquid documents are. In closing, whilst I consider the matter as novel and borderline, on a proper analysis of the concept of inherent jurisdiction, this is a case where it would be inappropriate for the court to extend its power to cover these applications. In the premises, the applications are dismissed. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">25 February 2022</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><img id="Picture_x0020_2" 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" style="width:60.75pt; height:27.75pt" /></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHILIMBE J</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[19]      I have read the judgment of my brother MAFUSIRE J. I concur. The sole issue in these applications is the registrability with this court for enforcement purposes of determinations by designated agents from employment councils. There is no specific statutory provision dealing with this aspect. The scope and purpose of activities of an employment council are defined in section 62(1) (a) of the Labour Act. Among other matters, an employment council is designed to support collective bargaining engagements between employers and employees. An employment council is also mandated to prevent or resolve any disputes as may occur within the undertaking. In short, an employment council is a forum for employers and employees to harmonise conflicting interests in the labour space, such harmony being essential for the effective functioning of specific undertakings, and in this case, rural district councils. They are an arm of local government.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[20]      The employment council deploys, in discharging its functions, the designated agent. He or she is an officer appointed by the employment council. He or she is invested with authority to redress, or attempt to redress, disputes as may occur within the undertaking. In the present proceedings, the applicant was aggrieved by the conduct of the rural district councils in question. The grievance arose from the non-remittance of union dues by those councils. The applicant sought an order to compel these councils to remit union dues from those of their employees who were not members of the applicant. The applicant was successful in this regard, before the designated agents. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> [21]     The determinations handed down by the designated agents outline the factual backgrounds as well as the basis of the awards. Essentially, the applicant had negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), on behalf of all employees of those rural district councils. Those CBAs awarded increases in the employees` salaries and benefits. In terms of the constitution of the National Employment Council, the applicant became entitled to a contribution equivalent to 25% of the value of the collective bargaining package. These contributions were due from those employees of the rural district councils that were not members of the applicant. The responsibility to deduct and remit the dues fell on the rural district councils. Thus, the applicant secured, in default of contestation by each of the respective rural district councils, the various awards set out in Para 3 of the judgment by my brother.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[22]      Armed with those default awards, the applicant has now approached this court seeking to register them for purposes of enforcement. The applicant acknowledges that there is no specific statute providing for the registration of a designated agent`s determination. The result is that the applicant is armed with a batch of awards validly issued by quasi-judicial tribunals vested with statutory authority to issue such awards. However, the applicant is unable to progress these awards to execution. Effectively, the applicant seems to be suggesting that unless this court registers the awards then it will be burdened with orders which are in effect a <i>brutum fulmen</i>. Implicit in their approach is the argument that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to issue designated agents with authority to dispose of matters, but deny the resultant orders legal effect.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[23]      In <i>Isoquant Investments (Private) Limited t/a ZIMOCO v Memory Darikwa</i> CCZ 6/20<u>,</u> MALABA CJ stated as follows at pages 29-30:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p class="Default" style="margin-right:19px; margin-bottom:13px; margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"><span style="color:black"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Section 63(3a) allows a designated agent, upon authorisation by the Registrar of Labour, to either redress or attempt to redress any dispute which is referred to the designated </span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">agent or has come to his or her attention.</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> …….What is key in understanding what a designated agent can or cannot do is to understand the meaning of the phrase “redress any dispute”, used in s 63(3a) of the Act…….. When used as a verb, the word “redress”, according to the Oxford English Dictionary means to remedy or set right an undesirable or unfair situation. A designated agent authorised by the Registrar of Labour redresses a dispute referred to him or her. He or she offers a remedy or sets right an unfair situation. A final decision was made by a designated agent after hearing evidence on the dispute from the parties. It was a decision made by an impartial arbiter after hearing evidence from both parties. It disposed of the issue for determination</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-right:19px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[24]      Once a designated agent disposes of a dispute through redress, the next question is how does the beneficiary or claimant awarded entitlement under that designated agent`s redress execute such an award? Naturally, this being a labour matter, one would assume that the Labour Act has mechanisms or a framework for the execution of determinations by the designated agents whom it not only created but invested with authority. Sections 92B<span style="color:black"> and 95(5a) t</span>he Labour Act provide for the registration of determination issued (92B), or confirmed (93(5b)) by the Labour Court with either the magistrates` court or he High Court for enforcement purposes. The destination court for registration of these determinations depends on the jurisdictional size or value of the judgment in question. It is clear that the registration of orders in terms of this provision relates only to orders made by the Labour Court. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-right:19px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[25]      Parts XI and XII of the Labour Act also create various other mechanisms for dispute resolution. These are additional to the main adjudicative functions of the Labour Court. They are also additional to the dispute resolution mechanism provided for under section 63(3a) relating to designated agents, as already noted. Thus Parts XI and XII of the Act create room for labour officers to refer labour disputes for resolution by compulsory arbitration. The awards obtained under that procedure can again be registered with the magistrates` court or the High Court for purposes of execution in terms of section 98 (13) of the Labour Act.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-right:19px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[26]      <span style="color:black">T</span>he Arbitration Act [<i>Chapter 7:15</i>], in Article 35, provides for the registration of arbitral awards with this court. Among others, these are awards resulting from disputes resolved by arbitration after referral in terms of the Labour Act. No provision is made for the registration of awards or determinations by the designated agents. Sections 2A and s 3 of the Labour Act, read together with the Act`s short title, encapsulate the purpose of the Act as follows: to advance social justice and democracy in the workplace by giving effect to the fundamental rights of employees; providing a legal framework within which employees and employers can bargain collectively for the improvement of conditions of employment; the promotion of the participation by employees in decisions affecting their interests in the work place, and securing the just, effective and expeditious resolution of disputes and unfair labour practices. It is also expressly provided that the Act shall be construed in such manner as best ensures the attainment of its purpose and that it shall prevail over any other enactment inconsistent with it. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[27]      However, notwithstanding such exhortations in the Labour Act, it is not correct to conclude that its seemingly over-arching purpose directly or implicitly provides for the general registration of all awards made pursuant to the Act. In <i>Chingombe &amp; Another v City of Harare &amp; Ors SC 177/20</i>, the court examined the above provisions and commented as follows at Para 26:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span style="color:black">“</span></span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="color:black">A perusal of the section makes it clear to the reader that the intended purpose is to ensure that <u>employees</u> are accorded the legal framework <u>for the enforcement of their rights within the workplace</u> as guaranteed by law. However, for present purposes s 2(1) (f) is the pertinent provision as it seeks to ensure the securing of a just, effective and expeditious <u>resolution of disputes</u> and <u>unfair labour practices</u></span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span style="color:black">.” (<i>Emphasis added</i>)</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[28]      Thus it may be concluded that where the legislature intended to facilitate the registration of orders for purposes of execution, it explicitly created specific mechanisms in the Labour Act for the registration of such awards. These mechanisms are, as stated, provided for in s 92B, 93(5a) dealing with registration of the Labour Court`s own judgments, and s 98 (2) as read with s 98 (14) and (15), dealing with resolutions of disputes in terms of the Arbitration Act. From the foregoing, it appears that the Legislature deliberately excluded the designated agent`s award from registration.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[29]      Away from the Labour Act, there are other instances in which the Legislature has created mechanisms for the registration of awards or determinations by quasi-judicial authorities. There is the registration and transferability of maintenance orders in terms of section 18 and 20 of the Maintenance Act [<i>Chapter 5:09</i>]. The Mines and Minerals Act [<i>Chapter 5:09</i>] firstly vests, in s 345, mining commissioners with judicial powers to adjudicate disputes arising from mining and mineral rights and exploitation. Secondly, it explicitly grants authority to these quasi-judicial officers to issue writs of execution in the form used by the magistrates’ courts for the recovery of monies awarded by them by way of costs. The messenger of courts is enjoined to treat such writs in the same manner as he would those writs issued by the magistrates’ courts under that court`s normal scope of adjudicative functions. Part V of the Consumer Protection Act [<i>Chapter 14:14</i>] provides for the resolution of consumer disputes through consumer protection officers. These officers` powers and authority are similar to those of labour officers appointed in terms of the Labour Act. Section 60 of that Act sets out the procedure for disposing of disputes or complaints through arbitration and s 60 (10) and (11) provide for the registrability and effect thereof of arbitral awards.  </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[30]      It goes without saying therefore that where quasi-judicial bodies are granted authority to resolve disputes, or address matters within the sphere of that authority, the extent of that authority is always circumscribed by statute. The process of enforcement of any subsequent awards made by such authority are also spelt out with clarity. For example, in the case of military courts as set out in terms of the defence statutes such as the Defence Act [<i>Chapter 11:02</i>], the authority  even extends to the imposition of sentences of imprisonment including capital punishment. Accordingly, it seems logical that where no specific provision is made for the registration of orders, as in the instance of the designated agents, that power cannot be created by assumption or deduction. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[31]      <i>In casu</i>, the applicant seeks to persuade the court that in the absence of specific provisions relating to the registration of the designated agents` orders with a particular court for enforcement purposes, then the High Court must exercise its inherent jurisdiction and accept registration of these orders. In <i>Derdale Investment (Pvt) Ltd v Econet Wireless (Pvt) Ltd &amp; Ors </i>2014 (2) ZLR 662 (H), DUBE J (as she then was) had occasion to examine the issue of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court at length. Relevant portions of her judgment read:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The High Court is a superior court of record and has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters. It has unlimited original jurisdiction which it exercises unless its jurisdiction is specifically ousted. It has concurrent jurisdiction and may exercise its jurisdiction over matters which other courts have jurisdiction. …………………………………. The High Court also has inherent power conferred upon it by s 176 of the Constitution to protect and regulate its own process and to develop the common law or the customary law. </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">……………………………………………………………</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The concept of inherent jurisdiction has its roots in the English common law that a superior court has <u>the inherent jurisdiction to hear any matter that comes before it</u> unless that authority is expressly excluded or limited by some statute or rule of law. The concept of inherent jurisdiction is described by Jerold Taitz in “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” (Cape Town, South Africa; Juta Publishers, 1985) as follows, </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">‘The inherent jurisdiction of the supreme court may be described as the unwritten power without which the court is unable to function with justice and good reason. As will be observed below, such powers are enjoyed by the court by virtue of its very nature as a superior court modelled on the lines of an English superior court….’ </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4 ed. (London, Butterworth’s), inherent power is defined as follows;</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> ‘In sum, it may be said that the inherent jurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine, and has been defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties <u>and to secure a fair trial between them</u>’</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> In <i>Martin Sibanda and Anor v Benson Chinemhute and Anor </i>HH 131/04 MAKARAU J gives a graphic distinction between a court of inherent jurisdiction and one without and remarks thus, </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">‘I have always visualised the difference between a court of inherent jurisdiction and one without as two buildings open to the citizenry. One has all its doors and windows open to all and for all reasons (and in all seasons), apart from those expressly and clearly forbidden entry by statute. Where a point of entry is hitherto non-existent for a member of the public in the form of procedure, one is inherently created in the interests of justice. This is the court of inherent jurisdiction. The sentry manning the building is less stern and less demanding than his counterpart at the gates of the other building. This other building representing the court without inherent powers is generally closed up apart from a few windows to allow access to those expressly defined in the statute creating the court, on certain terms and for certain specified purposes. <u>Where the statute does not create a point of entry, the court cannot open one for anyone. I</u>n this country that distinction boils down to classification of courts on the basis of superior courts and inferior courts.’ </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">……………………………………………………………………………….</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:76px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> The mischief behind the concept is to ensure that justice is done between the parties by ensuring that due process of law is observed, proceedings are fair and are conducted in accordance with real and substantial justice</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[32]      A fairly extensive assessment of the subject of inherent jurisdiction was also  conducted by Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrero in his article <i>The Inherent Jurisdiction and its Limits</i>, published in the New Zealander University of Otago`s Otago Law Review [2013 Vol 13 Number 1. The<u> </u>author traced the history of the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction from its roots in English common law, to its application in various jurisdictions including England, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and Australia. The critical guidance to draw from the surveyed authorities and principles have been summarised in the judgement by my brother. The High Court, as a superior court, does enjoy inherent jurisdiction. It has the intrinsic authority to exercise such jurisdiction. What the authorities also say is that this jurisdiction is not open-ended, unfettered or limitless. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[33]      The Singaporean Appeal Court decision of <i>Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 v Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd [2010] SGCA 39 [1</i>] stated that: </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">… ‘Inherent power’ should not be used as though it were the joker in a pack of cards, possessed of no specific designation and used only when one [does] not have the specific card required.</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">”<i> </i></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Another scholar, J. Farley in his article titled <i>Minimize Codification by Expanding Use of Inherent Jurisdiction </i>[(2007) 27 Lawyers Weekly 13, 13], sounded similar cautions stating that:<i> </i></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">….Inherent jurisdiction is not palm tree justice. Rather, as an element related to the common law, it should be used sparingly (cautiously), but as often as truly required.</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The High Court can hear matters, conduct trials, inquiries, determine matters, uphold or overrule preliminary or interlocutory issues, quash proceedings and orders in reviews and appeals respectively as well as carry out a wide array of other activities in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It must exercise the usual caution in the discharge of its discretionary mandate. This ensures that it stays true to its judicial function and avoids going on “<i>a frolic of its own”</i> (see <i>Mubaiwa v Chiwenga</i> SC 86/20).</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[34]      The applicant confined its focus to the court`s “<i>inherent jurisdiction</i>”. It is necessary to examine whether the court may grant the relief sought under its “<i>inherent powers</i>”. TSANGA J explained the distinction in <i>Machote v Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund</i> HH 813-15 in the following way:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Jurisdiction of a court essentially refers to the authority that a court has to hear and determine a dispute that is brought before it. This is in distinction to the court’s <i>“inherent power</i>” to do something as dealt with by s 176 of our Constitution. In terms of this section, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the High Court all have <i>inherent powers </i>‘to protect and regulate their own process and to develop the common law or customary law taking into account the interests of justice and the provisions of this Constitution.’ Such <i>inherent powers </i>can thus be inherent procedural powers or inherent substantive powers and are exercised on the premise that the court in question already has jurisdiction in the first place. Thus regulation of process as exhorted by s 176 would be largely an exercise of inherent procedural powers while development of common law and customary law as per s 176 would be largely an exercise of inherent substantive powers. Respondent’s argument was founded on the <i>jurisdictional authority </i>of the High Court in terms of s 171 (a) to hear and determine a civil matter, in this instance a labour dispute</span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[35]      From the above, the court must have recourse to its inherent powers in circumstances where there is no other tool, mechanism or option open to a litigant. As indicated earlier, the designated agent`s determinations are not covered with a specific statutory roadmap providing for their instantaneous registration with this or any other court for purposes of execution. Such omission by the Legislature may have been deliberate. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[36]      It is necessary to recognise further, that whenever awards or orders are registered with a court for enforcement purposes, specific guidelines are set out to lead the registering court on the qualifying criteria. There are different considerations associated with registration of orders, especially from the checks or due diligence which the registering court must carry out. In many instances, the guidelines or considerations differ depending on the source, the nature, effect or purpose of the order .As an example, the Civil Matters Mutual Assistance Act [<i>Chapter 8:02</i>], which deals with the registration of foreign judgments, the registration of orders obtained elsewhere is a matter revolving around authenticity, verification, transmission and reliability of such orders. Thus, where a court takes it upon itself to register an order issuing from another tribunal, the integrity of the order has to be scrupulously scrutinised. For a registering court to be able to do so, it needs to be guided by the relevant statute providing for the registration of the award or order. Sections 18 and 20 of the Maintenance Act, for instance, are quite detailed and deal with matters relating to family, child rights and support concerns and safeguards. Rule 77 of the High Court Rules sets out detailed guidelines to be followed by the court when registering foreign judgments for purposes of execution. This means that considerations which a registering court ought to take into account are a matter of legislative prescription.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[37]      Following on the analogy of MAKARAU J in the <i>Sibanda</i> case above (relating to buildings and their special entry points) it seems this court exercises such jurisdiction mindful of the specialities of those points of entry. The court has various platforms for litigants to prosecute their claims. These platforms include trials, applications, petitions, appeals, reviews and many others. Even in these specific instances, the court recognises and accords those litigants with urgent and pressing requests the right to “jump the queue” under appropriate circumstances. By the same token, those litigants who enjoy the privilege of statutory approval will be permitted to follow a simple procedure of registering their awards obtained in other fora. If such applicants pass the prescribed procedures they will walk away armed with writs of execution in their favour. Litigants may also approach the court armed with indisputable evidence of rights and entitlements such as acknowledgements of debts, bonds, guarantees or indemnities. Such litigants are directed to a special “entry point” through which they may pursue their debtors and obtain relief with expedition. Similarly, persons in possession of various certificates of title, possession or ownership can also vindicate their rights to property and entitlement through following certain simple procedures.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[38]      In all these instances, the Legislature did not privilege such litigants, (notwithstanding their possession of strong proof of entitlement), with the right to register their claims and walk away with an order to execute. They must litigate.  In this instance, the designated agent`s award becomes but another version of an advantageous positioning of a litigant. The applicant can found the basis to approach the court and seek relief under any of the truncated processes without going through the lengthy cycles of full blown litigation such as trials.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[39]      Notwithstanding my conclusion on the application, I would not say it was obviously the intention of the Legislature to relegate a statutorily appointed adjudicator`s award to the status of a debt collector`s IOU, bounced cheque, dishonoured promissory note and other debt instrument as used in commerce. The authority of the designated agent is indisputable. The Constitutional Court endorsed that position beyond doubt in the <i>Isoquant Investments</i> (or <i>ZIMOCO</i>) decision. Evidently it was the deliberate decision of the Legislature, mindful of the need to attain industrial justice, to set up dispute resolution mechanisms by making provision for the appointment of designated agents and clothing them with certain adjudicatory powers. But registration of awards by a court is something quite different. There is no statutory authority for it. That seems to leave the determination by a designated agent at the level of a liquid document or some such instrument of debt. In my view, there is an obvious need for the Legislature to step in and correct the anomaly. In the premises I would also dismiss the applications. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">25 February 2022</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p align="right" style="text-align:right; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> _____________________</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Lawman Law Chambers, </span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">legal practitioners for the applicant</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; margin-bottom:13px"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <div>  <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:115%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a> Referred to by Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere, <i>The Inherent Jurisdiction and its Limits</i>, Otago Law Review [2013] Vol 13, Number 1 at p 120 </span></span></p> </div> </div></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 17 Mar 2022 07:41:19 +0000 Sandra Muengwa 12354 at http://zimlii.org Police Service Commission and Another v Manyoni (7 of 2022) [2021] ZWSC 7 (28 May 2021); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2021/7-0 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Police Service Commission and Another v Manyoni (7 of 2022) [2021] ZWSC 7 (28 May 2021);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1516" hreflang="en">Judicial Review</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1537" hreflang="en">Administration of Justice</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Sandra Muengwa</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 01/31/2022 - 18:27</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-msword file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2021/7/2021-zwsc-7.doc" type="application/msword; length=71680">2021-zwsc-7.doc</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2021/7/2021-zwsc-7_0.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=396904">2021-zwsc-7.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-09a0f70ebcb39be85db331896af194132c5864177e71a50cdc7e61abd98ced6b"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><span class="file file--mime-application-msword file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2021/7/2021-zwsc-7.doc" type="application/msword; length=71680">2021-zwsc-7.doc</a></span> , <iframe class="pdf" webkitallowfullscreen="" mozallowfullscreen="" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="no" width="100%" height="800px" src="/libraries/pdf.js/web/viewer.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.zimlii.org%2Ffiles%2Fjudgments%2Fzwsc%2F2021%2F7%2F2021-zwsc-7_0.pdf" data-src="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2021/7/2021-zwsc-7_0.pdf" title="2021-zwsc-7.pdf"></iframe></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 31 Jan 2022 18:27:35 +0000 Sandra Muengwa 11542 at http://zimlii.org CABS v Magodo (34 of 2022) [2022] ZWHHC 34 (19 January 2022); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/harare-high-court/2022/34 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">CABS v Magodo (34 of 2022) [2022] ZWHHC 34 (19 January 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1488" hreflang="en">Loan Default</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1492" hreflang="en">Security For Loan</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2221" hreflang="x-default">Caveat subscriptor</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1595" hreflang="en">Facts Not Pleaded</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1615" hreflang="en">Costs</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1771" hreflang="en">Fraud</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2253" hreflang="x-default">extent to which parties are bound by pleadings</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2038" hreflang="en">Mortgage, loans and bonds</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2040" hreflang="en">Mortgage</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Sandra Muengwa</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 01/24/2022 - 19:26</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwhhc/2022/34/2022-zwhhc-34.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=34221">2022-zwhhc-34.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwhhc/2022/34/2022-zwhhc-34.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=454207">2022-zwhhc-34.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">HH 34-22 </span></span></p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">HC 1677/18</span></span></p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Ref HC 2810/17</span></span></p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Ref HC 10619/13</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CENTRAL AFRICA BUILDING SOCIETY </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">versus</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">PATIENCE MAGODO</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHITAPI J, 22 May, 2019 and 19 January, 2022</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Opposed Court Application</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">G Madzoka</span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, for the applicant </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">T Nzombe</span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, for the respondent </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHITAPI J:    This is an application for an order setting aside a deed of settlement executed by the applicant and the respondent in Case HC 2810/17. The applicant’s prayer as set out in the draft order reads as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“IT IS ORDERED THAT,</span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> The Deed of Settlement signed between the applicant and the respondent in case No HC 2810/17 and filed with the Registrar of the High Court on 27 November 2017 be and is hereby set aside. </span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.”</span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:72px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The background to this application is that in case no HC 10619/13, the applicant obtained judgment HH 331/15 against the respondent for payment of the sum of US$ 162884.01 being the balance due on mortgage bond No 7323/2011 registered in favour of the applicant over the security of the respondent’s property called Stand 40 Christon Bank held under Deed of Transfer No. 5965/11. Upon the applicant seeking the sale of the respondent’s property in execution to recover the amount on the judgment, the applicant and the respondent executed a deed of settlement dated 17 November, 2017 to amicably resolve the issue of payment in <i>lieu</i> of the sale of the property. A material term of the deed of settlement was that the execution on the judgment would be suspended on the conditions <i>inter-alia</i> that the respondent would make monthly instalment payments of US$ 2852.00 on or before an agreed date. Upon failure to pay any single instalment, then the balance outstanding would become wholly due whereupon the applicant would be at large to execute the judgment against the respondents property.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> The applicant was the former employee of the respondent. The parties were involved in a labour dispute with proceedings relative thereto then pending in the Labour Court under references LC/H/APP/615/17; LC/H/353/16 and LC/H/428/17. The cases featured in the Deed of Settlement aforesaid in para 1. The operative part of that paragraph which also forms the factual basis of this application reads as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“…..That total amount outstanding; due and payable to the 1<sup>st</sup> respondent on the applicant’s loan account No 1003188354 in terms of the judgment in case No HH 331/2015; as of the 1<sup>st</sup> of November, 2017 was the sum of US$ 342 374.79 (three hundred and forty two thousand three hundred and seventy four dollars and seventy nine cents) (the judgment debt). The principle of the matter being to move forward and start servicing the mortgage loan account, applicant accepted the aforesaid balance for the time being allowing time to get the final outcome of the labour matter case Ref Number LC/H/A/APP/615/17; LC/H/353/16; LC/H/428/17 as its outcome will be determinant of the final balance of the mortgage when the labour matter is finalized.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The applicant as noted prays that the whole deed of settlement be voided or set aside. The respondent opposed the relief sought and prayed for the dismissal of the application with costs on the higher scale of legal practitioner and client. The applicant in para 5 of the founding affidavit averred as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“5. The reason for seeking the setting aside of the deed is that the signing was fraudulently procured by the respondent. I will deal with this more in detail later on in this deposition.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Note is made that the applicant was at all material times represented by counsel <i>Edmore Jori</i> who passed on before this application was filed. Mr <i>Jori </i>would therefore not assist the court in determining whether or not there was a fraud committed by the respondent in relation to the deed of settlement. To plug the gap, the applicant averred that its counsel Mr <i>Jori</i> was working with an intern at the offices of the applicant’s legal practitioners. The intern, <i>Yolanda Marumahoko</i>, deposed to a supporting affidavit which will be dealt with later. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The gravamen of the alleged fraudulent acts by the respondent was that the respondent altered the deed of settlement sent to her by the applicant’s legal practitioners by including matters which had not been discussed nor made part of the negotiated terms of the deed of settlement. Crucially  the applicant averred in relation to the nature and extent of the respondents acts of fraud that she unilaterally included the following clause in para 5 in the deed of settlement which clause was not agreed to nor discussed with the applicant:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“…the principle of the matters being to move forward and start servicing the mortagage loan account, applicant accept the aforesaid balance for the time being allowing time to get the final outcome of the labour matters ref case LC/H/APP/615/17; LC/H/38/16; LC/H/428/17 as its outcome will be determinant of the final balance of the mortgage when the labour matter is finalized.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The applicant avers that it never mandated its late legal practitioner Mr <i>Jori</i> to include the above term in the deed of settlement and that the respondent included it on her own without reference to the applicant. The applicant averred that the unsanctioned inclusion of the clause was prejudicial to it because it would have the effect of disabling it from executing on the courts judgment in the event of default by the respondent to pay agreed materials since the balance on which execution could be levied was to be premised or predicated upon the outcomes of the labour matters pending in the labour court.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The applicant averred that its instructions to the late Mr <i>Jori</i> were to finalize a deed of settlement with the respondent on terms set out in the draft deed, annexure “13” to the founding affidavit. The unsigned draft annexure 13 aforesaid, does not contain the disputed excerpt as quoted above. The applicant attached to its founding affidavit a supporting affidavit deposed to by <i>Yolanda Marumahoko</i> (“Yolanda”) which I indicated that I would deal with later. Yolanda averred that she was assigned as an intern to and worked under the direction of the Mr <i>Jori</i>. She stated that the facts of this matter were within her personal knowledge. She was assigned an e-mail address for use by Wintertons legal practitioners the applicants’ legal practitioners who dealt with this matter. Her e-mail address was <span class="MsoHyperlink" style="color:blue"><span style="text-decoration:underline"><i><a href="mailto:ejsec@wintertons.co.zw" style="color:blue; text-decoration:underline">ejsec@wintertons.co.zw</a></i></span></span><i>.</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            <i>Yolanda</i> deposed that she was the one who was assigned by Mr <i>Jori</i> to forward by e-mail to the respondent the draft deed of settlement, annexure 13. She attached a copy of the e-mail message under whose cover annexure 13 was sent to the respondent on 24 November, 2017 at 3:14pm. <i>Yolanda</i> also attached copy of the e-mail sent to the respondent by Mr <i>Jori</i> on November, 29 2017 at 8.58. The e-mail read as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            <span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“Dear Mrs Magodo</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">I have been going through the deed of settlement which you executed and returned to our offices and noticed that you amended the Deed of Settlement by adding the six lines after the amounts stated in paragraph 1. You did not draw the changes to our attention and effectively misled us into believing that you had executed the draft forward to you. We are not agreeable to the changes you made as we have always argued that the labour matters and the foreclosure matters are essentially different. There was therefore no agreement on the amendments you mischievously made. In the circumstances we will not be bound by the Deed. Kindly attend at our offices and sign the original Deed before close of business today failing which we will proceed to execute the writ.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Yolanda</span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> also attached copy of a letter dated 22 January 2018 written by another legal practitioner Mr <i>G Mudzoka</i> alleged who made a follow up on the deed which the applicant alleged to have unlawfully altered. The letter reads as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“Dear Mrs Magodo </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">RE: CABS V PATIENCE MAGODO FRAUDULENT DEED OF SETTLEMENT CASE NO HC 2818/17</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The above matter and the deed of settlement that you executed and returned to our offices sometime in November 2017 refers.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">We noticed that you amended the deed of settlement by introducing some information relating to a labour matter which had nothing to do with the High Court matter to which the deed of settlement related.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Our client is not agreeable to the changes that you made to the deed of settlement. Your liability to our client is not dependent upon whatever matter or causes of action that you have against our client.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">We are instructed to demand that you attend at our offices and sign the correct deed of settlement as well as a notice of the fraudulent deed. You are to attend at our offices demanded herein within four days of service of this letter upon you. If you do not attend to signing of the documents mentioned herein, our client will institute proceedings for the setting aside of the fraudulent deed of settlement. Our client also reserves all its rights against you as you are now in breach of the agreed terms of settlement as contained in the deed originally sent to you.” </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Significantly, <i>Yolanda</i> stated in her supporting affidavit that she forwarded by e-mail the unsigned deed of settlement which the applicant stands by: <i>Yolanda</i> also stated that the respondent made amendments to the deed of settlement which the respondent signed and dropped at the applicant’s offices. <i>Yolanda</i> confirmed that the changes made by the respondent pertained to the inclusion and reference made therein to three labour matter which inclusion was not contained in the deed of settlement which <i>Yolanda</i> sent to the respondent for signing.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent for her part replied the letter written by Mr <i>Madzoka</i> as quotedted. The respondent’s response is dated 25 January 2018. It is I think important to reproduce the respondent’s letter. It reads as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“25 January 2018</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">G Madzoka </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Wintertons </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Dear Sir/ Madam</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><u><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">RE: YOUR ACCUSATION LETTER DATED 22 FEBRUARY REFERS</span></u></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">I write with dismay at the letter received on 24 January wherein you are falsely accusing me of executing a false deed of settlement sometime in November 2017.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> I further bring your attention that I am not voluntarily in breach of the repayment plan as your client has been rejecting RTGS to my CABS account and any attempts to have transfers to my mortgages are being rejected by your client’s as the system is giving back a response – no universal account. Even mobile banking transfers are giving the same response (see attached screen shots)</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The deed of settlement was agreed upon on the principle that CABS is owed by Patience Magodo an amount in respect of funds advanced to buy a property in Christon Bank and since the debt is acknowledged Patience Magodo should service the mortgage account. Your client has however abused their office of having access to my mortgage account and have been posting legal fees for the labour case together with other legal fees as they have three cases they have taken to court. Worse still wrong interest figures are being posted as this statement is not from the system and is being manufactured at the back office. The legal fees are not part of the mortgage hence should be reversed out of the mortgage account. Collins Chikukwa a CABS representative agreed to look into the matter and correct the anomaly so the figure of $227 000 as reflected at the top part of the statement as due is the amount that should be accruing interest for now until the issue of true balances is sorted out. The opening balance on the attached statement is not correct and your client has failed to give me my mortgage statement from inception. Follow ups with Collins have yielded no results as the Head of Operations is refusing to have the anomaly corrected. Talk of abuse of office.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">I am attaching the statement reflecting the numerous charges and entries which you client is refusing to correct so that we deal with a correct and un-adulterated account. The late Mr Jori had tasked Collins to look into the matter and correct the anomaly in the spirit of the deed of settlement.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">As things stand the amount for January 2018 instalment is in my transaction account whilst the December 2017 instalment has been floating between Stanchart and CABS as the latter was giving flimsy excuses so that they would cause me to appear to be in default. Your client has no right to behave the way they have been doing and to save precious time, they should sort their mess and allow people to move on with their lives, I am sure there is no place for corruption in the new Zimbabwe, even abuse of office will not be condoned so your client must be warned. </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Patience Magodo </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">(Attachments, screen shots and the mortgage account statement)”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the letter aforesaid, the respondent did not address the accusation that she unilaterally altered the deed of settlement in the ways set out in the letters from the applicants’ legal practitioners. The letter essentially address the respondent’s concerns which <i>inter alia</i> included rejection of deposits made into her mortgage account, the posting of legal fees for labour cases to the mortgage account and posting of wrong figures. The respondent by not addressing the accusations made against her by the applicant must be taken as having admitted that she made the alterations to the deed of settlement unilaterally. The implied admission in any event was confirmed in the respondent’s opposing affidavit.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent’s position as deposed to by her in the opposing affidavit was to admit that she made the unilateral alterations as detailed by the applicant. She did not deny that she did not bring the alterations to the attention of the applicant’s legal practitioner before or after making them. The respondent therefore signed a differently worded deed of settlement to the one sent to her. The respondent averred that she did not commit any act of fraud because the addition of a new term in the deed of settlement could not amount to fraud since the applicant’s representatives accepted the new terms in that the legal practitioner for the applicant signed the altered deed of settlement. The respondent averred that the preparation of the deed prior to signature by either party was part of negotiations and that there was nothing to stop either party from making additions, subtractions or other changes to the deed of settlement. According to the respondent, the deed of settlement would only come into effect and be binding on the parties upon both parties signing the deed of settlement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent also averred that the applicant was bound by the signature of its agent, who was in this case its legal practitioner and was senior and had repute. The respondent averred that the signature of the agent was affixed to every p</span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">age of the deed of settlement.  The respondent stated that a signature on a written contract binds the signatories thereto.  In para 11.3 of the opposing affidavit, the respondent stated:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“11.3 It is true that a signature on a written contract binds the signatory to the terms of the                </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:85px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">contract.  I am advised that this rule known as the caveat subscriptor which means that a party to a contract is bound by this signature whether or not he has read or understood the terms of the contract.” </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent further averred that she has been making the monthly instalments to the applicant in terms of the deed of the settlement. She attached proof four payments made respectively on 23 November 2017 for ZW$2 852; 29 January 2018 for ZW$2 852; 5 January 2018 for US$1 600 and 9 March 2018 for US$1 300.  The respondent averred that the amendments which she made to the deed of settlement were inconsequential because the respondent was making payments as shown in the deed of settlement. The amendment was according to the respondent not one which should vitiate the whole deed of settlement.  The respondent did not however call for the excision of the added part.  The respondent did not counter claim for an order that the amended deed of settlement be declared to be the binding deed.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The respondent also averred that the fact that the applicant’s legal practitioner blindly signed the agreement or had a change of heart was immaterial because public policy dictated that the courts should not re-write contracts for the parties who have voluntarily covenanted on a contract.  The respondent also averred that the applicant’s legal practitioner was deemed to have full authority to contract on behalf of the applicant.  The applicant was resultantly stopped from resiling from the contract on the basis of the negligence of its legal representative. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The applicant did not file an answering affidavit.  This was understandable because with the respondent having admitted making the unilateral changes to the deed of settlement, the bulk of the respondent averments raised matters of law which would not merit a replication since, as with the founding affidavit, the answering defendant should address facts arising for answer and not law.  It is not proper for a party in application proceedings to plead and argue matters of law.  It does not matter that a party avers that he or she has pleaded law on advice of legal practitioners.  It is wrong practice for a legal practitioner to advise a party to plead and argue or extrapolate the law in application proceedings.  Affidavits in application proceedings are there to outline the evidence of the parties.  Contentions of law are reserved for argument in heads of argument and in oral submissions of the parties.  The applicant in the founding affidavit in para 2 stated:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">2.  I have personal knowledge of the facts deposed to herein, somewhere specifically stated to  the contrary, and I believe the same to be true and correct. Where I make reference to the law, I do so on the advise of the applicant’s legal practitioners.”</span> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The applicant did not however plead the law or make reference to any specific law.  The respondent for her part stated in the opposing affidavit;</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“I am the respondent in this matter, and the facts I depose to herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.  Where I make conclusions of law, I do so on the advise of my legal practitioners of record, which advise I take to be correct and fully embrace without reservations.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            It is not for a party to reach conclusions of law for the court.  It is equally not acceptable that the legal practitioner pronounces upon a conclusion of law in a matter which falls for determination by the court.  It is the duty of the court to assess the facts presented by the parties and to reach a decision on both the facts and the law.  The fact that a party is required to plead facts and where appropriate to attach documents which verify the facts is provided for in rule 58(4) of the High Court rules SI 202/21 as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“(4)  An affidavit filed with a written application:-</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">  (a)  shall be made by the applicant or respondent as the case maybe, or by a person      who  can swear to the facts or averment set out therein; and </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US"> (b)  may be accompanied by documents verifying the facts averments set out in the affidavit and any reference in this past to an affidavit shall be construed as  including such documents.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The old High Court rules 1971 which were in force when the application in <i>casu</i> was filed provided in rule 230 as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“230 Form of Court Application –</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i>            </i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">A court application shall be in form no. 29 and shall be supported by one or more                affidavits setting out the facts upon which the party relies …….”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The applicant and respondent as indeed any other deponent to an affidavit in application proceedings is required to depose the facts which support the cause of action or defence as the case maybe.  The respondents’ affidavit contains averments of both facts and largely law and to that extent is not r 58(4) complaint.  I will however not strike it off but will take this opportunity to warn litigants and legal practitioners that r 58(4) must be strictly followed as it is couched in peremptory terms.  The court will be acting within its jurisdiction if it strikes off an affidavit which does not comply with the requirements of r 58(4).  Many a time parties make long and winding affidavits pregnant with legal arguments and contentions which are not always correct.  It is not acceptable to do so.  Applications tend to be bulky unnecessarily.  They inconvenience the court since the judge must go through the affidavit and pick out the facts from the mixed grill of facts, arguments and contentions.  The non-observance of the provisions of rule 58(4) by parties and legal practitioners must stop.  The time is nigh for the court to penalize errant parties by striking out affidavits which offend r 58(4). Legal practitioners are offside when they draft affidavits which is not in strict compliance with rule 58 (4)</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            Reverting to the issues for determination, it appears to me that the principal issue may be identified upon a consideration of the following common c</span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">ause facts:      </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(a)        Following agreement between the parties to dispose the chamber application, case number HC 2810/17 for suspension of the sale of the respondent property to satisfy the writ of   execution issued in case number HC 331/15 at the instance of the applicant, the applicant’s legal practitioners drafted a deed of settlement which they forwarded by e-mail to the respondent who received it.  The deed was therefore still in draft form and would become binding on the parties upon their signing. </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(b)        The respondent upon receipt of e-mailed draft deed of settlement made alterations which are now common cause.  In particular the respondent included an additional term to the agreement wherein, the calculation are determination of the actual balance due would be subject to the discussions reached in three pending labour cases between her and the     applicant.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(c)        The applicant’ legal practitioners received the altered signed deed of settlement.  The signed it and filed a copy thereof with the Registrar.  The signing of the deed of settlement and its filing meant that case number HC 2810/17 was resolved by deed of settlement whose cancellation is now sought by the applicant. </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(d)        The applicant’s legal practitioners subsequently discovered that they had signed and filed a deed which had been altered.  They stated that they realized after signing and filing that there were additions made to the deed of settlement.  They signed the deed of settlement on 27 November 2017, the same date on which the respondent had signed it.  They initialed </span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">each of the three pages of the deed of settlement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The issue that arises therefore is whether the applicant should be granted the relief of cancellation of the deed of settlement on the basis of a fraud allegedly committed by the respondent in inserting the additional qualification as already detailed.  A fraud in contract law exists if a party commits an act with the intention to deceive another party or his agent to enter into the contract.  Where the deceptive act is proved, the party who has been induced to enter into the contract through the deceptive or misrepresented act or fact may validly terminate or rescind the contract on the basis of the fraudulent misrepresentation.  Christie in his book, Law of Contract in South Africa, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, [<i>Chapter 7</i>] para 313 states:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            <span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“The general effect of a misrepresentation and fraud on a contract can be shortly stated.  A party who has been induced to enter into a contract by misrepresentation of an existing fact      is entitled to rescind the contract provided that the misrepresentation was material, was           intended to induce him to enter into the contradict and did so induce him.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The question arises therefore, whether there was an act of deception or misrepresentation committed by the respondent.  The act must be identified and the aggrieved party must allege and show on the balance of probabilities that he or she entered into or committed to the contract because of being induced to do so by the alleged misrepresentation or fact.  The evidence as revealed by the parties depositions is clear that the applicant </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">was not </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">induced to sign the deed of settlement through the alleged act of the applicant to insert the additional clause.  The applicant’s legal practitioner was not circumspect in signing and initiating the deed of settlement.  He noted after signing that he had signed the amended deed of settlement without noticing the amendment.  On this analysis, the applicant’s legal practitioners signed the deed of settlement in error.  The error was that he assumed that the deed of settlement which he had prepared and sent to the respondent was the same one which he signed.  The legal practitioner signed the deed of settlement blindly.  The applicant’s legal practitioner was not induced by any fraud allegedly committed by the respondent.  At best the applicant’s legal practitioner signed the deed in error or in the mistaken belief that the draft deed was the same one in content with the one that he had prepared and sent to the respondent for signature.  The applicant did not base its cause of action on mistake which is a competent ground for voiding a contract or makes the contract or agreement voidable.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">            In the case of <i>SPF and Anor</i> v <i>EBCCT/ALB and Anor</i> 2016 ZAGPPHC 378, <span style="font-variant:small-caps">leqodi j</span> stated as follows:</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“14.     A party wishing to rely on fraud must not only plead it, but also prove it clearly and distinctly.  The onus is the ordinary civil onus bearing in mind that fraud is not easily inferred.  The essential elements for a claim or defence based on fraud are the following:</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">            (a)        There must be a representation by the other party or by that party’s agent.  In the                              present case K who represented the plaintiffs during the negotiations (3) (<i>Feinstein </i>              v <i>Niggli</i> 1981 (2) SA 684 (A).  Representation may consist of non-disclosure [4]                             My emphasis (<i>Stainer</i> v <i>Palmer – Pilgrim</i> 1982 (4) SA 205 (0)) </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(b)        It must be alleged that the fraud or misrepresentation was false and or international or negligent [5] (<i>Rato Flour Mills (Pty) Ltd</i> v <i>Moriates </i>1957 (3) <i>AII SA</i> 28 (T))</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(c)        It must be alleged and proved that the representation induced the representative or innocent party to act [6] (<i>Bill Harvey Investments Trust (Pty) Ltd</i> v <i>Oranjegezicht</i> <i>Citrus Estate (Pty) Ltd</i> 1958 (2) AII SA 12 (A); 1958 (1) SA 479 (A). </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(d)        If damages are claimed, it must be alleged that the representee suffered damages as a result of the fraud [7] (<i>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</i> v <i>Mplumalanga</i> 2001 (3) AII SA 58 (CK)).” <b><i>Note</i>:  Case names inserted by myself.</b></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The extrapolation of the concept of fraud and its effect on contracts as set out in the above judgement reflects the position in this jurisdiction.  Given the facts which I have set out as proved, the applicant’s cause of action based on fraud has not been proved.  The applicant was not induced to act by any act of fraud on the part of the respondent.  The applicant’s legal practitioner perfunctorily signed the agreement.  He was dilatory in executing his duty.  I do not find it necessary to interrogate the issue of caveat <i>subscriptur </i>because the fraud has not been proved.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            I lastly deal with the issue of costs.  The costs are in the discretion of the court. The applicant’s claim may have been genuine and sounds so when it claims that the signed deed of settlement does not reflect what the applicant had agreed to and given its legal practitioner a mandate to sign for. Clearly, if the legal practitioner did not intimately check the deed of settlement before he signed it, the signing was a mistake or error.  This would be the cause of action, not fraud.  The respondent in such circumstances was called to court to answer a claim which was doomed to predictable dismissal.  The respondent is entitled to her costs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            Resultantly, I determine the application as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            “The application be and is hereby dismissed with costs.”  </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Wintertons</span></span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, applicant’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Sawyer &amp; Mkushi</span></span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, respondent’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-6a0704316a70b283eb5fb76c1a4062c6cb13611e8e07921454cce3f0cb6733dc"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">HH 34-22 </span></span></p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">HC 1677/18</span></span></p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Ref HC 2810/17</span></span></p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Ref HC 10619/13</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CENTRAL AFRICA BUILDING SOCIETY </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">versus</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">PATIENCE MAGODO</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHITAPI J, 22 May, 2019 and 19 January, 2022</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Opposed Court Application</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">G Madzoka</span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, for the applicant </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">T Nzombe</span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, for the respondent </span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHITAPI J:    This is an application for an order setting aside a deed of settlement executed by the applicant and the respondent in Case HC 2810/17. The applicant’s prayer as set out in the draft order reads as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“IT IS ORDERED THAT,</span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> The Deed of Settlement signed between the applicant and the respondent in case No HC 2810/17 and filed with the Registrar of the High Court on 27 November 2017 be and is hereby set aside. </span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.”</span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:72px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The background to this application is that in case no HC 10619/13, the applicant obtained judgment HH 331/15 against the respondent for payment of the sum of US$ 162884.01 being the balance due on mortgage bond No 7323/2011 registered in favour of the applicant over the security of the respondent’s property called Stand 40 Christon Bank held under Deed of Transfer No. 5965/11. Upon the applicant seeking the sale of the respondent’s property in execution to recover the amount on the judgment, the applicant and the respondent executed a deed of settlement dated 17 November, 2017 to amicably resolve the issue of payment in <i>lieu</i> of the sale of the property. A material term of the deed of settlement was that the execution on the judgment would be suspended on the conditions <i>inter-alia</i> that the respondent would make monthly instalment payments of US$ 2852.00 on or before an agreed date. Upon failure to pay any single instalment, then the balance outstanding would become wholly due whereupon the applicant would be at large to execute the judgment against the respondents property.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> The applicant was the former employee of the respondent. The parties were involved in a labour dispute with proceedings relative thereto then pending in the Labour Court under references LC/H/APP/615/17; LC/H/353/16 and LC/H/428/17. The cases featured in the Deed of Settlement aforesaid in para 1. The operative part of that paragraph which also forms the factual basis of this application reads as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“…..That total amount outstanding; due and payable to the 1<sup>st</sup> respondent on the applicant’s loan account No 1003188354 in terms of the judgment in case No HH 331/2015; as of the 1<sup>st</sup> of November, 2017 was the sum of US$ 342 374.79 (three hundred and forty two thousand three hundred and seventy four dollars and seventy nine cents) (the judgment debt). The principle of the matter being to move forward and start servicing the mortgage loan account, applicant accepted the aforesaid balance for the time being allowing time to get the final outcome of the labour matter case Ref Number LC/H/A/APP/615/17; LC/H/353/16; LC/H/428/17 as its outcome will be determinant of the final balance of the mortgage when the labour matter is finalized.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The applicant as noted prays that the whole deed of settlement be voided or set aside. The respondent opposed the relief sought and prayed for the dismissal of the application with costs on the higher scale of legal practitioner and client. The applicant in para 5 of the founding affidavit averred as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“5. The reason for seeking the setting aside of the deed is that the signing was fraudulently procured by the respondent. I will deal with this more in detail later on in this deposition.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Note is made that the applicant was at all material times represented by counsel <i>Edmore Jori</i> who passed on before this application was filed. Mr <i>Jori </i>would therefore not assist the court in determining whether or not there was a fraud committed by the respondent in relation to the deed of settlement. To plug the gap, the applicant averred that its counsel Mr <i>Jori</i> was working with an intern at the offices of the applicant’s legal practitioners. The intern, <i>Yolanda Marumahoko</i>, deposed to a supporting affidavit which will be dealt with later. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The gravamen of the alleged fraudulent acts by the respondent was that the respondent altered the deed of settlement sent to her by the applicant’s legal practitioners by including matters which had not been discussed nor made part of the negotiated terms of the deed of settlement. Crucially  the applicant averred in relation to the nature and extent of the respondents acts of fraud that she unilaterally included the following clause in para 5 in the deed of settlement which clause was not agreed to nor discussed with the applicant:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“…the principle of the matters being to move forward and start servicing the mortagage loan account, applicant accept the aforesaid balance for the time being allowing time to get the final outcome of the labour matters ref case LC/H/APP/615/17; LC/H/38/16; LC/H/428/17 as its outcome will be determinant of the final balance of the mortgage when the labour matter is finalized.”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The applicant avers that it never mandated its late legal practitioner Mr <i>Jori</i> to include the above term in the deed of settlement and that the respondent included it on her own without reference to the applicant. The applicant averred that the unsanctioned inclusion of the clause was prejudicial to it because it would have the effect of disabling it from executing on the courts judgment in the event of default by the respondent to pay agreed materials since the balance on which execution could be levied was to be premised or predicated upon the outcomes of the labour matters pending in the labour court.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The applicant averred that its instructions to the late Mr <i>Jori</i> were to finalize a deed of settlement with the respondent on terms set out in the draft deed, annexure “13” to the founding affidavit. The unsigned draft annexure 13 aforesaid, does not contain the disputed excerpt as quoted above. The applicant attached to its founding affidavit a supporting affidavit deposed to by <i>Yolanda Marumahoko</i> (“Yolanda”) which I indicated that I would deal with later. Yolanda averred that she was assigned as an intern to and worked under the direction of the Mr <i>Jori</i>. She stated that the facts of this matter were within her personal knowledge. She was assigned an e-mail address for use by Wintertons legal practitioners the applicants’ legal practitioners who dealt with this matter. Her e-mail address was <span class="MsoHyperlink" style="color:blue"><span style="text-decoration:underline"><i><a href="mailto:ejsec@wintertons.co.zw" style="color:blue; text-decoration:underline">ejsec@wintertons.co.zw</a></i></span></span><i>.</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            <i>Yolanda</i> deposed that she was the one who was assigned by Mr <i>Jori</i> to forward by e-mail to the respondent the draft deed of settlement, annexure 13. She attached a copy of the e-mail message under whose cover annexure 13 was sent to the respondent on 24 November, 2017 at 3:14pm. <i>Yolanda</i> also attached copy of the e-mail sent to the respondent by Mr <i>Jori</i> on November, 29 2017 at 8.58. The e-mail read as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            <span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“Dear Mrs Magodo</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">I have been going through the deed of settlement which you executed and returned to our offices and noticed that you amended the Deed of Settlement by adding the six lines after the amounts stated in paragraph 1. You did not draw the changes to our attention and effectively misled us into believing that you had executed the draft forward to you. We are not agreeable to the changes you made as we have always argued that the labour matters and the foreclosure matters are essentially different. There was therefore no agreement on the amendments you mischievously made. In the circumstances we will not be bound by the Deed. Kindly attend at our offices and sign the original Deed before close of business today failing which we will proceed to execute the writ.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Yolanda</span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> also attached copy of a letter dated 22 January 2018 written by another legal practitioner Mr <i>G Mudzoka</i> alleged who made a follow up on the deed which the applicant alleged to have unlawfully altered. The letter reads as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“Dear Mrs Magodo </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">RE: CABS V PATIENCE MAGODO FRAUDULENT DEED OF SETTLEMENT CASE NO HC 2818/17</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The above matter and the deed of settlement that you executed and returned to our offices sometime in November 2017 refers.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">We noticed that you amended the deed of settlement by introducing some information relating to a labour matter which had nothing to do with the High Court matter to which the deed of settlement related.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Our client is not agreeable to the changes that you made to the deed of settlement. Your liability to our client is not dependent upon whatever matter or causes of action that you have against our client.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">We are instructed to demand that you attend at our offices and sign the correct deed of settlement as well as a notice of the fraudulent deed. You are to attend at our offices demanded herein within four days of service of this letter upon you. If you do not attend to signing of the documents mentioned herein, our client will institute proceedings for the setting aside of the fraudulent deed of settlement. Our client also reserves all its rights against you as you are now in breach of the agreed terms of settlement as contained in the deed originally sent to you.” </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Significantly, <i>Yolanda</i> stated in her supporting affidavit that she forwarded by e-mail the unsigned deed of settlement which the applicant stands by: <i>Yolanda</i> also stated that the respondent made amendments to the deed of settlement which the respondent signed and dropped at the applicant’s offices. <i>Yolanda</i> confirmed that the changes made by the respondent pertained to the inclusion and reference made therein to three labour matter which inclusion was not contained in the deed of settlement which <i>Yolanda</i> sent to the respondent for signing.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent for her part replied the letter written by Mr <i>Madzoka</i> as quotedted. The respondent’s response is dated 25 January 2018. It is I think important to reproduce the respondent’s letter. It reads as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“25 January 2018</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">G Madzoka </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Wintertons </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Dear Sir/ Madam</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><u><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">RE: YOUR ACCUSATION LETTER DATED 22 FEBRUARY REFERS</span></u></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">I write with dismay at the letter received on 24 January wherein you are falsely accusing me of executing a false deed of settlement sometime in November 2017.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW"> I further bring your attention that I am not voluntarily in breach of the repayment plan as your client has been rejecting RTGS to my CABS account and any attempts to have transfers to my mortgages are being rejected by your client’s as the system is giving back a response – no universal account. Even mobile banking transfers are giving the same response (see attached screen shots)</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">The deed of settlement was agreed upon on the principle that CABS is owed by Patience Magodo an amount in respect of funds advanced to buy a property in Christon Bank and since the debt is acknowledged Patience Magodo should service the mortgage account. Your client has however abused their office of having access to my mortgage account and have been posting legal fees for the labour case together with other legal fees as they have three cases they have taken to court. Worse still wrong interest figures are being posted as this statement is not from the system and is being manufactured at the back office. The legal fees are not part of the mortgage hence should be reversed out of the mortgage account. Collins Chikukwa a CABS representative agreed to look into the matter and correct the anomaly so the figure of $227 000 as reflected at the top part of the statement as due is the amount that should be accruing interest for now until the issue of true balances is sorted out. The opening balance on the attached statement is not correct and your client has failed to give me my mortgage statement from inception. Follow ups with Collins have yielded no results as the Head of Operations is refusing to have the anomaly corrected. Talk of abuse of office.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">I am attaching the statement reflecting the numerous charges and entries which you client is refusing to correct so that we deal with a correct and un-adulterated account. The late Mr Jori had tasked Collins to look into the matter and correct the anomaly in the spirit of the deed of settlement.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">As things stand the amount for January 2018 instalment is in my transaction account whilst the December 2017 instalment has been floating between Stanchart and CABS as the latter was giving flimsy excuses so that they would cause me to appear to be in default. Your client has no right to behave the way they have been doing and to save precious time, they should sort their mess and allow people to move on with their lives, I am sure there is no place for corruption in the new Zimbabwe, even abuse of office will not be condoned so your client must be warned. </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">Patience Magodo </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">(Attachments, screen shots and the mortgage account statement)”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the letter aforesaid, the respondent did not address the accusation that she unilaterally altered the deed of settlement in the ways set out in the letters from the applicants’ legal practitioners. The letter essentially address the respondent’s concerns which <i>inter alia</i> included rejection of deposits made into her mortgage account, the posting of legal fees for labour cases to the mortgage account and posting of wrong figures. The respondent by not addressing the accusations made against her by the applicant must be taken as having admitted that she made the alterations to the deed of settlement unilaterally. The implied admission in any event was confirmed in the respondent’s opposing affidavit.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent’s position as deposed to by her in the opposing affidavit was to admit that she made the unilateral alterations as detailed by the applicant. She did not deny that she did not bring the alterations to the attention of the applicant’s legal practitioner before or after making them. The respondent therefore signed a differently worded deed of settlement to the one sent to her. The respondent averred that she did not commit any act of fraud because the addition of a new term in the deed of settlement could not amount to fraud since the applicant’s representatives accepted the new terms in that the legal practitioner for the applicant signed the altered deed of settlement. The respondent averred that the preparation of the deed prior to signature by either party was part of negotiations and that there was nothing to stop either party from making additions, subtractions or other changes to the deed of settlement. According to the respondent, the deed of settlement would only come into effect and be binding on the parties upon both parties signing the deed of settlement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent also averred that the applicant was bound by the signature of its agent, who was in this case its legal practitioner and was senior and had repute. The respondent averred that the signature of the agent was affixed to every p</span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">age of the deed of settlement.  The respondent stated that a signature on a written contract binds the signatories thereto.  In para 11.3 of the opposing affidavit, the respondent stated:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“11.3 It is true that a signature on a written contract binds the signatory to the terms of the                </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:85px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">contract.  I am advised that this rule known as the caveat subscriptor which means that a party to a contract is bound by this signature whether or not he has read or understood the terms of the contract.” </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent further averred that she has been making the monthly instalments to the applicant in terms of the deed of the settlement. She attached proof four payments made respectively on 23 November 2017 for ZW$2 852; 29 January 2018 for ZW$2 852; 5 January 2018 for US$1 600 and 9 March 2018 for US$1 300.  The respondent averred that the amendments which she made to the deed of settlement were inconsequential because the respondent was making payments as shown in the deed of settlement. The amendment was according to the respondent not one which should vitiate the whole deed of settlement.  The respondent did not however call for the excision of the added part.  The respondent did not counter claim for an order that the amended deed of settlement be declared to be the binding deed.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The respondent also averred that the fact that the applicant’s legal practitioner blindly signed the agreement or had a change of heart was immaterial because public policy dictated that the courts should not re-write contracts for the parties who have voluntarily covenanted on a contract.  The respondent also averred that the applicant’s legal practitioner was deemed to have full authority to contract on behalf of the applicant.  The applicant was resultantly stopped from resiling from the contract on the basis of the negligence of its legal representative. </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The applicant did not file an answering affidavit.  This was understandable because with the respondent having admitted making the unilateral changes to the deed of settlement, the bulk of the respondent averments raised matters of law which would not merit a replication since, as with the founding affidavit, the answering defendant should address facts arising for answer and not law.  It is not proper for a party in application proceedings to plead and argue matters of law.  It does not matter that a party avers that he or she has pleaded law on advice of legal practitioners.  It is wrong practice for a legal practitioner to advise a party to plead and argue or extrapolate the law in application proceedings.  Affidavits in application proceedings are there to outline the evidence of the parties.  Contentions of law are reserved for argument in heads of argument and in oral submissions of the parties.  The applicant in the founding affidavit in para 2 stated:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“</span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">2.  I have personal knowledge of the facts deposed to herein, somewhere specifically stated to  the contrary, and I believe the same to be true and correct. Where I make reference to the law, I do so on the advise of the applicant’s legal practitioners.”</span> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The applicant did not however plead the law or make reference to any specific law.  The respondent for her part stated in the opposing affidavit;</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“I am the respondent in this matter, and the facts I depose to herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.  Where I make conclusions of law, I do so on the advise of my legal practitioners of record, which advise I take to be correct and fully embrace without reservations.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            It is not for a party to reach conclusions of law for the court.  It is equally not acceptable that the legal practitioner pronounces upon a conclusion of law in a matter which falls for determination by the court.  It is the duty of the court to assess the facts presented by the parties and to reach a decision on both the facts and the law.  The fact that a party is required to plead facts and where appropriate to attach documents which verify the facts is provided for in rule 58(4) of the High Court rules SI 202/21 as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“(4)  An affidavit filed with a written application:-</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">  (a)  shall be made by the applicant or respondent as the case maybe, or by a person      who  can swear to the facts or averment set out therein; and </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US"> (b)  may be accompanied by documents verifying the facts averments set out in the affidavit and any reference in this past to an affidavit shall be construed as  including such documents.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The old High Court rules 1971 which were in force when the application in <i>casu</i> was filed provided in rule 230 as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            <span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“230 Form of Court Application –</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-bottom:11px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i>            </i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">A court application shall be in form no. 29 and shall be supported by one or more                affidavits setting out the facts upon which the party relies …….”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The applicant and respondent as indeed any other deponent to an affidavit in application proceedings is required to depose the facts which support the cause of action or defence as the case maybe.  The respondents’ affidavit contains averments of both facts and largely law and to that extent is not r 58(4) complaint.  I will however not strike it off but will take this opportunity to warn litigants and legal practitioners that r 58(4) must be strictly followed as it is couched in peremptory terms.  The court will be acting within its jurisdiction if it strikes off an affidavit which does not comply with the requirements of r 58(4).  Many a time parties make long and winding affidavits pregnant with legal arguments and contentions which are not always correct.  It is not acceptable to do so.  Applications tend to be bulky unnecessarily.  They inconvenience the court since the judge must go through the affidavit and pick out the facts from the mixed grill of facts, arguments and contentions.  The non-observance of the provisions of rule 58(4) by parties and legal practitioners must stop.  The time is nigh for the court to penalize errant parties by striking out affidavits which offend r 58(4). Legal practitioners are offside when they draft affidavits which is not in strict compliance with rule 58 (4)</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            Reverting to the issues for determination, it appears to me that the principal issue may be identified upon a consideration of the following common c</span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">ause facts:      </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(a)        Following agreement between the parties to dispose the chamber application, case number HC 2810/17 for suspension of the sale of the respondent property to satisfy the writ of   execution issued in case number HC 331/15 at the instance of the applicant, the applicant’s legal practitioners drafted a deed of settlement which they forwarded by e-mail to the respondent who received it.  The deed was therefore still in draft form and would become binding on the parties upon their signing. </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(b)        The respondent upon receipt of e-mailed draft deed of settlement made alterations which are now common cause.  In particular the respondent included an additional term to the agreement wherein, the calculation are determination of the actual balance due would be subject to the discussions reached in three pending labour cases between her and the     applicant.</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(c)        The applicant’ legal practitioners received the altered signed deed of settlement.  The signed it and filed a copy thereof with the Registrar.  The signing of the deed of settlement and its filing meant that case number HC 2810/17 was resolved by deed of settlement whose cancellation is now sought by the applicant. </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(d)        The applicant’s legal practitioners subsequently discovered that they had signed and filed a deed which had been altered.  They stated that they realized after signing and filing that there were additions made to the deed of settlement.  They signed the deed of settlement on 27 November 2017, the same date on which the respondent had signed it.  They initialed </span><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">each of the three pages of the deed of settlement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The issue that arises therefore is whether the applicant should be granted the relief of cancellation of the deed of settlement on the basis of a fraud allegedly committed by the respondent in inserting the additional qualification as already detailed.  A fraud in contract law exists if a party commits an act with the intention to deceive another party or his agent to enter into the contract.  Where the deceptive act is proved, the party who has been induced to enter into the contract through the deceptive or misrepresented act or fact may validly terminate or rescind the contract on the basis of the fraudulent misrepresentation.  Christie in his book, Law of Contract in South Africa, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, [<i>Chapter 7</i>] para 313 states:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            <span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-ZW">“The general effect of a misrepresentation and fraud on a contract can be shortly stated.  A party who has been induced to enter into a contract by misrepresentation of an existing fact      is entitled to rescind the contract provided that the misrepresentation was material, was           intended to induce him to enter into the contradict and did so induce him.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The question arises therefore, whether there was an act of deception or misrepresentation committed by the respondent.  The act must be identified and the aggrieved party must allege and show on the balance of probabilities that he or she entered into or committed to the contract because of being induced to do so by the alleged misrepresentation or fact.  The evidence as revealed by the parties depositions is clear that the applicant </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">was not </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">induced to sign the deed of settlement through the alleged act of the applicant to insert the additional clause.  The applicant’s legal practitioner was not circumspect in signing and initiating the deed of settlement.  He noted after signing that he had signed the amended deed of settlement without noticing the amendment.  On this analysis, the applicant’s legal practitioners signed the deed of settlement in error.  The error was that he assumed that the deed of settlement which he had prepared and sent to the respondent was the same one which he signed.  The legal practitioner signed the deed of settlement blindly.  The applicant’s legal practitioner was not induced by any fraud allegedly committed by the respondent.  At best the applicant’s legal practitioner signed the deed in error or in the mistaken belief that the draft deed was the same one in content with the one that he had prepared and sent to the respondent for signature.  The applicant did not base its cause of action on mistake which is a competent ground for voiding a contract or makes the contract or agreement voidable.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">            In the case of <i>SPF and Anor</i> v <i>EBCCT/ALB and Anor</i> 2016 ZAGPPHC 378, <span style="font-variant:small-caps">leqodi j</span> stated as follows:</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">“14.     A party wishing to rely on fraud must not only plead it, but also prove it clearly and distinctly.  The onus is the ordinary civil onus bearing in mind that fraud is not easily inferred.  The essential elements for a claim or defence based on fraud are the following:</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">            (a)        There must be a representation by the other party or by that party’s agent.  In the                              present case K who represented the plaintiffs during the negotiations (3) (<i>Feinstein </i>              v <i>Niggli</i> 1981 (2) SA 684 (A).  Representation may consist of non-disclosure [4]                             My emphasis (<i>Stainer</i> v <i>Palmer – Pilgrim</i> 1982 (4) SA 205 (0)) </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(b)        It must be alleged that the fraud or misrepresentation was false and or international or negligent [5] (<i>Rato Flour Mills (Pty) Ltd</i> v <i>Moriates </i>1957 (3) <i>AII SA</i> 28 (T))</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(c)        It must be alleged and proved that the representation induced the representative or innocent party to act [6] (<i>Bill Harvey Investments Trust (Pty) Ltd</i> v <i>Oranjegezicht</i> <i>Citrus Estate (Pty) Ltd</i> 1958 (2) AII SA 12 (A); 1958 (1) SA 479 (A). </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif" xml:lang="EN-US">(d)        If damages are claimed, it must be alleged that the representee suffered damages as a result of the fraud [7] (<i>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</i> v <i>Mplumalanga</i> 2001 (3) AII SA 58 (CK)).” <b><i>Note</i>:  Case names inserted by myself.</b></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:96px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            The extrapolation of the concept of fraud and its effect on contracts as set out in the above judgement reflects the position in this jurisdiction.  Given the facts which I have set out as proved, the applicant’s cause of action based on fraud has not been proved.  The applicant was not induced to act by any act of fraud on the part of the respondent.  The applicant’s legal practitioner perfunctorily signed the agreement.  He was dilatory in executing his duty.  I do not find it necessary to interrogate the issue of caveat <i>subscriptur </i>because the fraud has not been proved.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            I lastly deal with the issue of costs.  The costs are in the discretion of the court. The applicant’s claim may have been genuine and sounds so when it claims that the signed deed of settlement does not reflect what the applicant had agreed to and given its legal practitioner a mandate to sign for. Clearly, if the legal practitioner did not intimately check the deed of settlement before he signed it, the signing was a mistake or error.  This would be the cause of action, not fraud.  The respondent in such circumstances was called to court to answer a claim which was doomed to predictable dismissal.  The respondent is entitled to her costs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            Resultantly, I determine the application as follows:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            “The application be and is hereby dismissed with costs.”  </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Wintertons</span></span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, applicant’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Sawyer &amp; Mkushi</span></span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, respondent’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">            </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 24 Jan 2022 19:26:42 +0000 Sandra Muengwa 11533 at http://zimlii.org Mangoma v Zimbabwe Educational Scientific and Cultural Workers Union (38 of 2022) [2022] ZWHHC 38 (19 January 2022); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/harare-high-court/2022/38 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Mangoma v Zimbabwe Educational Scientific and Cultural Workers Union (38 of 2022) [2022] ZWHHC 38 (19 January 2022);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1454" hreflang="en">Arbitration awards</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2294" hreflang="x-default">Arbitrator</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1474" hreflang="en">Prescription</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1615" hreflang="en">Costs</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Sandra Muengwa</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 01/24/2022 - 17:25</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwhhc/2022/38/2022-zwhhc-38.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=32948">2022-zwhhc-38.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwhhc/2022/38/2022-zwhhc-38.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=150484">2022-zwhhc-38.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p class="text-align-right"> </p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HH 38-22</span></span></p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HC 2779/21</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">SHAME MANGOMA</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">versus</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ZIMBABWE EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC </span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">AND CULTURAL WORKERS UNION</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DEME J</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HARARE, 23 November, 2021 and 19 January 2022</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><b>Opposed Application</b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Mr<i> S Chako</i>, for the applicant</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Mr<i> M Ndlovu,</i> for the respondent</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DEME J:    The applicant has approached this Court in terms of S 98(14) of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>] for registration of an arbitral award. The draft order for the present application is as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:85px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-27.8pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">.     The arbitral award dated 28 May 2012 by the Arbitrator Ms L. Chibvongodze and quantified by the Arbitrator Mrs L. Sigauke on 1 March 2016 be and is hereby registered as an order of this Honourable Court.</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:85px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-24.8pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">2.     The respondent shall pay the applicant a total sum of $72 000.00 (Seventy-two thousand Dollars) in terms of arbitral award.</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:4px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="tab-stops:2.0cm"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">3.    Here shall be no order as to costs.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The 2012 arbitral award ordered ZESSCWU to reinstate the applicant to his position. In the event of failing to reinstate the applicant, ZESSCWU was given an option for payment of damages to the applicant <i>in lieu</i> of reinstatement. I am avoiding referring to ZESSCWU as the respondent for a simple reason that the respondent is denying that ZESSCWU is its other name.    Parties were not able to reach an agreement in relation to reinstatement and whereupon four years later, they re-engaged the arbitration services for quantification of damages. On 1 March 2016, ZESSCWU was ordered to pay compensatory damages for reinstatement in the sum of $72 000 subject to tax directions.  </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The applicant previously filed an application for registration of the same arbitral award under HC 3701/20. The applicant averred that after some deliberations with the respondent, he chose to withdraw the application and made an undertaking of addressing the issues raised by the respondent. After withdrawing the case under HC 3701/20,   the applicant engaged the respondent with a view of amicably resolving the dispute according to the applicant’s averments incorporated in his founding affidavit. The engagement, according to the applicant’s averments, did not yield any result. </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Against the present application, the respondent raised three points <i>in limine</i> namely:</span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the arbitral award has prescribed in terms of the Prescription Act, [<i>Chapter 8:11</i>].</span></span></span></li> <li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the arbitral award is citing a non-existent entity.</span></span></span></li> <li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the arbitral award cannot be registered without the tax directive.</span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In relation to the issue of prescription, Mr<i> Ndlovu</i>, on behalf of the respondent, submitted that  the arbitral award has prescribed in terms of the Prescription Act [<i>Chapter 8:11</i>]. He further submitted that the arbitral award is a debt and therefore prescribes after three years. He referred me to the case of <i>Nhidza v Unifreight Ltd</i><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></a>, where the court held that the arbitral award is not a civil judgment and hence prescribes after three years as it is a debt. The applicant’s counsel, Mr<i> Chako</i>, submitted that the arbitral award is a civil judgment and hence prescribes after thirty years. He referred me to the case of <i>Elephant College v Chiyangwa and Another</i><a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="" id="_ftnref2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]</span></span></span></span></a>.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the case of <i>Nhidza v Unifreight Ltd</i> (<i>supra</i>), the court held that:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">But apart from these equitable and procedural hurdles, there remains one insurmountable hurdle for the appellant, and that is prescription. A civil judgment in one’s favour is prescribed only after thirty years. (Prescription Act [<i>Chapter 8:11</i>] s 15(a) (ii)). But Nhidza’s right under the determination of the RHO dated 14 June 1991 was not a civil judgment. It was potentially a civil judgment. But until it became a civil judgment it was no more than a right, incapable of enforcement until it was registered in terms of the appropriate version of the Labour Relations Act. As such it qualifies as a “debt” under the very wide definition of that word in the Prescription Act, and becomes prescribed within three years. Prescription would have begun to run as soon as the “debt” was “due” (s 16(1) of the Prescription Act). In this case it would have run from the date of the order in favour of Nhidza. The right therefore became prescribed on 14 June 1994.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is apparent that the labour law that was in force in 1991 when the arbitral award in favour of Nhidza was handed down is significantly different from the labour law that was in existence at the time when the arbitral award was handed down in favour of the Applicant. An appeal against the decision of the labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer was not to be on a question of law alone. Thus, the appeal against the decision of the labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer could be on question of fact or law or on both fact and law. Section 97(1) of the Labour Relations Act, (hereinafter called the Labour Relations Act) provided as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:21.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">Any person who is aggrieved by --</span></span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">the confirmation, variation, substitution or setting aside of a determination by a senior labour relations officer, or</span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">the conduct of the investigation of a dispute or unfair labour practice by a labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer;</span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:28px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">may, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, appeal against such determination or conduct to the Tribunal</span>.”</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On the other hand, the Labour Act, [<i>Chapter</i> 28:01] (hereinafter called the Labour Act)   provides for the noting of the appeal against the arbitrator’s decision on a question of law. Section 98(10) of the Labour Act is as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">An appeal on a question of law shall lie to the Labour Court from any decision of an arbitrator appointed in terms of this section.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Under the Labour Act, the mandate of the arbitrator is to make a finding on questions of facts and law.  The finding of fact by the arbitrator may not be appealed against save in exceptional circumstances. Reference is made to the cases of <i>Misihairambwi and Others v Africare Zimbabw</i>e<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="" id="_ftnref3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]</span></span></span></span></a>, <i>Tirivangani v University of Zimbabwe</i><a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="" id="_ftnref4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]</span></span></span></span></a>, <i>Sable Chemical Industries Ltd v David Peter Easterbrook</i><a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title="" id="_ftnref5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]</span></span></span></span></a>.  The labour relations officers and senior Labour relations officers   were also charged with the responsibility of making a finding on questions of law and fact under the Labour Relations Act.  Any person dissatisfied by the decisions of the labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer would appeal on both questions of law and fact.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Arbitration, unlike the proceedings before the labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer, is more judicial. Arbitral award, unlike the determination by the labour relations officer or the senior labour relations officer, has the characteristics of the judgment of the court. Arbitrators do exercise powers of the Labour Court in hearing disputes. This is established in terms of s 98(9) of the Labour Act. The labour relations officers and senior labour relations officers did not enjoy this privilege. They were not supposed to exercise the powers of the Labour Relations Tribunal in hearing the disputes. These marked distinctions justify the departure from the case of <i>Nhidza v Unifreight Ltd</i> (<i>supra</i>). MANGOTA J., in the case of <i>Elephant College v Chiyangwa</i> (<i>supra</i>) commented as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“The question which begs the answer is whether or not an arbitral award is a debt as defined in s 15 (d) or it is a judgment debt as stipulated in s 15 (a) (ii), of the Act. To answer the above question one has to unpack the meaning and import of what an arbitral award is. An arbitral award, it is trite, is the result of a judicial or quasi-judicial process. The procedure which brings about the result which is referred to as an arbitral award falls substantially into that of the civil court. WIKIPEDIA, The Free Encyclopedia defines an arbitration award as a determination, on the merits, by an arbitration tribunal in an arbitration. It stresses that the arbitration award is analogous to a judgment in a court of law. It states that, in most jurisdictions, the tribunal which pronounces the award has the same power as a court to:</span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-roman"><li style="margin-left:65px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">order a party to do or refrain from doing something; or</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:65px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> order specific performance of a contract; or</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:65px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> order the rectification, or setting aside or cancellation of a deed or other document.</span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:105px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:4px; text-align:justify; text-indent:33.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> The above –stated matters are in tandem with s 98 (9) of the Labour Act. It reads: </span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:4px; text-align:justify; text-indent:33.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:57px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">“In hearing and determining any dispute, an arbitrator shall have the same powers as the Labour Court.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:57px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:57px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">Section 98 (10) of the Labour Act allows a party who is aggrieved by the decision of the arbitrator, on a question of law, to appeal the same to the Labour Court.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:57px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">There are more features which make arbitral award resemble a civil judgment. In addition, In the case of <i>Elephant College v Ch</i>i<i>yangwa </i>(<i>supra</i>), the court further observed as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">“Both statements are filed with the office of the arbitrator who calls the parties to a hearing of the dispute. The hearing, more often than not, resembles the procedure of a civil trial. The arbitrator whom the law recognises in the Labour Act and the Arbitration Act presides over the dispute of the parties. He plays the role of an uninterested umpire. The decision which he makes at the conclusion of the hearing of the parties’ case is the arbitral award. It is a judgment or a ruling and not a debt as is stipulated in s 15 (d) of the Act. What falls under s 15 (d) of the Act is the claimant’s statement of claim. That is, more often than not, a debt which may be sued for or claimed by reason of an obligation which arises from statute, contract, delict or otherwise. The arbitral award is not such. It is, in my view, a judgment. It is so because it is enforceable upon its registration. It is appealable, reviewable, decisive and final. It is for the mentioned reasons that, once it is issued, the court which registers it is not permitted to go into the merits of how it came to be issued in favour of the party who seeks its registration.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            Before the matter is referred to the arbitrator, it qualifies to be treated as a debt defined in terms of the Prescription Act [<i>Chapter</i> <i>8:11</i>]. Once the arbitrator has handed down the arbitral award, it ceases to be the debt specified in the Prescription Act.  The same matter cannot continue assuming the shape of the debt in terms of the prescription Act. It should assume the scope of the civil judgment. It becomes a judgment debt and ceases to be the debt in the ordinary sense.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            I find no merits in the submissions for Mr <i>Ndlovu</i>    with respect to prescription for the reasons highlighted before.   Resultantly, I dismiss the point <i>in limine </i>raised in relation to prescription.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent also raised the issue of citation of the respondent. The arbitral award does bear the name of ZESSCWU. The applicant instituted the present application against   Zimbabwe Educational Scientific Social and Cultural Workers Union, an entity which is different from the one specified in the arbitral award. The Respondent’s counsel, Mr <i>Ndlovu</i>, submitted that ZESSCWU is an unknown entity. He further submitted that there is nowhere in the arbitral award where it is stated that the acronym of ZESSCWU represents the respondent. He also submitted that the applicant cannot seek the correction of the citation before this court since the duty of this court is purely to register the arbitral award and not to amend the citation of parties. Mr <i>Ndlovu</i> also argued that the present application must be dismissed for citing a party which is not in existence. The applicant’s counsel, Mr<i> Chako</i> submitted that the acronym represents the respondent. However, there is nothing which Mr <i>Chako </i>did bring to my attention which proves that the two names refer to the same entity.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is apparent that ZESSCWU and the respondent are two different entities. Although there is a possibility that the acronym may refer to the respondent, without evidence from the arbitral award, it is difficult for this court to verify whether the acronym refers to the respondent.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The correct citation is also beneficial to the tax authorities. The tax authorities will be in a better position to identify the respondent for purposes of enforcing outstanding tax from the arbitral award. If the arbitral award is registered in its state, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority will have challenges in recovering its tax.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the case of <i>Elephant College v Chiyangwa</i> (<i>supra</i>), MANGOTA J. held that the court, during the hearing of the application for registration of the arbitral award, must, among other factors, ensure that the parties mentioned in the application for registration of the arbitral award must be similar to the ones specified in the award. He commented as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“All it requires to satisfy itself of it that:</span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-roman"><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">the arbitral award emanated from a court of competent jurisdiction;</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">the award is extant;</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> it has not been set aside on appeal or review;</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> the parties to the award are the same as are cited in the application which registers the award –.”</span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            In the present case, the parties are different. That must be remedied. .  I am sure that it is not an insurmountable task to have the arbitral award corrected by the arbitrator with respect to the citation of the respondent. Without this, this court may not be able to register the arbitral award that has a different name from the actual and legal name being used by the respondent.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It was emphasized in the case of <i>Elephant College v Chiyangwa</i> (<i>supra</i>) that the court, in the process of registering the arbitral award, is not supposed to direct its efforts on the merits. Determining the merits of the matter is the responsibility of the arbitrator.    Where a party has noted an appeal, the Labour Court or Supreme Court may deal with the merits of the labour matter.   In addition, s 98(14) of the Labour Act which gives powers to this court to register arbitral awards does not empower this court to hear the merits of the award. Thus, this court cannot order the amendment of the citation of parties as doing so would deal with the merits of the arbitral award.  For this reason, I uphold the point <i>in limine.</i></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In relation to the tax direction, the respondent’s counsel argued that the applicant’s attempt to register the arbitral award without complying with the tax laws is illegal. Mr <i>Ndlovu </i>argued that the applicant is supposed to get the tax clearance from the tax authorities. He further argued that the respondent needs to know the amount that is due to the tax authorities. He also submitted that the arbitral award cannot be registered without complying with tax directions. On the basis of non-compliance with tax laws by the applicant, Mr <i>Ndlovu</i> submitted that the present application must be dismissed.  Mr <i>Chako</i>, on behalf of the applicant, argued that the tax directions can still be complied with after registration. He further submitted that the draft order can be amended to reflect that the amount due in terms of the arbitral award must be taxed. Upon being asked by the court, Mr <i>Chako</i> was not able to explain how the applicant will manage to comply with the tax directions after the registration of the arbitral award.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitral award, in its operative clause, reads as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“The respondent, ZESSCWU is be and is hereby ordered to pay Shame Mangoma, within thirty days of receipt of this award, an amount of 72 000 (subject to taxation) that is, 12 months damages  <i>in lieu</i> of reinstatement and backpay for the 6 months period of suspension.”</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">All citizens earning income in Zimbabwe are under the legal obligation to pay income tax in terms of the Income Tax Act [<i>Chapter </i>23:06]. It is difficult to ensure compliance with the tax laws after registration of the arbitral award. The Deputy Sheriff enforcing the arbitral award will need to execute the judgment in favour of the applicant for the amount due to the applicant after tax deductions. The court must ensure that what is due to the tax authorities is calculated and appropriately subtracted from $72 000. In light of this, it is imperative that the Applicant submits the arbitral award to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority for him to verify the amount due to the Authority. The applicant must take appropriate steps to ensure that he furnishes the court with all necessary documentation that proves final amount due to him after tax deductions. In the circumstances, I do uphold the point <i>in limine</i>. </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The defects of application for non-compliance with tax directions and wrong citation of parties are remediable matters. For that reason, it is not appropriate to dismiss the present application. Dismissing the present application is unconstitutional as it will take away the Applicant’s right to be heard by this court after the necessary corrections. The right to be heard, established in terms of Section 69 of the Constitution, is a fundamental cornerstone in the national justice delivery system.  In the circumstances, the appropriate decision is to strike the application from the roll to allow the Applicant to take necessary corrective measures before resetting down the application for hearing. </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In relation to costs, the Applicant had suggested that there be no order as to costs. On the other hand, the respondent prayed for costs on an attorney and client scale. The basis for the Respondent’s claim for punitive costs is that the respondent has been put to unnecessary costs by the present application. The respondent’s counsel further submitted that the Applicant has failed to remedy the defects highlighted in the withdrawn application under case number HC 3701/20. The Applicant remedied some of the issues raised. I am not convinced by the justification of the respondent with respect to costs. Costs are the sole discretion of the court.<b> </b><i>Hebstein and Van Winsen</i><a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title="" id="_ftnref6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]</span></span></span></span></a>, in relation to costs commented as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">The award of costs in a matter is wholly with the discretion of the Court, but this is a judicial discretion and must be exercised on grounds upon which a reasonable person could have come to the conclusion arrived at.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            Punitive costs will deter litigants from accessing the justice system. Therefore, punitive costs can only be ordered in exceptional circumstances.  Costs on an ordinary scale are just and equitable in the circumstances. This will continue to deter the applicant and other potential litigants from prematurely filing applications with this court. Such costs are reasonably sufficient.    </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Consequently, it is ordered that the application be and is hereby struck from the roll with costs.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><i>Mushangwe and Company</i>, applicant’s legal practitioners</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><i>Mutamangira and Associates</i>, respondent’s legal practitioners</span></span></p> <div>  <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></a> SC 27/99.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="" id="_ftn2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]</span></span></span></span></a> HH485/19.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn3"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="" id="_ftn3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]</span></span></span></span></a> SC 22-17.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn4"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="" id="_ftn4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]</span></span></span></span></a> SC21-13.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn5"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title="" id="_ftn5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]</span></span></span></span></a> SC 18-10.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn6"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title="" id="_ftn6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]</span></span></span></span></a> <b><i>Civil Practice of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 5<sup>th</sup>  Ed,  Vol 2 p954</i></b></span></span></p> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-810d5628e4f2eb9ce2818f68b401572c71b99d4be0601a968c0d41860abb2534"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p class="text-align-right"> </p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HH 38-22</span></span></p> <p align="right" class="MsoHeader" style="text-align:right"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HC 2779/21</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">SHAME MANGOMA</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">versus</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">ZIMBABWE EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC </span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">AND CULTURAL WORKERS UNION</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DEME J</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HARARE, 23 November, 2021 and 19 January 2022</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><b>Opposed Application</b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Mr<i> S Chako</i>, for the applicant</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Mr<i> M Ndlovu,</i> for the respondent</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">DEME J:    The applicant has approached this Court in terms of S 98(14) of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>] for registration of an arbitral award. The draft order for the present application is as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:85px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-27.8pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“1<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">.     The arbitral award dated 28 May 2012 by the Arbitrator Ms L. Chibvongodze and quantified by the Arbitrator Mrs L. Sigauke on 1 March 2016 be and is hereby registered as an order of this Honourable Court.</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:85px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-24.8pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">2.     The respondent shall pay the applicant a total sum of $72 000.00 (Seventy-two thousand Dollars) in terms of arbitral award.</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:4px; text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="tab-stops:2.0cm"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">3.    Here shall be no order as to costs.”</span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The 2012 arbitral award ordered ZESSCWU to reinstate the applicant to his position. In the event of failing to reinstate the applicant, ZESSCWU was given an option for payment of damages to the applicant <i>in lieu</i> of reinstatement. I am avoiding referring to ZESSCWU as the respondent for a simple reason that the respondent is denying that ZESSCWU is its other name.    Parties were not able to reach an agreement in relation to reinstatement and whereupon four years later, they re-engaged the arbitration services for quantification of damages. On 1 March 2016, ZESSCWU was ordered to pay compensatory damages for reinstatement in the sum of $72 000 subject to tax directions.  </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The applicant previously filed an application for registration of the same arbitral award under HC 3701/20. The applicant averred that after some deliberations with the respondent, he chose to withdraw the application and made an undertaking of addressing the issues raised by the respondent. After withdrawing the case under HC 3701/20,   the applicant engaged the respondent with a view of amicably resolving the dispute according to the applicant’s averments incorporated in his founding affidavit. The engagement, according to the applicant’s averments, did not yield any result. </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Against the present application, the respondent raised three points <i>in limine</i> namely:</span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the arbitral award has prescribed in terms of the Prescription Act, [<i>Chapter 8:11</i>].</span></span></span></li> <li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the arbitral award is citing a non-existent entity.</span></span></span></li> <li style="text-align:justify; margin-left:8px"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the arbitral award cannot be registered without the tax directive.</span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In relation to the issue of prescription, Mr<i> Ndlovu</i>, on behalf of the respondent, submitted that  the arbitral award has prescribed in terms of the Prescription Act [<i>Chapter 8:11</i>]. He further submitted that the arbitral award is a debt and therefore prescribes after three years. He referred me to the case of <i>Nhidza v Unifreight Ltd</i><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="" id="_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></a>, where the court held that the arbitral award is not a civil judgment and hence prescribes after three years as it is a debt. The applicant’s counsel, Mr<i> Chako</i>, submitted that the arbitral award is a civil judgment and hence prescribes after thirty years. He referred me to the case of <i>Elephant College v Chiyangwa and Another</i><a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="" id="_ftnref2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]</span></span></span></span></a>.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the case of <i>Nhidza v Unifreight Ltd</i> (<i>supra</i>), the court held that:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">But apart from these equitable and procedural hurdles, there remains one insurmountable hurdle for the appellant, and that is prescription. A civil judgment in one’s favour is prescribed only after thirty years. (Prescription Act [<i>Chapter 8:11</i>] s 15(a) (ii)). But Nhidza’s right under the determination of the RHO dated 14 June 1991 was not a civil judgment. It was potentially a civil judgment. But until it became a civil judgment it was no more than a right, incapable of enforcement until it was registered in terms of the appropriate version of the Labour Relations Act. As such it qualifies as a “debt” under the very wide definition of that word in the Prescription Act, and becomes prescribed within three years. Prescription would have begun to run as soon as the “debt” was “due” (s 16(1) of the Prescription Act). In this case it would have run from the date of the order in favour of Nhidza. The right therefore became prescribed on 14 June 1994.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is apparent that the labour law that was in force in 1991 when the arbitral award in favour of Nhidza was handed down is significantly different from the labour law that was in existence at the time when the arbitral award was handed down in favour of the Applicant. An appeal against the decision of the labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer was not to be on a question of law alone. Thus, the appeal against the decision of the labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer could be on question of fact or law or on both fact and law. Section 97(1) of the Labour Relations Act, (hereinafter called the Labour Relations Act) provided as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:21.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">Any person who is aggrieved by --</span></span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha"><li style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">the confirmation, variation, substitution or setting aside of a determination by a senior labour relations officer, or</span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:12px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">the conduct of the investigation of a dispute or unfair labour practice by a labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer;</span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:28px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">may, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, appeal against such determination or conduct to the Tribunal</span>.”</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">On the other hand, the Labour Act, [<i>Chapter</i> 28:01] (hereinafter called the Labour Act)   provides for the noting of the appeal against the arbitrator’s decision on a question of law. Section 98(10) of the Labour Act is as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">An appeal on a question of law shall lie to the Labour Court from any decision of an arbitrator appointed in terms of this section.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Under the Labour Act, the mandate of the arbitrator is to make a finding on questions of facts and law.  The finding of fact by the arbitrator may not be appealed against save in exceptional circumstances. Reference is made to the cases of <i>Misihairambwi and Others v Africare Zimbabw</i>e<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="" id="_ftnref3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]</span></span></span></span></a>, <i>Tirivangani v University of Zimbabwe</i><a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="" id="_ftnref4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]</span></span></span></span></a>, <i>Sable Chemical Industries Ltd v David Peter Easterbrook</i><a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title="" id="_ftnref5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]</span></span></span></span></a>.  The labour relations officers and senior Labour relations officers   were also charged with the responsibility of making a finding on questions of law and fact under the Labour Relations Act.  Any person dissatisfied by the decisions of the labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer would appeal on both questions of law and fact.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Arbitration, unlike the proceedings before the labour relations officer or senior labour relations officer, is more judicial. Arbitral award, unlike the determination by the labour relations officer or the senior labour relations officer, has the characteristics of the judgment of the court. Arbitrators do exercise powers of the Labour Court in hearing disputes. This is established in terms of s 98(9) of the Labour Act. The labour relations officers and senior labour relations officers did not enjoy this privilege. They were not supposed to exercise the powers of the Labour Relations Tribunal in hearing the disputes. These marked distinctions justify the departure from the case of <i>Nhidza v Unifreight Ltd</i> (<i>supra</i>). MANGOTA J., in the case of <i>Elephant College v Chiyangwa</i> (<i>supra</i>) commented as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“The question which begs the answer is whether or not an arbitral award is a debt as defined in s 15 (d) or it is a judgment debt as stipulated in s 15 (a) (ii), of the Act. To answer the above question one has to unpack the meaning and import of what an arbitral award is. An arbitral award, it is trite, is the result of a judicial or quasi-judicial process. The procedure which brings about the result which is referred to as an arbitral award falls substantially into that of the civil court. WIKIPEDIA, The Free Encyclopedia defines an arbitration award as a determination, on the merits, by an arbitration tribunal in an arbitration. It stresses that the arbitration award is analogous to a judgment in a court of law. It states that, in most jurisdictions, the tribunal which pronounces the award has the same power as a court to:</span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-roman"><li style="margin-left:65px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">order a party to do or refrain from doing something; or</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:65px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> order specific performance of a contract; or</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:65px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> order the rectification, or setting aside or cancellation of a deed or other document.</span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:105px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:4px; text-align:justify; text-indent:33.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> The above –stated matters are in tandem with s 98 (9) of the Labour Act. It reads: </span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:4px; text-align:justify; text-indent:33.0pt"> </p> <p style="margin-left:57px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">“In hearing and determining any dispute, an arbitrator shall have the same powers as the Labour Court.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:57px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="margin-left:57px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">Section 98 (10) of the Labour Act allows a party who is aggrieved by the decision of the arbitrator, on a question of law, to appeal the same to the Labour Court.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:57px; text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">There are more features which make arbitral award resemble a civil judgment. In addition, In the case of <i>Elephant College v Ch</i>i<i>yangwa </i>(<i>supra</i>), the court further observed as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">“Both statements are filed with the office of the arbitrator who calls the parties to a hearing of the dispute. The hearing, more often than not, resembles the procedure of a civil trial. The arbitrator whom the law recognises in the Labour Act and the Arbitration Act presides over the dispute of the parties. He plays the role of an uninterested umpire. The decision which he makes at the conclusion of the hearing of the parties’ case is the arbitral award. It is a judgment or a ruling and not a debt as is stipulated in s 15 (d) of the Act. What falls under s 15 (d) of the Act is the claimant’s statement of claim. That is, more often than not, a debt which may be sued for or claimed by reason of an obligation which arises from statute, contract, delict or otherwise. The arbitral award is not such. It is, in my view, a judgment. It is so because it is enforceable upon its registration. It is appealable, reviewable, decisive and final. It is for the mentioned reasons that, once it is issued, the court which registers it is not permitted to go into the merits of how it came to be issued in favour of the party who seeks its registration.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            Before the matter is referred to the arbitrator, it qualifies to be treated as a debt defined in terms of the Prescription Act [<i>Chapter</i> <i>8:11</i>]. Once the arbitrator has handed down the arbitral award, it ceases to be the debt specified in the Prescription Act.  The same matter cannot continue assuming the shape of the debt in terms of the prescription Act. It should assume the scope of the civil judgment. It becomes a judgment debt and ceases to be the debt in the ordinary sense.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            I find no merits in the submissions for Mr <i>Ndlovu</i>    with respect to prescription for the reasons highlighted before.   Resultantly, I dismiss the point <i>in limine </i>raised in relation to prescription.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The respondent also raised the issue of citation of the respondent. The arbitral award does bear the name of ZESSCWU. The applicant instituted the present application against   Zimbabwe Educational Scientific Social and Cultural Workers Union, an entity which is different from the one specified in the arbitral award. The Respondent’s counsel, Mr <i>Ndlovu</i>, submitted that ZESSCWU is an unknown entity. He further submitted that there is nowhere in the arbitral award where it is stated that the acronym of ZESSCWU represents the respondent. He also submitted that the applicant cannot seek the correction of the citation before this court since the duty of this court is purely to register the arbitral award and not to amend the citation of parties. Mr <i>Ndlovu</i> also argued that the present application must be dismissed for citing a party which is not in existence. The applicant’s counsel, Mr<i> Chako</i> submitted that the acronym represents the respondent. However, there is nothing which Mr <i>Chako </i>did bring to my attention which proves that the two names refer to the same entity.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It is apparent that ZESSCWU and the respondent are two different entities. Although there is a possibility that the acronym may refer to the respondent, without evidence from the arbitral award, it is difficult for this court to verify whether the acronym refers to the respondent.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The correct citation is also beneficial to the tax authorities. The tax authorities will be in a better position to identify the respondent for purposes of enforcing outstanding tax from the arbitral award. If the arbitral award is registered in its state, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority will have challenges in recovering its tax.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the case of <i>Elephant College v Chiyangwa</i> (<i>supra</i>), MANGOTA J. held that the court, during the hearing of the application for registration of the arbitral award, must, among other factors, ensure that the parties mentioned in the application for registration of the arbitral award must be similar to the ones specified in the award. He commented as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“All it requires to satisfy itself of it that:</span></span></p> <ol style="list-style-type:lower-roman"><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">the arbitral award emanated from a court of competent jurisdiction;</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">the award is extant;</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> it has not been set aside on appeal or review;</span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"> the parties to the award are the same as are cited in the application which registers the award –.”</span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            In the present case, the parties are different. That must be remedied. .  I am sure that it is not an insurmountable task to have the arbitral award corrected by the arbitrator with respect to the citation of the respondent. Without this, this court may not be able to register the arbitral award that has a different name from the actual and legal name being used by the respondent.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">It was emphasized in the case of <i>Elephant College v Chiyangwa</i> (<i>supra</i>) that the court, in the process of registering the arbitral award, is not supposed to direct its efforts on the merits. Determining the merits of the matter is the responsibility of the arbitrator.    Where a party has noted an appeal, the Labour Court or Supreme Court may deal with the merits of the labour matter.   In addition, s 98(14) of the Labour Act which gives powers to this court to register arbitral awards does not empower this court to hear the merits of the award. Thus, this court cannot order the amendment of the citation of parties as doing so would deal with the merits of the arbitral award.  For this reason, I uphold the point <i>in limine.</i></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In relation to the tax direction, the respondent’s counsel argued that the applicant’s attempt to register the arbitral award without complying with the tax laws is illegal. Mr <i>Ndlovu </i>argued that the applicant is supposed to get the tax clearance from the tax authorities. He further argued that the respondent needs to know the amount that is due to the tax authorities. He also submitted that the arbitral award cannot be registered without complying with tax directions. On the basis of non-compliance with tax laws by the applicant, Mr <i>Ndlovu</i> submitted that the present application must be dismissed.  Mr <i>Chako</i>, on behalf of the applicant, argued that the tax directions can still be complied with after registration. He further submitted that the draft order can be amended to reflect that the amount due in terms of the arbitral award must be taxed. Upon being asked by the court, Mr <i>Chako</i> was not able to explain how the applicant will manage to comply with the tax directions after the registration of the arbitral award.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The arbitral award, in its operative clause, reads as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“The respondent, ZESSCWU is be and is hereby ordered to pay Shame Mangoma, within thirty days of receipt of this award, an amount of 72 000 (subject to taxation) that is, 12 months damages  <i>in lieu</i> of reinstatement and backpay for the 6 months period of suspension.”</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">All citizens earning income in Zimbabwe are under the legal obligation to pay income tax in terms of the Income Tax Act [<i>Chapter </i>23:06]. It is difficult to ensure compliance with the tax laws after registration of the arbitral award. The Deputy Sheriff enforcing the arbitral award will need to execute the judgment in favour of the applicant for the amount due to the applicant after tax deductions. The court must ensure that what is due to the tax authorities is calculated and appropriately subtracted from $72 000. In light of this, it is imperative that the Applicant submits the arbitral award to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority for him to verify the amount due to the Authority. The applicant must take appropriate steps to ensure that he furnishes the court with all necessary documentation that proves final amount due to him after tax deductions. In the circumstances, I do uphold the point <i>in limine</i>. </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The defects of application for non-compliance with tax directions and wrong citation of parties are remediable matters. For that reason, it is not appropriate to dismiss the present application. Dismissing the present application is unconstitutional as it will take away the Applicant’s right to be heard by this court after the necessary corrections. The right to be heard, established in terms of Section 69 of the Constitution, is a fundamental cornerstone in the national justice delivery system.  In the circumstances, the appropriate decision is to strike the application from the roll to allow the Applicant to take necessary corrective measures before resetting down the application for hearing. </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In relation to costs, the Applicant had suggested that there be no order as to costs. On the other hand, the respondent prayed for costs on an attorney and client scale. The basis for the Respondent’s claim for punitive costs is that the respondent has been put to unnecessary costs by the present application. The respondent’s counsel further submitted that the Applicant has failed to remedy the defects highlighted in the withdrawn application under case number HC 3701/20. The Applicant remedied some of the issues raised. I am not convinced by the justification of the respondent with respect to costs. Costs are the sole discretion of the court.<b> </b><i>Hebstein and Van Winsen</i><a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title="" id="_ftnref6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]</span></span></span></span></a>, in relation to costs commented as follows:</span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US">The award of costs in a matter is wholly with the discretion of the Court, but this is a judicial discretion and must be exercised on grounds upon which a reasonable person could have come to the conclusion arrived at.”</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">            Punitive costs will deter litigants from accessing the justice system. Therefore, punitive costs can only be ordered in exceptional circumstances.  Costs on an ordinary scale are just and equitable in the circumstances. This will continue to deter the applicant and other potential litigants from prematurely filing applications with this court. Such costs are reasonably sufficient.    </span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Consequently, it is ordered that the application be and is hereby struck from the roll with costs.</span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><i>Mushangwe and Company</i>, applicant’s legal practitioners</span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><i>Mutamangira and Associates</i>, respondent’s legal practitioners</span></span></p> <div>  <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="" id="_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[1]</span></span></span></span></a> SC 27/99.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn2"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title="" id="_ftn2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[2]</span></span></span></span></a> HH485/19.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn3"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title="" id="_ftn3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[3]</span></span></span></span></a> SC 22-17.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn4"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title="" id="_ftn4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[4]</span></span></span></span></a> SC21-13.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn5"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title="" id="_ftn5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[5]</span></span></span></span></a> SC 18-10.</span></span></p> </div> <div id="ftn6"> <p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif"><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title="" id="_ftn6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:10.0pt" xml:lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">[6]</span></span></span></span></a> <b><i>Civil Practice of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 5<sup>th</sup>  Ed,  Vol 2 p954</i></b></span></span></p> </div> </div></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 24 Jan 2022 17:25:41 +0000 Sandra Muengwa 11530 at http://zimlii.org Mutsengi v Rural Electrification Agency (13 of 2021) [2021] ZWMSVHC 13 (22 February 2021); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/masvingo-high-court/2021/13 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Mutsengi v Rural Electrification Agency (13 of 2021) [2021] ZWMSVHC 13 (22 February 2021);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1604" hreflang="en">Res Judicata</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1885" hreflang="en">Jurisdiction</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1981" hreflang="en">Termination of Employment</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Sandra Muengwa</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Thu, 09/16/2021 - 07:18</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwmsvhc/2021/13/2021-zwmsvhc-13.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=19655">2021-zwmsvhc-13.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwmsvhc/2021/13/2021-zwmsvhc-13.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=418250">2021-zwmsvhc-13.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p class="text-align-right">HMA 13-21</p> <p class="text-align-right">HC 551-18</p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">TADIOS MUTSENGI</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">versus</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AGENCY</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WAMAMBO J</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MASVINGO, 4 October 2020 and 22 February, 2021</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="tab-stops:193.95pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">                                                                 </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Opposed Application</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Applicant </span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">in person</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">T. Pasirayi </span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">for respondent</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WAMAMBO J:          This is an opposed application wherein applicant seeks the following relief:- </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<i>IT IS HEREBY ORDERED</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That applicant was on a contract without limit of time.</span></span></span></i></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the variation of the applicant’s contract of employment is null and void</span></span></span></i></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the fixed term contract be taken to never have existed and that the respondent reinstates the applicant to his employment as if the purported termination of contract never happened.</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:72px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="4"><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That there be no order of costs if application is not opposed.”</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-bottom:13px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Applicant appeared in person. To a certain extent this explains the in elegant expression reflected in the draft order and the manner in which the founding affidavit is written both in form and in content. In the founding affidavit applicant states the following:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">He was employed by respondent in the position of Stores Clerk since January 2010 up to 9 March 2011. The contract of employment was however not reduced to writing. Applicant through an appointment letter dated 9 March 2020 obtained a fixed term contract to run for two years.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">After a year however on 30 April, 2012 the fixed term contract was terminated by respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I say the founding affidavit is not properly formulated for it is a mixture of fact and law.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Sections of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>] and the Constitution in particular are cited in the body of the founding affidavit. The version sought to be relied on by applicant is neither consistent nor chronological because of the reliance on provisions of the Labour Act and the Constitution mixed with the facts he alleges took place.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">After painstaking efforts to glean the facts and the relief sought I can do no better than to say applicant seeks the relief as more fully expressed at the start of this judgment.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the opposing affidavit respondent as represented by the Acting Chief Executive Officer states as follows:-</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This matter is purely a labour matter. Applicant was employed as a Stores Clerk on a fixed term non-renewable two year contract effective from 1 May 2010 to 30 April 2012. The contract was not renewed.  A dispute then arose as applicant alleged that he had a legitimate expectation that his fixed term of employment would be renewed. Respondent disputed this resulting in the matter being determined in respondent’s favour by the Labour Court under LC/MS/14/17 handed down on 10 March, 2017.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Effectively respondent raised that this court has no jurisdiction as the issues raised were dealt with on the merits in LC/MS/14/17. Applicant in thus raising the special plea of <i>res judicata</i>. Applicant is coming through the back door instead of appealing against the Labour Court judgment as provided for in section 43(1) of the Labour Court Rules, 2017.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The first port of call is the judgment of the Labour Court LC/MS/14/17 which forms the basis why respondent claims that this matter is already <i>res judicata</i>.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The special plea of <i>res judicata</i> was raised by respondent as early in the opposing affidavit and developed in the heads of argument and in oral argument.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In Labour case LC/MS/14/17 the appellants in that case are reflected as W. Taudzai and Another. Respondent contends that the other appellant is the applicant in this case. Applicant in their papers and in oral argument did not dispute this point. I take it therefore that applicant was the other appellant in LC/MS/14/17.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In LC/MS/14/17 the matter came up on appeal from the decision of an arbitrator. There were two grounds of appeal expressed by the Honourable Labour Court KACHAMBWA J. as follows:-</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<i>There are two grounds of appeal. The first ground of appeal is that the arbitrator grossly misdirected himself on the facts by finding that there were no ground for legitimate expectation of renewal of contract.</i></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The second ground is that the finding that the appellants were fairly dismissed was a gross misdirection and error on the facts and so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who has applied his mind (to the facts) would have arrived at it.”</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The Labour Court at the end of the day dismissed the appeal. The prerequisites of <i>res</i> <i>judicata</i> have been explored in many a case.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHIWESHE J.P. in <i>ZAMBEZI Power (Private) Ltd (in liquidation)</i> vs <i>Zimbabwe Revenue</i> <i>Authority &amp; 2 Others</i> HH 670/17 at page 3 summarised the requirements of the special plea of <i>res</i> <i>judicata </i>as follows:- </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<i>the requirements for it to be upheld have been laid down in a number of cases. Suffice it to say for that plea to succeed, it must be shown that the action in which judgment was given was between the same parties, with respect to the same subject matter and based on the same ground or complaint as the action under consideration. See Banda and Ors v ZISCO 1990 (1) ZLR 340 (S</i>)”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">To apply the principles as enunciated above, the following becomes clear.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Applicant and respondent were both parties in LC/MS/14/17. The same subject matter namely the contract of employment as it related to its termination, were under examination in both matters.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">One has to note that the second ground of appeal in LC/MS/14/17 attacked the finding that appellants in that matter were fairly dismissed.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In this case applicant seeks to reverse this finding. The ultimate request in this case as per the draft order is for reinstatement of applicant and a declaratory that the termination never took place.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Effectively I am attracted to respondent’s argument that instead of applicant following the correct appeal procedure on LC/MS/14/17 he chose to approach this court through the back door.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I am, satisfied that in the circumstances the judgment in LC/MS/14/17 was on the subject matter based on the same ground as the matter before me. Notably although raised as a second ground of appeal the said ground </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">was not developed according to the findings of the Labour Court.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the circumstances although other points <i>in limine</i> have been raised, I will not deal with them as I find that the special plea of <i>res judicata</i> holds water.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I order as follows:-</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the special plea of res judicata is upheld</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the applicant’s claim is dismissed with costs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Gill, Godlonton &amp; Gerrans</span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, respondent’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-be84512ab6ade61a06dd74494f90a4c59944383794400c4d67d4fa64623d11d4"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p class="text-align-right">HMA 13-21</p> <p class="text-align-right">HC 551-18</p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">TADIOS MUTSENGI</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">versus</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AGENCY</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WAMAMBO J</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">MASVINGO, 4 October 2020 and 22 February, 2021</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="tab-stops:193.95pt"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">                                                                 </span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><b><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Opposed Application</span></span></span></b></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Applicant </span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">in person</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">T. Pasirayi </span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">for respondent</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">WAMAMBO J:          This is an opposed application wherein applicant seeks the following relief:- </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<i>IT IS HEREBY ORDERED</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That applicant was on a contract without limit of time.</span></span></span></i></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the variation of the applicant’s contract of employment is null and void</span></span></span></i></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the fixed term contract be taken to never have existed and that the respondent reinstates the applicant to his employment as if the purported termination of contract never happened.</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-left:72px; text-align:justify"> </p> <ol start="4"><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That there be no order of costs if application is not opposed.”</span></span></i></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="margin-bottom:13px; margin-left:48px"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Applicant appeared in person. To a certain extent this explains the in elegant expression reflected in the draft order and the manner in which the founding affidavit is written both in form and in content. In the founding affidavit applicant states the following:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">He was employed by respondent in the position of Stores Clerk since January 2010 up to 9 March 2011. The contract of employment was however not reduced to writing. Applicant through an appointment letter dated 9 March 2020 obtained a fixed term contract to run for two years.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">After a year however on 30 April, 2012 the fixed term contract was terminated by respondent.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I say the founding affidavit is not properly formulated for it is a mixture of fact and law.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Sections of the Labour Act [<i>Chapter 28:01</i>] and the Constitution in particular are cited in the body of the founding affidavit. The version sought to be relied on by applicant is neither consistent nor chronological because of the reliance on provisions of the Labour Act and the Constitution mixed with the facts he alleges took place.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">After painstaking efforts to glean the facts and the relief sought I can do no better than to say applicant seeks the relief as more fully expressed at the start of this judgment.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the opposing affidavit respondent as represented by the Acting Chief Executive Officer states as follows:-</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">This matter is purely a labour matter. Applicant was employed as a Stores Clerk on a fixed term non-renewable two year contract effective from 1 May 2010 to 30 April 2012. The contract was not renewed.  A dispute then arose as applicant alleged that he had a legitimate expectation that his fixed term of employment would be renewed. Respondent disputed this resulting in the matter being determined in respondent’s favour by the Labour Court under LC/MS/14/17 handed down on 10 March, 2017.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Effectively respondent raised that this court has no jurisdiction as the issues raised were dealt with on the merits in LC/MS/14/17. Applicant in thus raising the special plea of <i>res judicata</i>. Applicant is coming through the back door instead of appealing against the Labour Court judgment as provided for in section 43(1) of the Labour Court Rules, 2017.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The first port of call is the judgment of the Labour Court LC/MS/14/17 which forms the basis why respondent claims that this matter is already <i>res judicata</i>.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The special plea of <i>res judicata</i> was raised by respondent as early in the opposing affidavit and developed in the heads of argument and in oral argument.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In Labour case LC/MS/14/17 the appellants in that case are reflected as W. Taudzai and Another. Respondent contends that the other appellant is the applicant in this case. Applicant in their papers and in oral argument did not dispute this point. I take it therefore that applicant was the other appellant in LC/MS/14/17.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In LC/MS/14/17 the matter came up on appeal from the decision of an arbitrator. There were two grounds of appeal expressed by the Honourable Labour Court KACHAMBWA J. as follows:-</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<i>There are two grounds of appeal. The first ground of appeal is that the arbitrator grossly misdirected himself on the facts by finding that there were no ground for legitimate expectation of renewal of contract.</i></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The second ground is that the finding that the appellants were fairly dismissed was a gross misdirection and error on the facts and so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who has applied his mind (to the facts) would have arrived at it.”</span></span></i></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">The Labour Court at the end of the day dismissed the appeal. The prerequisites of <i>res</i> <i>judicata</i> have been explored in many a case.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">CHIWESHE J.P. in <i>ZAMBEZI Power (Private) Ltd (in liquidation)</i> vs <i>Zimbabwe Revenue</i> <i>Authority &amp; 2 Others</i> HH 670/17 at page 3 summarised the requirements of the special plea of <i>res</i> <i>judicata </i>as follows:- </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="margin-left:48px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:normal"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">“<i>the requirements for it to be upheld have been laid down in a number of cases. Suffice it to say for that plea to succeed, it must be shown that the action in which judgment was given was between the same parties, with respect to the same subject matter and based on the same ground or complaint as the action under consideration. See Banda and Ors v ZISCO 1990 (1) ZLR 340 (S</i>)”</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">To apply the principles as enunciated above, the following becomes clear.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Applicant and respondent were both parties in LC/MS/14/17. The same subject matter namely the contract of employment as it related to its termination, were under examination in both matters.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">One has to note that the second ground of appeal in LC/MS/14/17 attacked the finding that appellants in that matter were fairly dismissed.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In this case applicant seeks to reverse this finding. The ultimate request in this case as per the draft order is for reinstatement of applicant and a declaratory that the termination never took place.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Effectively I am attracted to respondent’s argument that instead of applicant following the correct appeal procedure on LC/MS/14/17 he chose to approach this court through the back door.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I am, satisfied that in the circumstances the judgment in LC/MS/14/17 was on the subject matter based on the same ground as the matter before me. Notably although raised as a second ground of appeal the said ground </span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">was not developed according to the findings of the Labour Court.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">In the circumstances although other points <i>in limine</i> have been raised, I will not deal with them as I find that the special plea of <i>res judicata</i> holds water.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <p style="text-align:justify; text-indent:36.0pt"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">I order as follows:-</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> <ol><li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the special plea of res judicata is upheld</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> <li style="margin-left:32px; text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">That the applicant’s claim is dismissed with costs.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li> </ol><p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"> </p> <p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size:11pt"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">Gill, Godlonton &amp; Gerrans</span></span></span></i><span lang="EN-ZW" style="font-size:12.0pt" xml:lang="EN-ZW"><span style="line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,serif">, respondent’s legal practitioners</span></span></span></span></span></span></p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Thu, 16 Sep 2021 07:18:05 +0000 Sandra Muengwa 11185 at http://zimlii.org Mafunda v ZERA (SC 9 of 2016, Civil Appeal SC 134 of 2015) [2016] ZWSC 9 (04 March 2016); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2016/9 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Mafunda v ZERA (SC 9 of 2016, Civil Appeal SC 134 of 2015) [2016] ZWSC 9 (04 March 2016);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2325" hreflang="x-default">Conditions of employment</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2390" hreflang="x-default">Remuneration</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 09/06/2021 - 13:39</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2016/9/2016-zwsc-9.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=41143">2016-zwsc-9.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2016/9/2016-zwsc-9.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=414968">2016-zwsc-9.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p>                                             </p> <p><strong>DISTRIBUTABLE</strong>  <strong>(6)</strong></p> <p>                                                  </p> <p><strong>PETER     MAFUNDA</strong></p> <p><strong>vs</strong></p> <p><strong>ZIMBABWE     ENERGY     REGULATORY     AUTHORITY</strong></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>HLATSHWAYO JA, MAVANGIRA JA &amp; UCHENA JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, OCTOBER 26, 2015 &amp; MARCH 4, 2016</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><em>S. Hashiti</em>, for the Appellant</p> <p><em>E. Matinenga</em>, for the Respondent.</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>UCHENA JA:</strong>           The appellant Peter Mufunda is a Legal Advisor in the Ministry of Energy and Power Development. The respondent Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority is a statutory successor of the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission.</p> <p> </p> <p>The common cause facts on which the dispute between the parties arose are as follows. The appellant, an employee of the Ministry of Energy and Power Development was, on 20 October 2009, by appointment assigned to perform duties for the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission     (ZERC), whose functions were taken over by The Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA).  The appellant played a role in the establishment of ZERA. According to the assigning memorandum he was to play the leading role. ZERA appreciated his role to the extent that when the Ministry sought to withdraw his services to it by memorandum dated 17 November 2011, it asked the Ministry to allow him to continue in that role till it appointed its own Chief Executive officer. The Ministry agreed and extended his assignment to 28 February 2012.</p> <p>After assuming duty at (ZERC) and thereafter (ZERA) the appellant continued to perform his normal duties as Legal Advisor for the Ministry. He did not sign a contract of employment with either ZERC or ZERA, but was paid an allowance of US$500.00 per month after he protested against none payment after serving ZERC for some time. He had demanded that he be paid a salary but the Secretary of the Ministry of Energy after initially telling him rather brutally and uncharitably, to “learn to work for nothing” authorised him to arrange with the respondent that he be paid the US$500.00 per month allowance which the Minister had authorised. The appellant accepted the payments on a without prejudice basis. The parties failed to reach an agreement leading to the appellant referring the dispute over salary and benefits to the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. On 2 September 2013 a certificate of no settlement was issued and the dispute was referred to arbitration. The Arbitrator found that the parties had entered into a valid contractual relationship. He ordered the parties to quantify the award failing which they could revert back to him for quantification.</p> <p> </p> <p>The respondent noted an appeal to the Labour Court which found in its favour leading to the appellant noting this appeal.</p> <p> </p> <p>In his two grounds of appeal the appellant alleged the following against the decision of the Labour Court:</p> <ol><li>The court <em>a quo</em> erred and misdirected itself in finding that there was no contractual relationship between the appellant and respondent contrary to the dictates of s 14 of the Public Service Regulations SI 1/2000 as read with ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act (Chapter 28;01).</li> <li>The court further erred and misdirected itself in holding that there was no legal basis for the award of arrear salaries and benefits due to appellant from respondent.<br />   </li> </ol><p>In finding for the respondent the Labour Court on pages 54 to 55 of the record said:</p> <p>“The Oxford Dictionary defines secondment as a temporary transfer. In other words an employee on secondment remains the employee of the original employer (seconder) during the period of secondment. The Industrial Court of Malaysia in the case of Bank Simpanan Nasional Finance Bhd &amp; anor v Omar Hashim (2002) 1 ILR 272 (Award NO. 1013 of 2005) explained the meaning of the term “secondment” as follows:</p> <p>“The ordinary dictionary meaning of secondment as a temporary transfer has on the face of it the connotation that the employee is subject to recall by his employer. So he is not a permanent employee of the other.”</p> <p>The same court in Come Services Asia Pacific Region, Miri v Grame Ashley Power (1987) 2 ILR 34 reinforced the idea of a temporary transfer stating:</p> <p>“<strong>Therefore so long as the contract is not terminated, a new contract is not made and the employee continues to be in the employment of the original employer. Even if the employer orders the employee to do certain work for another person, the employee still continues to be in his employment.</strong> The only thing that happens in such cases is that the employee carries out the orders of the master hence he has the right to claim his wages from the employer and not from the third party to whom his services are lent or hired. It may be that such third party may pay his wages during the period he had hired his services, but that is because of his agreement with his real employer. However, that does not have the effect of transferring the service of the employee to the other employer. The hirer may exercise control and direction in the doing of the thing for which he has hired the employee; or even the manner in which it is to be done. But if the employee fails to carry out his direction he cannot dismiss him and can only complain to the actual employer. The right of dismissal is vested in the employer.</p> <p> </p> <p>I am persuaded that the above quotation aptly describes the Respondent’s position. <strong>In my view the Respondent’s secondment was informal as no fully detailed secondment agreement was put in place as envisaged by s 14 (2) of S.I 1/2000. Consequently the respondent continued to receive his remuneration as a member of the Public Service.</strong> <strong>If the appellant was to pay for respondent’s services, in my view, a detailed agreement would have been put in place.</strong> In the case of <em>Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited v Lazarus Muyambi</em> SC 22/2002 the terms and conditions of the secondment were set out in a contract of assignment entered into by the appellant and the respondent. Such a contract is missing <em>in casu</em>. <strong>I am not persuaded that bit can be implied from the circumstances of this case.” </strong>(emphasis added)</p> <p>The court <em>a quo</em> therefore found that (a) the appellant was not released by his employer, (b) he did not enter into any contract of employment with ZERC nor ZERA, (c) the contract of secondment cannot be inferred from the conduct of the parties and the provisions of ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act.</p> <p> </p> <p>The issue for determination by this court is whether or not the court <em>a quo</em> correctly summarised the law and applied it to the facts of this case. Mr <em>Hashiti</em> for the appellant submitted that there was a contract of employment between the appellant and respondent. He submitted that the provisions of s 14 of the Public Service Regulations S.I 1/2000 as read with s 12 of the Labour Act [<em>Chapter 28;01</em>], and the conduct of the parties confirms that there was an agreement.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mr <em>Matinenga</em> for the respondent submitted that there is no valid appeal before the court as there is no appeal on a point of Law. He further submitted that if the appeal is valid there was no contract of employment between the appellant and the respondent.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mr <em>Matinenga</em>’s submission that there is no appeal on a point of Law has no merit. The appeal is against the court <em>a quo</em>’s interpretation of s 14 of the Public Service Regulations SI 1/2000 and ss 2 and 12 (2) of the Labour Act. The appellant’s first ground of appeal refers to the court <em>a quo</em>’s failure to properly interpret the dictates of s 14 of the Public Service Regulations as read with ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act. That clearly raises a point of law.</p> <p> </p> <p>Section 14(1) and (2) of the Public Service Regulations S.I. 1/2000, provides for the secondment of civil servants as follows;   </p> <p>“(1) A member may at any time with his consent and at the invitation of the Head of the Ministry or Commission, be seconded by the Commission for a period not exceeding three years to a post in an approved service.</p> <p>     (2)The terms and conditions of service of a member while on secondment shall, subject to any policy directive issued by the Commission, be governed by contract between the member and the approved service concerned.”</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>Section 14(1) and (2) of the Public Service Regulations requires an employee who is seconded to enter into two contracts. The first contract is with his employer who will offer to second him to an approved service provider, which offer he can accept by giving his consent to the secondment. The secondment to be agreed upon should be “to a post in an approved service”.  The second contract is for the employee’s conditions of service which the employee enters into with the approved service provider to which his employer will have released him for secondment.</p> <p> </p> <p>If the agreement between the seconding employer and the employee to be seconded is for the employee to be released and seconded to a post in the approved service provider, then that institution and the employee must enter into an agreement which will govern the seconded employee’s conditions of service. The need for the second agreement depends on the agreement between the seconding employer and his employee. If for example the seconding employer wants his employee to continue working for it but also wants the employee to render services to a specified institution at its expense there will be no need for an agreement between the service provider and the employee. This is what the court <em>a quo</em> attempted to explain in the passage quoted above but unfortunately without fully analysing the provisions of s 14.</p> <p> </p> <p>The court <em>a quo</em>’s decision is correct though it should have adequately analysed s 14 and assessed the facts of this case against it starting from the intention of the seconding employer. The intention of the seconding employer is clearly explained in its memorandum dated 20 October 2009 on page 159 of the record, in which it explained the reason and nature of the secondment in issue. The memorandum reads;</p> <p>“To      Honourable Minister</p> <p>From    Permanent Secretary</p> <p>            Date      20 October 2009</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>Appointment of Ministry Officials To Run The Affairs Of Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission (ZERC)</strong></p> <p>   As you may recall ZERC was dissolved in order to pave way for the establishment of an all-encompassing Energy Regulatory Commission after the passage of the Energy Act by Parliament of Zimbabwe.</p> <p>   As you may also <strong>recall Eng. M. C Munodawafa was appointed to oversee the operations of ZERC.</strong></p> <p>   Eng M C Munodawafa has since been appointed Chief Executive Officer of the Zambezi River Authority. <strong>Therefore there is need to appoint persons to execute the functions of ZERC until the establishment of the Energy Regulatory Commission.</strong></p> <p>   I recommend that Mr P Mufunda and Mrs G Ngoma, Legal Advisor and Deputy Director for Policy and Planning respectively <strong>be appointed to administer ZERC.</strong> Mr P Mufunda shall take the leading role.”</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>The Minister through a hand written endorsement to the Permanent Secretary’s letter agreed with the appellant’s appointment. He said:</p> <p>“<strong>The Chief Legal Officer may take the proposed role.</strong> While Mrs Ngoma is a good candidate she is a board member of ZESA so please substitute her with another member so that there is no direct conflict in roles” (emphasis added).</p> <p>  </p> <p> </p> <p>                        The Minister’s directive was implemented through a memorandum dated 21 October 2009 through which Mr Hugh Sagonda was appointed in place of Mrs Ngoma.</p> <p> </p> <p>It should be noted from these memoranda that the Ministry appointed its officers to carry out roles at ZERC. It did not second them in terms of s 14 (1) and (2) of SI 1/2000.  It did not second them to posts within ZERC. An appointment to a role by one’s own employer is not a secondment to a post in the service provider. In terms of s 14 (1) the role of the employer is to release the employee for appointment into a specified post by the approved service.</p> <p> </p> <p>The memorandum talks of the appointment of Ministry officials to run the affairs of ZERC. This means the persons being appointed would remain Ministry officials and were to run ZERC’s affairs in that capacity. This is confirmed by reference to M. C. Munodawafa having previously been appointed to oversee the operations of ZERC and the appellant being appointed to administer ZERC. These terms are not consistent with one being seconded in the capacity of an employee of the approved service. If that was the employer’s intention the post to be occupied in the approved service would have been specified. The employees were therefore not released by the Ministry. In the case of a secondment in terms of s 14 the approved service and not the original employer assigns duties to the employee. In this case it is the Ministry which assigned duties to the appellant. When the original employer assigns duties to be performed for the approved service it will not have released the employee. It will be assigning duties to its employee for the benefit of a third party.</p> <p> </p> <p>The determinant facts are that the employer did not release the appellant from his position within it. It did not mention a post to which he was to be appointed within ZERC. It clearly states that Ministry officials were to run the affairs of ZERC. The court <em>a quo</em> was therefore correct that what happened was an informal secondment because a real secondment can only take place when the employer and employee’s agreement is one in which the employer releases the employee to enable him to  go and take up employment in a specified post for a period not exceeding that stipulated in s 14.</p> <p> </p> <p>This explains why the appellant continued to perform duties for the Ministry and receiving his salary from the Public Service Commission.</p> <p> </p> <p>In view of my finding that the employer did not intend to release the appellant to take up a post in (ZERC) or (ZERA), Mr <em>Hashiti</em>’s submissions on the effect of the conduct of the parties and the meaning of ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act does not warrant consideration. The parties’ conduct and the interpretation of ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act cannot change the clear intention of the employer to assign the appellant a role as opposed to seconding him. They cannot change the appellant’s agreement with his employer from that of an informal secondment to a secondment in terms of s 14 of SI 1/2000.</p> <p> </p> <p>The appellant’s appeal against the court <em>a quo</em>’s finding that there was no secondment agreement must, therefore, be dismissed.</p> <p> </p> <p>There is however an injustice caused by the Permanent Secretary. He backdated the allowance approved by the Minister to January 2010, when the appellant had been performing duties at ZERC since 20 October 2009. The appellant is entitled to the US$500.00 per month allowance for that period. There is no reason why he should not be paid for that period. The appellant raised this issue in the court <em>a quo</em> and in this Court. The respondent did not give any reasonable explanation for excluding that period from the authorised payment of allowances. The court <em>a quo</em> did not address its mind to this issue. Its decision in this regard must therefore be set aside.</p> <p> </p> <p>Both parties succeeded in part. Each party will therefore bear its own costs.</p> <p>In the result the decision of the court <em>a quo</em> is set aside and is substituted by the following:</p> <p>It is ordered that:</p> <ol><li>The appellant’s appeal against the court <em>a quo</em>’s finding that there was no secondment agreement between him and the respondent be and is hereby dismissed.</li> <li>The appellant’s appeal against none payment of the US$500.00 per month allowance for the period 20 October to 31 December 2009 succeeds.</li> <li>The respondent is ordered to pay the appellant the US$500.00 per month allowance for the period 20 October 2009 to 31 December 2009.</li> <li>Each party shall bear its own costs</li> </ol><p><strong>HLATSHWAYO JA</strong>                        I agree</p> <p><strong>MAVANGIRA JA</strong>                I agree</p> <p><em>Messrs Mtombeni Mukwesha &amp; Muzavazi,</em> Appellant’s Legal Practitioners.</p> <p><em>Messrs Kantor &amp; Immerman,</em> Respondents Legal Practitioners.   </p> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-law-report-citations field--type-string field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Law report citations</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-bb6300c7340f008d77f5be6a440e0a0e64b741c557bbcf94df11a4bb7aac2508"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p>                                             </p> <p><strong>DISTRIBUTABLE</strong>  <strong>(6)</strong></p> <p>                                                  </p> <p><strong>PETER     MAFUNDA</strong></p> <p><strong>vs</strong></p> <p><strong>ZIMBABWE     ENERGY     REGULATORY     AUTHORITY</strong></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>HLATSHWAYO JA, MAVANGIRA JA &amp; UCHENA JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, OCTOBER 26, 2015 &amp; MARCH 4, 2016</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><em>S. Hashiti</em>, for the Appellant</p> <p><em>E. Matinenga</em>, for the Respondent.</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>UCHENA JA:</strong>           The appellant Peter Mufunda is a Legal Advisor in the Ministry of Energy and Power Development. The respondent Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority is a statutory successor of the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission.</p> <p> </p> <p>The common cause facts on which the dispute between the parties arose are as follows. The appellant, an employee of the Ministry of Energy and Power Development was, on 20 October 2009, by appointment assigned to perform duties for the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission     (ZERC), whose functions were taken over by The Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA).  The appellant played a role in the establishment of ZERA. According to the assigning memorandum he was to play the leading role. ZERA appreciated his role to the extent that when the Ministry sought to withdraw his services to it by memorandum dated 17 November 2011, it asked the Ministry to allow him to continue in that role till it appointed its own Chief Executive officer. The Ministry agreed and extended his assignment to 28 February 2012.</p> <p>After assuming duty at (ZERC) and thereafter (ZERA) the appellant continued to perform his normal duties as Legal Advisor for the Ministry. He did not sign a contract of employment with either ZERC or ZERA, but was paid an allowance of US$500.00 per month after he protested against none payment after serving ZERC for some time. He had demanded that he be paid a salary but the Secretary of the Ministry of Energy after initially telling him rather brutally and uncharitably, to “learn to work for nothing” authorised him to arrange with the respondent that he be paid the US$500.00 per month allowance which the Minister had authorised. The appellant accepted the payments on a without prejudice basis. The parties failed to reach an agreement leading to the appellant referring the dispute over salary and benefits to the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. On 2 September 2013 a certificate of no settlement was issued and the dispute was referred to arbitration. The Arbitrator found that the parties had entered into a valid contractual relationship. He ordered the parties to quantify the award failing which they could revert back to him for quantification.</p> <p> </p> <p>The respondent noted an appeal to the Labour Court which found in its favour leading to the appellant noting this appeal.</p> <p> </p> <p>In his two grounds of appeal the appellant alleged the following against the decision of the Labour Court:</p> <ol><li>The court <em>a quo</em> erred and misdirected itself in finding that there was no contractual relationship between the appellant and respondent contrary to the dictates of s 14 of the Public Service Regulations SI 1/2000 as read with ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act (Chapter 28;01).</li> <li>The court further erred and misdirected itself in holding that there was no legal basis for the award of arrear salaries and benefits due to appellant from respondent.<br />   </li> </ol><p>In finding for the respondent the Labour Court on pages 54 to 55 of the record said:</p> <p>“The Oxford Dictionary defines secondment as a temporary transfer. In other words an employee on secondment remains the employee of the original employer (seconder) during the period of secondment. The Industrial Court of Malaysia in the case of Bank Simpanan Nasional Finance Bhd &amp; anor v Omar Hashim (2002) 1 ILR 272 (Award NO. 1013 of 2005) explained the meaning of the term “secondment” as follows:</p> <p>“The ordinary dictionary meaning of secondment as a temporary transfer has on the face of it the connotation that the employee is subject to recall by his employer. So he is not a permanent employee of the other.”</p> <p>The same court in Come Services Asia Pacific Region, Miri v Grame Ashley Power (1987) 2 ILR 34 reinforced the idea of a temporary transfer stating:</p> <p>“<strong>Therefore so long as the contract is not terminated, a new contract is not made and the employee continues to be in the employment of the original employer. Even if the employer orders the employee to do certain work for another person, the employee still continues to be in his employment.</strong> The only thing that happens in such cases is that the employee carries out the orders of the master hence he has the right to claim his wages from the employer and not from the third party to whom his services are lent or hired. It may be that such third party may pay his wages during the period he had hired his services, but that is because of his agreement with his real employer. However, that does not have the effect of transferring the service of the employee to the other employer. The hirer may exercise control and direction in the doing of the thing for which he has hired the employee; or even the manner in which it is to be done. But if the employee fails to carry out his direction he cannot dismiss him and can only complain to the actual employer. The right of dismissal is vested in the employer.</p> <p> </p> <p>I am persuaded that the above quotation aptly describes the Respondent’s position. <strong>In my view the Respondent’s secondment was informal as no fully detailed secondment agreement was put in place as envisaged by s 14 (2) of S.I 1/2000. Consequently the respondent continued to receive his remuneration as a member of the Public Service.</strong> <strong>If the appellant was to pay for respondent’s services, in my view, a detailed agreement would have been put in place.</strong> In the case of <em>Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited v Lazarus Muyambi</em> SC 22/2002 the terms and conditions of the secondment were set out in a contract of assignment entered into by the appellant and the respondent. Such a contract is missing <em>in casu</em>. <strong>I am not persuaded that bit can be implied from the circumstances of this case.” </strong>(emphasis added)</p> <p>The court <em>a quo</em> therefore found that (a) the appellant was not released by his employer, (b) he did not enter into any contract of employment with ZERC nor ZERA, (c) the contract of secondment cannot be inferred from the conduct of the parties and the provisions of ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act.</p> <p> </p> <p>The issue for determination by this court is whether or not the court <em>a quo</em> correctly summarised the law and applied it to the facts of this case. Mr <em>Hashiti</em> for the appellant submitted that there was a contract of employment between the appellant and respondent. He submitted that the provisions of s 14 of the Public Service Regulations S.I 1/2000 as read with s 12 of the Labour Act [<em>Chapter 28;01</em>], and the conduct of the parties confirms that there was an agreement.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mr <em>Matinenga</em> for the respondent submitted that there is no valid appeal before the court as there is no appeal on a point of Law. He further submitted that if the appeal is valid there was no contract of employment between the appellant and the respondent.</p> <p> </p> <p>Mr <em>Matinenga</em>’s submission that there is no appeal on a point of Law has no merit. The appeal is against the court <em>a quo</em>’s interpretation of s 14 of the Public Service Regulations SI 1/2000 and ss 2 and 12 (2) of the Labour Act. The appellant’s first ground of appeal refers to the court <em>a quo</em>’s failure to properly interpret the dictates of s 14 of the Public Service Regulations as read with ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act. That clearly raises a point of law.</p> <p> </p> <p>Section 14(1) and (2) of the Public Service Regulations S.I. 1/2000, provides for the secondment of civil servants as follows;   </p> <p>“(1) A member may at any time with his consent and at the invitation of the Head of the Ministry or Commission, be seconded by the Commission for a period not exceeding three years to a post in an approved service.</p> <p>     (2)The terms and conditions of service of a member while on secondment shall, subject to any policy directive issued by the Commission, be governed by contract between the member and the approved service concerned.”</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>Section 14(1) and (2) of the Public Service Regulations requires an employee who is seconded to enter into two contracts. The first contract is with his employer who will offer to second him to an approved service provider, which offer he can accept by giving his consent to the secondment. The secondment to be agreed upon should be “to a post in an approved service”.  The second contract is for the employee’s conditions of service which the employee enters into with the approved service provider to which his employer will have released him for secondment.</p> <p> </p> <p>If the agreement between the seconding employer and the employee to be seconded is for the employee to be released and seconded to a post in the approved service provider, then that institution and the employee must enter into an agreement which will govern the seconded employee’s conditions of service. The need for the second agreement depends on the agreement between the seconding employer and his employee. If for example the seconding employer wants his employee to continue working for it but also wants the employee to render services to a specified institution at its expense there will be no need for an agreement between the service provider and the employee. This is what the court <em>a quo</em> attempted to explain in the passage quoted above but unfortunately without fully analysing the provisions of s 14.</p> <p> </p> <p>The court <em>a quo</em>’s decision is correct though it should have adequately analysed s 14 and assessed the facts of this case against it starting from the intention of the seconding employer. The intention of the seconding employer is clearly explained in its memorandum dated 20 October 2009 on page 159 of the record, in which it explained the reason and nature of the secondment in issue. The memorandum reads;</p> <p>“To      Honourable Minister</p> <p>From    Permanent Secretary</p> <p>            Date      20 October 2009</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>Appointment of Ministry Officials To Run The Affairs Of Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission (ZERC)</strong></p> <p>   As you may recall ZERC was dissolved in order to pave way for the establishment of an all-encompassing Energy Regulatory Commission after the passage of the Energy Act by Parliament of Zimbabwe.</p> <p>   As you may also <strong>recall Eng. M. C Munodawafa was appointed to oversee the operations of ZERC.</strong></p> <p>   Eng M C Munodawafa has since been appointed Chief Executive Officer of the Zambezi River Authority. <strong>Therefore there is need to appoint persons to execute the functions of ZERC until the establishment of the Energy Regulatory Commission.</strong></p> <p>   I recommend that Mr P Mufunda and Mrs G Ngoma, Legal Advisor and Deputy Director for Policy and Planning respectively <strong>be appointed to administer ZERC.</strong> Mr P Mufunda shall take the leading role.”</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>The Minister through a hand written endorsement to the Permanent Secretary’s letter agreed with the appellant’s appointment. He said:</p> <p>“<strong>The Chief Legal Officer may take the proposed role.</strong> While Mrs Ngoma is a good candidate she is a board member of ZESA so please substitute her with another member so that there is no direct conflict in roles” (emphasis added).</p> <p>  </p> <p> </p> <p>                        The Minister’s directive was implemented through a memorandum dated 21 October 2009 through which Mr Hugh Sagonda was appointed in place of Mrs Ngoma.</p> <p> </p> <p>It should be noted from these memoranda that the Ministry appointed its officers to carry out roles at ZERC. It did not second them in terms of s 14 (1) and (2) of SI 1/2000.  It did not second them to posts within ZERC. An appointment to a role by one’s own employer is not a secondment to a post in the service provider. In terms of s 14 (1) the role of the employer is to release the employee for appointment into a specified post by the approved service.</p> <p> </p> <p>The memorandum talks of the appointment of Ministry officials to run the affairs of ZERC. This means the persons being appointed would remain Ministry officials and were to run ZERC’s affairs in that capacity. This is confirmed by reference to M. C. Munodawafa having previously been appointed to oversee the operations of ZERC and the appellant being appointed to administer ZERC. These terms are not consistent with one being seconded in the capacity of an employee of the approved service. If that was the employer’s intention the post to be occupied in the approved service would have been specified. The employees were therefore not released by the Ministry. In the case of a secondment in terms of s 14 the approved service and not the original employer assigns duties to the employee. In this case it is the Ministry which assigned duties to the appellant. When the original employer assigns duties to be performed for the approved service it will not have released the employee. It will be assigning duties to its employee for the benefit of a third party.</p> <p> </p> <p>The determinant facts are that the employer did not release the appellant from his position within it. It did not mention a post to which he was to be appointed within ZERC. It clearly states that Ministry officials were to run the affairs of ZERC. The court <em>a quo</em> was therefore correct that what happened was an informal secondment because a real secondment can only take place when the employer and employee’s agreement is one in which the employer releases the employee to enable him to  go and take up employment in a specified post for a period not exceeding that stipulated in s 14.</p> <p> </p> <p>This explains why the appellant continued to perform duties for the Ministry and receiving his salary from the Public Service Commission.</p> <p> </p> <p>In view of my finding that the employer did not intend to release the appellant to take up a post in (ZERC) or (ZERA), Mr <em>Hashiti</em>’s submissions on the effect of the conduct of the parties and the meaning of ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act does not warrant consideration. The parties’ conduct and the interpretation of ss 2 and 12 of the Labour Act cannot change the clear intention of the employer to assign the appellant a role as opposed to seconding him. They cannot change the appellant’s agreement with his employer from that of an informal secondment to a secondment in terms of s 14 of SI 1/2000.</p> <p> </p> <p>The appellant’s appeal against the court <em>a quo</em>’s finding that there was no secondment agreement must, therefore, be dismissed.</p> <p> </p> <p>There is however an injustice caused by the Permanent Secretary. He backdated the allowance approved by the Minister to January 2010, when the appellant had been performing duties at ZERC since 20 October 2009. The appellant is entitled to the US$500.00 per month allowance for that period. There is no reason why he should not be paid for that period. The appellant raised this issue in the court <em>a quo</em> and in this Court. The respondent did not give any reasonable explanation for excluding that period from the authorised payment of allowances. The court <em>a quo</em> did not address its mind to this issue. Its decision in this regard must therefore be set aside.</p> <p> </p> <p>Both parties succeeded in part. Each party will therefore bear its own costs.</p> <p>In the result the decision of the court <em>a quo</em> is set aside and is substituted by the following:</p> <p>It is ordered that:</p> <ol><li>The appellant’s appeal against the court <em>a quo</em>’s finding that there was no secondment agreement between him and the respondent be and is hereby dismissed.</li> <li>The appellant’s appeal against none payment of the US$500.00 per month allowance for the period 20 October to 31 December 2009 succeeds.</li> <li>The respondent is ordered to pay the appellant the US$500.00 per month allowance for the period 20 October 2009 to 31 December 2009.</li> <li>Each party shall bear its own costs</li> </ol><p><strong>HLATSHWAYO JA</strong>                        I agree</p> <p><strong>MAVANGIRA JA</strong>                I agree</p> <p><em>Messrs Mtombeni Mukwesha &amp; Muzavazi,</em> Appellant’s Legal Practitioners.</p> <p><em>Messrs Kantor &amp; Immerman,</em> Respondents Legal Practitioners.   </p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:39:32 +0000 Anonymous 10095 at http://zimlii.org University of Zimbabwe v Jirira & Another (SC 12 of 2018, Chamber Application SC 179 of 2015) [2016] ZWSC 12 (15 June 2016); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2016/12 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">University of Zimbabwe v Jirira &amp; Another (SC 12 of 2018, Chamber Application SC 179 of 2015) [2016] ZWSC 12 (15 June 2016);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1459" hreflang="en">Arbitration</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1451" hreflang="en">Arbitration appeal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2124" hreflang="x-default">Award</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2260" hreflang="x-default">enforcement</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 09/06/2021 - 13:39</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2016/12/2016-zwsc-12.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=30688">2016-zwsc-12.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2016/12/2016-zwsc-12.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=127574">2016-zwsc-12.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p><strong>UNIVERSITY     OF     ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <ol><li><strong>KWANELE N.JIRIRA(2)LOUIS MASUKO</strong></li> </ol><p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, 15 JUNE 2016</strong></p> <p><em>R. H. Goba, </em>for the applicant</p> <p><em>K. E. Kadzere, </em>for the respondents</p> <p><strong>IN CHAMBERS</strong></p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA:</strong>       This is a chamber application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court in terms of r 5 (2) of the Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Appeals and References) Rules, 1975.</p> <p>The applicant is a tertiary educational institution incorporated as such under the University of Zimbabwe Act [<em>Chapter 25:16</em>]. Both respondents are its former workers who were employed as research fellows at its Institute of Development Studies. They were dismissed from employment by the disciplinary Tribunal on allegations of misconduct. They are alleged to have wilfully refused to obey a lawful order to be redeployed from the Institute of Development Studies offices to the University campus.</p> <p>Aggrieved by their dismissal from employment they approached the Labour officer complaining of unfair dismissal. The Labour Officer in turn referred their grievance for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in their favour and made an award of reinstatement and in the alternative damages in<em> lieu</em> of reinstatement.</p> <p>Dissatisfied with the Arbitration award, the applicant appealed to the Labour Court without success. Unhappy with the decision of the Labour court, the applicant sought leave to appeal to this court. On 5 April 2013 the Labour Court granted the applicant leave to appeal to this Court.</p> <p>The applicant did not however reinstate the respondent as ordered by both the Arbitrator and the Labour Court. As the result the respondents approached the Arbitrator for quantification of damages in<em> lieu</em> of reinstatement. The Arbitrator assessed damages in the amounts of US$156 852.13 and US$134 362. 00, respectively.</p> <p>Aggrieved by the quantification award, the applicant once again appealed against that award to the Labour Court. Despite the appeal, the respondents proceeded to register the award with the High Court for enforcement. A writ of execution and attachment of the applicant’s property was subsequently issued. The applicant made an urgent application for stay of execution without success. It then successfully appealed to this court for stay of execution pending appeal under judgment number SC 6/12.</p> <p>The applicant’s appeal against the quantification award was subsequently dismissed by the Labour Court. Its complaint is that CHIVIZHE J granted the application for dismissal of the appeal without a formal hearing of the appeal. They allege that despite numerous requests the honourable judge failed to provide the applicant with reasons for judgment resulting in the lapse of time stipulated of the intended appeal.</p> <p>                        It therefore became necessary to apply for condonation and extension of time to file an application for leave to apply to this Court. Both parties filed heads of argument. The applicant now alleges that while they were waiting for the set down date of hearing they were surprised to receive a written judgment by HOVE J dismissing the application for leave to appeal to this Court. It is not clear to me but it appears that the matter was subsequently placed before the same judge who then properly heard the application and dismissed the applicant’s claim under judgment LCH/H/472/2011 at page 56 of the record of proceedings. It is this judgment which prompted this application.</p> <p>In terms s 92F (3) of the Labour Act [<em>Chapter 28:01</em>], where a judge of the Labour Court refuses to grant leave to appeal, the applicant may seek leave from a judge of this Court. When a judge of the Supreme Court sits in chambers to decide the application for leave to appeal he does not treat the application as an appeal against the refusal to grant leave by the court <em>a quo</em>. He simply decides the matter on the merits as if it was a fresh application before him/her. For that reason while he may consider the criticisms levelled against the judge in the court <em>a quo</em>, these are not overriding considerations because he makes his own independent fresh determination on the basis of the papers and arguments placed before him/her.</p> <p>I now turn to consider the application for leave to appeal to this Court on the merits.</p> <p>An application for leave to appeal to this Court is firmly grounded on the applicant’s prospects of success on appeal.  In terms of s 92F of the Act, appeals from the Labour Court only lie to this Court on a point of law. In that regard the first question for consideration is whether the applicant’s grounds of appeal raise a point of law.</p> <p>The grounds of appeal essentially raises the question whether the applicant was subjected to a fair trial when CHIVIZHE J issued an order under case number LC/H/145/11 without giving reasons for the order which it has branded a judgment.</p> <p>The order is dated 31 October 2012 and it reads:</p> <p>“IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE</p> <p>LC/H/145/11</p> <p>In the matter between:-</p> <p><strong>KWANELE JIRIRA &amp; ANOTHER                                                 Applicants</strong></p> <p><strong>Vs</strong></p> <p><strong>UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE                                          Respondents</strong></p> <p>Before the Honourable B T Chivizhe, President</p> <p><strong>(IN CHAMBERS)</strong></p> <p>Whereupon after reading documents filed of record</p> <p>IT IS ORDERED THAT</p> <p>The application for dismissal of appeal in terms of Rule 19 (3) (a) of the Labour Court Rules be and is hereby granted.”</p> <p>The above order is clearly not a judgment but an order given by the learned judge <em>a quo</em> sitting in chambers. This is so because it does not bear a judgment number or reasons for judgment. It cites no legal representatives signifying that none were heard although both parties had legal representation. This is clearly a default judgment. It is not correct for the applicant to say in its founding affidavit that the learned judge did not give reasons for its judgment. This is because in the same breath it confesses that the judgment was given pursuant to an application for dismissal of its appeal because of its failure to file heads of argument timeously.</p> <p>It is therefore plain that the applicant’s appeal was dismissed for want of compliance with the Rules. Nowhere in its grounds of appeal does the applicant allege that it filed its heads of argument timeously. </p> <p>In my view, the applicant having failed to file its heads of argument within the prescribed time limit, it ought to have applied for rescission of judgment in terms of s 92C. The section confers a wide discretion on a judge of the labour Court to rescind his own decisions including those given in the absence of a party or in error. The section provides as follows:</p> <p>“(1) Subject to this section, the Labour Court may, on application, rescind or vary any determination or order—</p> <ul><li>which it made in the absence of the party against whom it was made;</li> <li> </li> </ul><p>(<em>b</em>) which the Labour Court is satisfied is void or was obtained by fraud or a mistake common to the parties; or</p> <ul><li>in order to correct any patent error.</li> </ul><p>(2) The Labour Court shall not exercise the powers conferred by subsection (1)–</p> <ul><li>except upon notice to all the parties affected by the determination or order concerned; or</li> <li>in respect of any determination or order which is the subject of a pending appeal or review.</li> </ul><p>(3) Where an application has been made to the Labour Court to rescind or vary any determination or order in terms of subsection (1), the Labour Court may direct that—</p> <ul><li>the determination or order shall be carried into execution; or</li> <li>execution of the determination or order shall be suspended pending the decision upon the application;</li> </ul><p>upon such terms as the Labour Court may fix as to security for the due performance of the determination or order or any variation thereof”</p> <p>That application ought to have been made simultaneously with an application for condonation and extension of time within which to file its heads of argument in terms of r 26 which provides that:</p> <p>“At any time before or during the hearing of a matter a President or the Court may—</p> <p>(<em>a</em>) direct, authorise or condone a departure from any of these rules, including an extension of any period specified therein, where the President or Court is satisfied that the departure is required in the interests</p> <p>of justice, fairness and equity;</p> <p>(<em>b</em>) give such directions as to procedure in respect of any matter not expressly provided for in these rules as</p> <p>appear to the President of the Court to be just, expedient and equitable”</p> <p>In terms of r 33 the applicant had 30 days within which to make the above applications for relief in the court <em>a quo.</em> From the date it became aware of the so called judgment. This it not do. The so called judgment it seeks to impugn is dated 31 October 2012. It only approached this court for relief about two and a half years later on 15 March 2015. That delay in approaching this Court is lengthy and inordinate. It cannot be the kind of delay occasioned by a party who has the serious intention to prosecute its appeal.</p> <p>It appears to me that this Application was lodged as an afterthought, simply to circumvent the court <em>a quo</em> and throw spanners into the pending execution. The applicant could no longer approach the court <em>a quo</em> for relief as it was now woefully out of time. Approaching this Court was an ingenuous way of evading the natural consequences of its inordinate delay in approaching the court <em>a quo</em> for relief timeously.</p> <p>The applicant has not proffered any explanation for the inordinate delay of more than two and a half years before approaching this Court if it was sincere in its belief that the relief it seeks resides in this Court. In any case the applicant ought to have exhausted its domestic remedies before approaching this Court for relief. For the foregoing reasons I come to the conclusion that there is absolutely no merit in this Application it is accordingly ordered that the application be and is hereby dismissed with costs.</p> <p><em>Ziumbe &amp; partners, </em>applicant’s legal practitioners</p> <p><em>Hungwe &amp; Mandevere, </em>respondents’ legal practitioners</p> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-law-report-citations field--type-string field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Law report citations</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-f543ff232c3e655dc9fa32100698edbb8f2f5eaf50679ab446be454ff815a633"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p><strong>UNIVERSITY     OF     ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <ol><li><strong>KWANELE N.JIRIRA(2)LOUIS MASUKO</strong></li> </ol><p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, 15 JUNE 2016</strong></p> <p><em>R. H. Goba, </em>for the applicant</p> <p><em>K. E. Kadzere, </em>for the respondents</p> <p><strong>IN CHAMBERS</strong></p> <p><strong>BHUNU JA:</strong>       This is a chamber application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court in terms of r 5 (2) of the Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Appeals and References) Rules, 1975.</p> <p>The applicant is a tertiary educational institution incorporated as such under the University of Zimbabwe Act [<em>Chapter 25:16</em>]. Both respondents are its former workers who were employed as research fellows at its Institute of Development Studies. They were dismissed from employment by the disciplinary Tribunal on allegations of misconduct. They are alleged to have wilfully refused to obey a lawful order to be redeployed from the Institute of Development Studies offices to the University campus.</p> <p>Aggrieved by their dismissal from employment they approached the Labour officer complaining of unfair dismissal. The Labour Officer in turn referred their grievance for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in their favour and made an award of reinstatement and in the alternative damages in<em> lieu</em> of reinstatement.</p> <p>Dissatisfied with the Arbitration award, the applicant appealed to the Labour Court without success. Unhappy with the decision of the Labour court, the applicant sought leave to appeal to this court. On 5 April 2013 the Labour Court granted the applicant leave to appeal to this Court.</p> <p>The applicant did not however reinstate the respondent as ordered by both the Arbitrator and the Labour Court. As the result the respondents approached the Arbitrator for quantification of damages in<em> lieu</em> of reinstatement. The Arbitrator assessed damages in the amounts of US$156 852.13 and US$134 362. 00, respectively.</p> <p>Aggrieved by the quantification award, the applicant once again appealed against that award to the Labour Court. Despite the appeal, the respondents proceeded to register the award with the High Court for enforcement. A writ of execution and attachment of the applicant’s property was subsequently issued. The applicant made an urgent application for stay of execution without success. It then successfully appealed to this court for stay of execution pending appeal under judgment number SC 6/12.</p> <p>The applicant’s appeal against the quantification award was subsequently dismissed by the Labour Court. Its complaint is that CHIVIZHE J granted the application for dismissal of the appeal without a formal hearing of the appeal. They allege that despite numerous requests the honourable judge failed to provide the applicant with reasons for judgment resulting in the lapse of time stipulated of the intended appeal.</p> <p>                        It therefore became necessary to apply for condonation and extension of time to file an application for leave to apply to this Court. Both parties filed heads of argument. The applicant now alleges that while they were waiting for the set down date of hearing they were surprised to receive a written judgment by HOVE J dismissing the application for leave to appeal to this Court. It is not clear to me but it appears that the matter was subsequently placed before the same judge who then properly heard the application and dismissed the applicant’s claim under judgment LCH/H/472/2011 at page 56 of the record of proceedings. It is this judgment which prompted this application.</p> <p>In terms s 92F (3) of the Labour Act [<em>Chapter 28:01</em>], where a judge of the Labour Court refuses to grant leave to appeal, the applicant may seek leave from a judge of this Court. When a judge of the Supreme Court sits in chambers to decide the application for leave to appeal he does not treat the application as an appeal against the refusal to grant leave by the court <em>a quo</em>. He simply decides the matter on the merits as if it was a fresh application before him/her. For that reason while he may consider the criticisms levelled against the judge in the court <em>a quo</em>, these are not overriding considerations because he makes his own independent fresh determination on the basis of the papers and arguments placed before him/her.</p> <p>I now turn to consider the application for leave to appeal to this Court on the merits.</p> <p>An application for leave to appeal to this Court is firmly grounded on the applicant’s prospects of success on appeal.  In terms of s 92F of the Act, appeals from the Labour Court only lie to this Court on a point of law. In that regard the first question for consideration is whether the applicant’s grounds of appeal raise a point of law.</p> <p>The grounds of appeal essentially raises the question whether the applicant was subjected to a fair trial when CHIVIZHE J issued an order under case number LC/H/145/11 without giving reasons for the order which it has branded a judgment.</p> <p>The order is dated 31 October 2012 and it reads:</p> <p>“IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE</p> <p>LC/H/145/11</p> <p>In the matter between:-</p> <p><strong>KWANELE JIRIRA &amp; ANOTHER                                                 Applicants</strong></p> <p><strong>Vs</strong></p> <p><strong>UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE                                          Respondents</strong></p> <p>Before the Honourable B T Chivizhe, President</p> <p><strong>(IN CHAMBERS)</strong></p> <p>Whereupon after reading documents filed of record</p> <p>IT IS ORDERED THAT</p> <p>The application for dismissal of appeal in terms of Rule 19 (3) (a) of the Labour Court Rules be and is hereby granted.”</p> <p>The above order is clearly not a judgment but an order given by the learned judge <em>a quo</em> sitting in chambers. This is so because it does not bear a judgment number or reasons for judgment. It cites no legal representatives signifying that none were heard although both parties had legal representation. This is clearly a default judgment. It is not correct for the applicant to say in its founding affidavit that the learned judge did not give reasons for its judgment. This is because in the same breath it confesses that the judgment was given pursuant to an application for dismissal of its appeal because of its failure to file heads of argument timeously.</p> <p>It is therefore plain that the applicant’s appeal was dismissed for want of compliance with the Rules. Nowhere in its grounds of appeal does the applicant allege that it filed its heads of argument timeously. </p> <p>In my view, the applicant having failed to file its heads of argument within the prescribed time limit, it ought to have applied for rescission of judgment in terms of s 92C. The section confers a wide discretion on a judge of the labour Court to rescind his own decisions including those given in the absence of a party or in error. The section provides as follows:</p> <p>“(1) Subject to this section, the Labour Court may, on application, rescind or vary any determination or order—</p> <ul><li>which it made in the absence of the party against whom it was made;</li> <li> </li> </ul><p>(<em>b</em>) which the Labour Court is satisfied is void or was obtained by fraud or a mistake common to the parties; or</p> <ul><li>in order to correct any patent error.</li> </ul><p>(2) The Labour Court shall not exercise the powers conferred by subsection (1)–</p> <ul><li>except upon notice to all the parties affected by the determination or order concerned; or</li> <li>in respect of any determination or order which is the subject of a pending appeal or review.</li> </ul><p>(3) Where an application has been made to the Labour Court to rescind or vary any determination or order in terms of subsection (1), the Labour Court may direct that—</p> <ul><li>the determination or order shall be carried into execution; or</li> <li>execution of the determination or order shall be suspended pending the decision upon the application;</li> </ul><p>upon such terms as the Labour Court may fix as to security for the due performance of the determination or order or any variation thereof”</p> <p>That application ought to have been made simultaneously with an application for condonation and extension of time within which to file its heads of argument in terms of r 26 which provides that:</p> <p>“At any time before or during the hearing of a matter a President or the Court may—</p> <p>(<em>a</em>) direct, authorise or condone a departure from any of these rules, including an extension of any period specified therein, where the President or Court is satisfied that the departure is required in the interests</p> <p>of justice, fairness and equity;</p> <p>(<em>b</em>) give such directions as to procedure in respect of any matter not expressly provided for in these rules as</p> <p>appear to the President of the Court to be just, expedient and equitable”</p> <p>In terms of r 33 the applicant had 30 days within which to make the above applications for relief in the court <em>a quo.</em> From the date it became aware of the so called judgment. This it not do. The so called judgment it seeks to impugn is dated 31 October 2012. It only approached this court for relief about two and a half years later on 15 March 2015. That delay in approaching this Court is lengthy and inordinate. It cannot be the kind of delay occasioned by a party who has the serious intention to prosecute its appeal.</p> <p>It appears to me that this Application was lodged as an afterthought, simply to circumvent the court <em>a quo</em> and throw spanners into the pending execution. The applicant could no longer approach the court <em>a quo</em> for relief as it was now woefully out of time. Approaching this Court was an ingenuous way of evading the natural consequences of its inordinate delay in approaching the court <em>a quo</em> for relief timeously.</p> <p>The applicant has not proffered any explanation for the inordinate delay of more than two and a half years before approaching this Court if it was sincere in its belief that the relief it seeks resides in this Court. In any case the applicant ought to have exhausted its domestic remedies before approaching this Court for relief. For the foregoing reasons I come to the conclusion that there is absolutely no merit in this Application it is accordingly ordered that the application be and is hereby dismissed with costs.</p> <p><em>Ziumbe &amp; partners, </em>applicant’s legal practitioners</p> <p><em>Hungwe &amp; Mandevere, </em>respondents’ legal practitioners</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:39:22 +0000 Anonymous 10089 at http://zimlii.org Mbangani v OK Zimbabwe (SC 9 of 2018, Civil Appeal SC 445 of 2015) [2017] ZWSC 9 (17 July 2017); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2017/9 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">Mbangani v OK Zimbabwe (SC 9 of 2018, Civil Appeal SC 445 of 2015) [2017] ZWSC 9 (17 July 2017);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2236" hreflang="x-default">Appeal (EMPLOYMENT)</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2237" hreflang="x-default">Appeal against determination of disciplinary committee under disciplinary code</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1628" hreflang="en">Default Judgment</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 09/06/2021 - 13:39</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2017/9/2017-zwsc-9.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=26628">2017-zwsc-9.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2017/9/2017-zwsc-9.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=99950">2017-zwsc-9.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p><strong>  DISTRIBUTABLE             (8)</strong></p> <p><strong>WEBSTER     MBANGANI</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>OK     ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>GWAUNZA JA, GOWORA JA &amp; HLATSHWAYO JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, </strong>JULY 17, 2017</p> <p>No appearance for the appellant</p> <p>Mrs<em> Matsika</em>, for the respondent</p> <p><strong>GWAUNZA JA</strong>:     This is an appeal against the decision of the Labour Court upholding the appellant’s dismissal from his employment with the respondent.</p> <p>On 17 July 2017, the court dismissed the appeal with costs. The appellant was in default but was aggrieved by such dismissal and wrote to the Registrar requesting reasons for the order. These are they:</p> <p>The brief facts of this case are as follows:</p> <p>The appellant was employed as a Branch Manager by the respondent. Sometime in 2009, he was charged with having ordered 180 ‘fancy’ loaves of bread on 11 September 2008 and another 180 loaves on 12 September 2008, contrary to standing orders disallowing bulk purchases. This was a measure implemented by the employer at the height of bread shortages to avoid employees supplying the “black market” with bread, thereby prejudicing the formal market. The appellant was also charged for allegedly cashing 50 personal cheques with a total value of US$254 015.00 and generally failing to diligently execute his duties.</p> <p>The disciplinary committee before which the appellant appeared decided that the penalty for the bulk purchases was dismissal, and proceeded to impose it on the appellant. In relation to the charge of encashment of cheques the appellant was acquitted and a final written warning was imposed for failure to discharge his duties diligently. Therefore, the effective penalty imposed by the disciplinary committee was dismissal. We were satisfied on a reading of the papers before us that no misdirection could be attributed to the disciplinary committee in reaching the decisions it did.</p> <p>Having unsuccessfully gone through the relevant appeals processes both internally and before the Labour Court, the appellant filed this appeal. The appeal was initially set down for hearing on 13 June 2017 following proper service of the notice of hearing on him on 8 May 2017. The service was effected at No. 2208 Manyuchi Road, New Malborough on the appellant’s daughter, Samantha V. Mbangani. However, the matter could not be heard on the set down date.</p> <p>The matter was then set down for hearing on 17 July 2017. The notice of hearing was again served at the same address, this time on Winnet Maniko, who identified herself as a tenant at the address. This was on 23 June 2017.  On the date of hearing, the appellant was in default and after having sight of the Sheriff’s return of service dated 23 June 2017 the court found that service of the notice of hearing had been properly effected.  The address at which service was effected was the appellant’s given address for service in terms of the record and no notice of change of the address had been filed. Further, the appellant’s name was called out from outside the courtroom by the Registrar and no response was received.</p> <p>In these circumstances, the court was satisfied that the appellant was in default, hence its dismissal of the matter.</p> <p><strong>GOWORA JA:                                  </strong>I agree</p> <p><strong>HLATSHWAYO JA:</strong>                       I agree</p> <p><em>Atherstone &amp; Cook</em>, respondents’ legal practitioners</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-law-report-citations field--type-string field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Law report citations</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-15f05b8478f9ceb60cfdbe1cea423e1ee61cc7fdf8d9fe8863104a372e354129"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p><strong>  DISTRIBUTABLE             (8)</strong></p> <p><strong>WEBSTER     MBANGANI</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>OK     ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>GWAUNZA JA, GOWORA JA &amp; HLATSHWAYO JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE, </strong>JULY 17, 2017</p> <p>No appearance for the appellant</p> <p>Mrs<em> Matsika</em>, for the respondent</p> <p><strong>GWAUNZA JA</strong>:     This is an appeal against the decision of the Labour Court upholding the appellant’s dismissal from his employment with the respondent.</p> <p>On 17 July 2017, the court dismissed the appeal with costs. The appellant was in default but was aggrieved by such dismissal and wrote to the Registrar requesting reasons for the order. These are they:</p> <p>The brief facts of this case are as follows:</p> <p>The appellant was employed as a Branch Manager by the respondent. Sometime in 2009, he was charged with having ordered 180 ‘fancy’ loaves of bread on 11 September 2008 and another 180 loaves on 12 September 2008, contrary to standing orders disallowing bulk purchases. This was a measure implemented by the employer at the height of bread shortages to avoid employees supplying the “black market” with bread, thereby prejudicing the formal market. The appellant was also charged for allegedly cashing 50 personal cheques with a total value of US$254 015.00 and generally failing to diligently execute his duties.</p> <p>The disciplinary committee before which the appellant appeared decided that the penalty for the bulk purchases was dismissal, and proceeded to impose it on the appellant. In relation to the charge of encashment of cheques the appellant was acquitted and a final written warning was imposed for failure to discharge his duties diligently. Therefore, the effective penalty imposed by the disciplinary committee was dismissal. We were satisfied on a reading of the papers before us that no misdirection could be attributed to the disciplinary committee in reaching the decisions it did.</p> <p>Having unsuccessfully gone through the relevant appeals processes both internally and before the Labour Court, the appellant filed this appeal. The appeal was initially set down for hearing on 13 June 2017 following proper service of the notice of hearing on him on 8 May 2017. The service was effected at No. 2208 Manyuchi Road, New Malborough on the appellant’s daughter, Samantha V. Mbangani. However, the matter could not be heard on the set down date.</p> <p>The matter was then set down for hearing on 17 July 2017. The notice of hearing was again served at the same address, this time on Winnet Maniko, who identified herself as a tenant at the address. This was on 23 June 2017.  On the date of hearing, the appellant was in default and after having sight of the Sheriff’s return of service dated 23 June 2017 the court found that service of the notice of hearing had been properly effected.  The address at which service was effected was the appellant’s given address for service in terms of the record and no notice of change of the address had been filed. Further, the appellant’s name was called out from outside the courtroom by the Registrar and no response was received.</p> <p>In these circumstances, the court was satisfied that the appellant was in default, hence its dismissal of the matter.</p> <p><strong>GOWORA JA:                                  </strong>I agree</p> <p><strong>HLATSHWAYO JA:</strong>                       I agree</p> <p><em>Atherstone &amp; Cook</em>, respondents’ legal practitioners</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:39:19 +0000 Anonymous 10087 at http://zimlii.org UNIFREIGHT LIMITED v MADEMBO (SC 6 of 2018, Civil Appeal SC 213 of 2015) [2015] ZWSC 6 (31 July 2015); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2015/6 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">UNIFREIGHT LIMITED v MADEMBO (SC 6 of 2018, Civil Appeal SC 213 of 2015) [2015] ZWSC 6 (31 July 2015);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1439" hreflang="en">Administrative Law</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/1713" hreflang="en">Natural Justice</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2380" hreflang="x-default">rules of</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2103" hreflang="x-default">Disciplinary proceedings</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2104" hreflang="x-default">Dismissal</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 09/06/2021 - 13:39</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2015/6/2015-zwsc-6.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=39760">2015-zwsc-6.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2015/6/2015-zwsc-6.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=202912">2015-zwsc-6.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p><strong>DISTRIBUTABLE</strong><strong>   (13)</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>UNIFREIGHT     LIMITED</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>LIGHTON     MADEMBO</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>GOWORA JA; GUVAVA JA &amp; MAVANGIRA JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE: 31 JULY, 2015</strong></p> <p><em>A. Rukawo</em>, for the appellant</p> <p>N.S. <em>Chidzanga</em>, for the respondent</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>GUVAVA JA</strong>:    This is an appeal against a decision of the Labour Court judgment number LC/H/122/2012 dated 17 August 2012.   After hearing arguments from both counsel the appeal was dismissed with costs. It was indicated that the reasons for this decision would follow in due course. These are they.</p> <p>The brief facts which gave rise to this matter may be summarized as follows:</p> <p>The respondent was employed by the appellant as a truck driver. His duties included delivering bulk fuel to various service stations. On 8 September 2010 the respondent made a delivery to Cargill Chegutu.  Upon arrival at the premises he had a physical altercation with a local tout. The manager of Cargill reported the incident to the police and the tout was arrested. Upon being interviewed by the police, the tout made a statement claiming that on a previous occasion, the respondent stopped at an off-route location and offered to sell two “containers” of diesel to the tout for $60.00. The tout offered to pay $30.00 which the respondent rejected. The respondent denied the allegation and stated that he had in fact been robbed of a container of diesel by the tout.</p> <p>When the appellant was informed by the police on the allegations made by the tout it suspended the respondent from 15 September 2010 with pay until Monday 20 September 2010 whilst conducting investigations into the matter.  On 18 September 2010, the Contracts Supervisor wrote a report of the incident to the Personnel Manager of the appellant indicating that a report against the conduct of the respondent had been filed by Total Zimbabwe who is a customer of the appellant and to whom Cargill Chegutu is a client. The Contracts Supervisor, on the basis of this report, requested that the personnel department arrange for the respondent to be charged with misconduct arising from the incident.</p> <p>Following the above report the respondent was charged with the following acts of misconduct:</p> <ol><li>Contravening Part III Section 3.3.5 as read with Part VII 7.3 Subsection 7.33 (d) of the Unifreight Group Code, that is, violent and disorderly behaviour.</li> <li>Contravening Part III Section 3.3.5 (ix) as read with Part VII, Section 7.4 subsection 7.4.4 (d) of the same Code of Conduct, that is any act or attempted act of dishonesty against the company or any of its customers whether a criminal conviction is pursued or not.</li> </ol><p>The respondent was summoned to attend a disciplinary hearing scheduled to be held on 24 September 2010. The letter advised the respondent that he had the right to be represented by a workers committee member or fellow worker at the proceedings.</p> <p>At the hearing the respondent denied the charges and explained that on 25 August 2010 the tout had approached him and asked to buy fuel from him. He advised the tout that he did not sell fuel and he should buy it from a service station. He went on to ask this individual where he could buy affordable potatoes and he was directed to a place a few kilometres outside Chegutu. He admits that he went off route in search of these potatoes. When he pulled off the road, he crossed the road to buy the potatoes. As he was buying the potatoes he noticed a small truck with four men in it parked behind his truck. He stated that some of them disappeared behind his truck.  He crossed over to investigate and realized that they were syphoning diesel from his truck. He stated that a scuffle ensued but the men got away with some fuel. The respondent admitted that he did not report this incident as he reasoned that the fuel syphoned was negligible. The respondent explained that when he made the delivery on 8 September 2010 he recognized the tout as one of the four men involved in the incident of 25 August, 2010 and he decided to confront him.</p> <p>The disciplinary committee disbelieved the respondent and found him guilty as charged. It reasoned as follows:</p> <ol><li>He failed to report the incident of 25 August 2010 which was found to be tantamount to contributing to fuel loss and or theft;</li> <li>The company suffered substantial prejudice by loss of business as a result of his violent and disorderly behavior as it lost the contract with Cargill.</li> <li>The respondent did not appear to show any remorse.</li> </ol><p>The disciplinary committee decided that the appropriate penalty was to dismiss the respondent as a deterrent to any other would be perpetrators in their employ. He was dismissed with immediate effect on 24 September 2010. The respondent appealed this decision to the Executive Director of Personnel and Training on 28 September 2010. In his appeal he submitted that he was under the assumption that the hearing was merely a discussion and not a formal hearing. He stated that he queried why there were no representatives from the workers committee present during the hearing in accordance with their code. He informed the appeals committee that when he queried the anomaly he was advised that it was simply a discussion not a hearing. He stated that he was therefore surprised to receive a letter of termination of employment.</p> <p>The Executive Director of Personnel and Training analyzed the appeal and concluded that the determination of the committee could not be faulted. As to composition of the committee it was brought to his attention that the Works Council minutes of 23 September 2010 discussed the threat by the Logistics Workers Committee to boycott all disciplinary hearings on allegations that the employer was perpetually inclined to dismiss employees. This difficulty remained ongoing at the time the respondent’s hearing was held and the employer made the decision to proceed with hearings and not be held to ransom by the Workers Committee. The Executive Director also took into account that the respondent was informed of this predicament at the hearing and that he gave his consent to proceed. It was also noted that the letter calling the respondent to the hearing advised him that he would be well within his rights to attend with any other worker if he was so inclined. He was also advised that he could seek legal representation. Having taken note of all these factors the appeal was dismissed on 7 October 2010.</p> <p>                        Dissatisfied with the result, the respondent appealed to the Labour Court alleging gross procedural irregularities which he believed should result in the setting aside of the decision of the disciplinary hearings. He argued that:</p> <ol><li>The employer failed to produce the record of proceedings</li> <li>That there was no evidence to support claims of the boycott members of the Workers Committee as alleged by the Executive Director, neither was there evidence to show that members of the Workers Committee were notified and invited to attend which invitation they declined</li> <li>In the absence of a representative of the Workers Committee the hearing was not properly constituted</li> <li>The hearing was not properly constituted as the Chairman was also the complainant and also served as the minute taker.</li> </ol><p>The court <em>a quo</em> in its judgment was dissatisfied with the failure by the disciplinary committee to transcribe proper minutes and the double role performed by the Chairman which it held compromised his impartiality as he had to be both complainant and adjudicator. On this basis the court <em>a quo</em> ordered the remittal of the matter to be heard <em>de novo</em> by the disciplinary committee in a procedurally correct manner within thirty days of the order and, pending such hearing the respondent was to revert to “suspension with pay” basis.</p> <p>The appellant was aggrieved by the judgment of the court <em>a quo</em> and appealed against its decision on the following grounds:</p> <ol><li>The Labour Court grossly misdirected itself on the facts in finding that there were gross procedural irregularities in the disciplinary proceedings</li> <li>The Labour Court erred in finding that by doubling up as complainant and Chairman, the impartiality of the Chairman became compromised when in fact the Chairman was never the complainant</li> <li>The Labour Court erred in finding that members of the disciplinary committee were also the investigating officials</li> <li>The Labour Court erred in finding that the Chairman’s assumption of the role of secretary was an irregularity in procedure nullifying the disciplinary hearing</li> <li>The Labour Court grossly misdirected itself in ruling that there was an irregularity in procedure because the workers representatives had not been asked to provide a secretary at the hearing when in fact the workers representatives had boycotted the disciplinary hearing</li> </ol><p>In my view it is apparent from the above grounds of appeal that this appeal turns on one issue; that is, whether the procedural irregularities in the disciplinary hearing are so serious as to warrant the setting aside of the determination of the hearing committee.</p> <p>It cannot be denied that there were some irregularities during the disciplinary hearing. This is indeed accepted by the appellant. Although it is trite that not all irregularities result in the vitiating of disciplinary proceedings it must be shown that the irregularities resulted in prejudice. This point was well articulated in the case of <em>Nyahuma v Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe </em>SC 67/05 wherein the court held as follows:</p> <p>“…it is not all procedural irregularities which vitiate proceedings. In order to succeed in having the proceedings set aside on the basis of a procedural irregularity it must be shown that the party concerned was prejudiced by the irregularity.”</p> <p>In<em> casu</em>, it appears most of the procedural dictates of the Code governing the employment relationship between the parties were disregarded. There was a blatant disregard of the most basic of procedural requirements. No accurate minutes of the disciplinary hearing were kept by the appellant. The committee comprised of only two disciplinary officers, one of whom was the chairman and also posed questions raising the employers concerns. In essence, the Chairman’s role went beyond that of an inquisitorial authority and became a party to the proceedings.</p> <p>It is important to note that the Code that regulates the conduct between employer and employee operates as a contractual obligation which they both willingly entered into and is therefore binding. One of the parties cannot therefore arbitrarily, and to the prejudice of the other, decide not to comply with certain dictates of that contract.</p> <p>The double role undertaken by the Chairman as both chairman and complainant was in my view wholly inappropriate and not in line with the principles of natural justice. His impartiality could in these circumstances not be guaranteed. This is clearly apparent when one has regard to the accepted test for bias. The case of<em> City and Suburban Transport (Pvt) Ltd v Local Board Road Transportation Johannesburg </em>1932 WLD 100 sets out clearly the test for bias. It was held that:</p> <p>“the test [for bias] appears to be whether the person challenged has so associated himself with one of the two opposing views that there is a real likelihood of bias or that a reasonable person would believe that he would be biased.” [My emphasis]</p> <p>This case makes it clear that the conduct of the appellant, in convening a hearing, must be transparent. Any reasonable person faced with the above facts would suspect that the chairman was biased. <em>In casu</em> the duplication of roles creates doubt with regard to impartiality in anyone’s mind and therefore a reasonable man could not find such an arrangement free from bias. The case of <em>Musarira v Anglo American Corporation</em> SC 53/05 states that once a charge of misconduct is preferred by an employer against an employee there is always a certain element of institutional bias, as the employer is the offended party. The Chairman cannot therefore operate in an employer appointed role and remain impartial as the adjudicator in the hearing.</p> <p>The Code mandates that a representative of the Workers Committee be present at all hearings, for substantive and procedural fairness, a disciplinary hearing ought to be properly constituted. In the case of <em>Madzitauswa v ZFC Ltd &amp; Anor</em> SC 73/15, GOWORA JA stated that:</p> <p>“The definition of disciplinary committee clearly envisages a body in which both the employer and the employees are represented …</p> <p>In any event, this court has time after time emphasised the need for flexibility in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings in which the overriding principle is that disciplinary tribunals must conduct an enquiry.  The rules of natural justice require no more than that the domestic tribunal acts according to common sense precepts of fairness.  See <em>Dulys Holdings v Chanaiwa</em> 2007 (2) ZLR 1 at 6A-B.” [My emphasis]</p> <p>A disciplinary committee must be comprised of representatives of the employer and the employees. This was not the case during the respondent’s hearing. This case also recognizes that certain liberties can be taken in conducting hearings. However, such flexibility must not operate against the rights of the employee to a fair and procedurally just hearing.  (See also <em>Chataira v ZESA</em> HH9/2000).  In my view, the facts of this case show that the respondent was clearly prejudiced by the irregularities.</p> <p>The appellant also invited this Court to set aside the decision of the court <em>a quo</em>, which was based on findings of fact. It is trite that for an appellate court to interfere with the judgment of a court <em>a quo</em> based on factual findings gross misdirection must be alleged and established. The case of <em>Hama v National Railways of Zimbabwe</em> 1996(1) ZLR 664 (S) states in this regard as follows:</p> <p>“In other words, the decision must have been irrational, in the sense of being outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who applied his mind to the question could have arrived at such a conclusion.” [My emphasis]</p> <p>This cannot be said of the decision of the court <em>a quo. </em> It cannot be said that the court <em>a quo</em> erred. In fact, the court <em>a quo</em> correctly applied the principles in <em>Dalny Mine v Banda</em> 1999(1) ZLR 220 which states that:</p> <p><strong>“</strong>As a general rule it seems to me undesirable that labour relations matters should be decided on the basis of procedural irregularities. By this, I do not mean that such irregularities should be ignored. I mean that the procedural irregularities should be put right. This can be done in one of two ways:</p> <ul><li>by remitting the matter for hearing <em>de novo</em> and in a procedurallycorrect manner;</li> <li>by the Tribunal hearing the evidence <em>de novo</em>.”</li> </ul><p>                        It is the finding of this Court that the court <em>a quo</em> therefore correctly remitted the appeal back to the disciplinary committee.</p> <p>                        Accordingly it was for the above reasons that the court found against the appellant.</p> <p>                        <strong>GOWORA JA:                      </strong>I agree</p> <p><strong>MAVANGIRA JA:               </strong>I agree</p> <p><em>Gwaunza &amp; Mapota, </em>appellant’s legal practitioners</p> <p><em>Mangwana &amp; Partners, </em>respondent’s legal practitioners</p> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-law-report-citations field--type-string field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Law report citations</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-9ef903d4b1c4a221fe0a537123e55f33316d417da47b7e4be3680fe2d93ce215"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p><strong>DISTRIBUTABLE</strong><strong>   (13)</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>UNIFREIGHT     LIMITED</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>LIGHTON     MADEMBO</strong></p> <p> </p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>GOWORA JA; GUVAVA JA &amp; MAVANGIRA JA</strong></p> <p><strong>HARARE: 31 JULY, 2015</strong></p> <p><em>A. Rukawo</em>, for the appellant</p> <p>N.S. <em>Chidzanga</em>, for the respondent</p> <p> </p> <p><strong>GUVAVA JA</strong>:    This is an appeal against a decision of the Labour Court judgment number LC/H/122/2012 dated 17 August 2012.   After hearing arguments from both counsel the appeal was dismissed with costs. It was indicated that the reasons for this decision would follow in due course. These are they.</p> <p>The brief facts which gave rise to this matter may be summarized as follows:</p> <p>The respondent was employed by the appellant as a truck driver. His duties included delivering bulk fuel to various service stations. On 8 September 2010 the respondent made a delivery to Cargill Chegutu.  Upon arrival at the premises he had a physical altercation with a local tout. The manager of Cargill reported the incident to the police and the tout was arrested. Upon being interviewed by the police, the tout made a statement claiming that on a previous occasion, the respondent stopped at an off-route location and offered to sell two “containers” of diesel to the tout for $60.00. The tout offered to pay $30.00 which the respondent rejected. The respondent denied the allegation and stated that he had in fact been robbed of a container of diesel by the tout.</p> <p>When the appellant was informed by the police on the allegations made by the tout it suspended the respondent from 15 September 2010 with pay until Monday 20 September 2010 whilst conducting investigations into the matter.  On 18 September 2010, the Contracts Supervisor wrote a report of the incident to the Personnel Manager of the appellant indicating that a report against the conduct of the respondent had been filed by Total Zimbabwe who is a customer of the appellant and to whom Cargill Chegutu is a client. The Contracts Supervisor, on the basis of this report, requested that the personnel department arrange for the respondent to be charged with misconduct arising from the incident.</p> <p>Following the above report the respondent was charged with the following acts of misconduct:</p> <ol><li>Contravening Part III Section 3.3.5 as read with Part VII 7.3 Subsection 7.33 (d) of the Unifreight Group Code, that is, violent and disorderly behaviour.</li> <li>Contravening Part III Section 3.3.5 (ix) as read with Part VII, Section 7.4 subsection 7.4.4 (d) of the same Code of Conduct, that is any act or attempted act of dishonesty against the company or any of its customers whether a criminal conviction is pursued or not.</li> </ol><p>The respondent was summoned to attend a disciplinary hearing scheduled to be held on 24 September 2010. The letter advised the respondent that he had the right to be represented by a workers committee member or fellow worker at the proceedings.</p> <p>At the hearing the respondent denied the charges and explained that on 25 August 2010 the tout had approached him and asked to buy fuel from him. He advised the tout that he did not sell fuel and he should buy it from a service station. He went on to ask this individual where he could buy affordable potatoes and he was directed to a place a few kilometres outside Chegutu. He admits that he went off route in search of these potatoes. When he pulled off the road, he crossed the road to buy the potatoes. As he was buying the potatoes he noticed a small truck with four men in it parked behind his truck. He stated that some of them disappeared behind his truck.  He crossed over to investigate and realized that they were syphoning diesel from his truck. He stated that a scuffle ensued but the men got away with some fuel. The respondent admitted that he did not report this incident as he reasoned that the fuel syphoned was negligible. The respondent explained that when he made the delivery on 8 September 2010 he recognized the tout as one of the four men involved in the incident of 25 August, 2010 and he decided to confront him.</p> <p>The disciplinary committee disbelieved the respondent and found him guilty as charged. It reasoned as follows:</p> <ol><li>He failed to report the incident of 25 August 2010 which was found to be tantamount to contributing to fuel loss and or theft;</li> <li>The company suffered substantial prejudice by loss of business as a result of his violent and disorderly behavior as it lost the contract with Cargill.</li> <li>The respondent did not appear to show any remorse.</li> </ol><p>The disciplinary committee decided that the appropriate penalty was to dismiss the respondent as a deterrent to any other would be perpetrators in their employ. He was dismissed with immediate effect on 24 September 2010. The respondent appealed this decision to the Executive Director of Personnel and Training on 28 September 2010. In his appeal he submitted that he was under the assumption that the hearing was merely a discussion and not a formal hearing. He stated that he queried why there were no representatives from the workers committee present during the hearing in accordance with their code. He informed the appeals committee that when he queried the anomaly he was advised that it was simply a discussion not a hearing. He stated that he was therefore surprised to receive a letter of termination of employment.</p> <p>The Executive Director of Personnel and Training analyzed the appeal and concluded that the determination of the committee could not be faulted. As to composition of the committee it was brought to his attention that the Works Council minutes of 23 September 2010 discussed the threat by the Logistics Workers Committee to boycott all disciplinary hearings on allegations that the employer was perpetually inclined to dismiss employees. This difficulty remained ongoing at the time the respondent’s hearing was held and the employer made the decision to proceed with hearings and not be held to ransom by the Workers Committee. The Executive Director also took into account that the respondent was informed of this predicament at the hearing and that he gave his consent to proceed. It was also noted that the letter calling the respondent to the hearing advised him that he would be well within his rights to attend with any other worker if he was so inclined. He was also advised that he could seek legal representation. Having taken note of all these factors the appeal was dismissed on 7 October 2010.</p> <p>                        Dissatisfied with the result, the respondent appealed to the Labour Court alleging gross procedural irregularities which he believed should result in the setting aside of the decision of the disciplinary hearings. He argued that:</p> <ol><li>The employer failed to produce the record of proceedings</li> <li>That there was no evidence to support claims of the boycott members of the Workers Committee as alleged by the Executive Director, neither was there evidence to show that members of the Workers Committee were notified and invited to attend which invitation they declined</li> <li>In the absence of a representative of the Workers Committee the hearing was not properly constituted</li> <li>The hearing was not properly constituted as the Chairman was also the complainant and also served as the minute taker.</li> </ol><p>The court <em>a quo</em> in its judgment was dissatisfied with the failure by the disciplinary committee to transcribe proper minutes and the double role performed by the Chairman which it held compromised his impartiality as he had to be both complainant and adjudicator. On this basis the court <em>a quo</em> ordered the remittal of the matter to be heard <em>de novo</em> by the disciplinary committee in a procedurally correct manner within thirty days of the order and, pending such hearing the respondent was to revert to “suspension with pay” basis.</p> <p>The appellant was aggrieved by the judgment of the court <em>a quo</em> and appealed against its decision on the following grounds:</p> <ol><li>The Labour Court grossly misdirected itself on the facts in finding that there were gross procedural irregularities in the disciplinary proceedings</li> <li>The Labour Court erred in finding that by doubling up as complainant and Chairman, the impartiality of the Chairman became compromised when in fact the Chairman was never the complainant</li> <li>The Labour Court erred in finding that members of the disciplinary committee were also the investigating officials</li> <li>The Labour Court erred in finding that the Chairman’s assumption of the role of secretary was an irregularity in procedure nullifying the disciplinary hearing</li> <li>The Labour Court grossly misdirected itself in ruling that there was an irregularity in procedure because the workers representatives had not been asked to provide a secretary at the hearing when in fact the workers representatives had boycotted the disciplinary hearing</li> </ol><p>In my view it is apparent from the above grounds of appeal that this appeal turns on one issue; that is, whether the procedural irregularities in the disciplinary hearing are so serious as to warrant the setting aside of the determination of the hearing committee.</p> <p>It cannot be denied that there were some irregularities during the disciplinary hearing. This is indeed accepted by the appellant. Although it is trite that not all irregularities result in the vitiating of disciplinary proceedings it must be shown that the irregularities resulted in prejudice. This point was well articulated in the case of <em>Nyahuma v Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe </em>SC 67/05 wherein the court held as follows:</p> <p>“…it is not all procedural irregularities which vitiate proceedings. In order to succeed in having the proceedings set aside on the basis of a procedural irregularity it must be shown that the party concerned was prejudiced by the irregularity.”</p> <p>In<em> casu</em>, it appears most of the procedural dictates of the Code governing the employment relationship between the parties were disregarded. There was a blatant disregard of the most basic of procedural requirements. No accurate minutes of the disciplinary hearing were kept by the appellant. The committee comprised of only two disciplinary officers, one of whom was the chairman and also posed questions raising the employers concerns. In essence, the Chairman’s role went beyond that of an inquisitorial authority and became a party to the proceedings.</p> <p>It is important to note that the Code that regulates the conduct between employer and employee operates as a contractual obligation which they both willingly entered into and is therefore binding. One of the parties cannot therefore arbitrarily, and to the prejudice of the other, decide not to comply with certain dictates of that contract.</p> <p>The double role undertaken by the Chairman as both chairman and complainant was in my view wholly inappropriate and not in line with the principles of natural justice. His impartiality could in these circumstances not be guaranteed. This is clearly apparent when one has regard to the accepted test for bias. The case of<em> City and Suburban Transport (Pvt) Ltd v Local Board Road Transportation Johannesburg </em>1932 WLD 100 sets out clearly the test for bias. It was held that:</p> <p>“the test [for bias] appears to be whether the person challenged has so associated himself with one of the two opposing views that there is a real likelihood of bias or that a reasonable person would believe that he would be biased.” [My emphasis]</p> <p>This case makes it clear that the conduct of the appellant, in convening a hearing, must be transparent. Any reasonable person faced with the above facts would suspect that the chairman was biased. <em>In casu</em> the duplication of roles creates doubt with regard to impartiality in anyone’s mind and therefore a reasonable man could not find such an arrangement free from bias. The case of <em>Musarira v Anglo American Corporation</em> SC 53/05 states that once a charge of misconduct is preferred by an employer against an employee there is always a certain element of institutional bias, as the employer is the offended party. The Chairman cannot therefore operate in an employer appointed role and remain impartial as the adjudicator in the hearing.</p> <p>The Code mandates that a representative of the Workers Committee be present at all hearings, for substantive and procedural fairness, a disciplinary hearing ought to be properly constituted. In the case of <em>Madzitauswa v ZFC Ltd &amp; Anor</em> SC 73/15, GOWORA JA stated that:</p> <p>“The definition of disciplinary committee clearly envisages a body in which both the employer and the employees are represented …</p> <p>In any event, this court has time after time emphasised the need for flexibility in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings in which the overriding principle is that disciplinary tribunals must conduct an enquiry.  The rules of natural justice require no more than that the domestic tribunal acts according to common sense precepts of fairness.  See <em>Dulys Holdings v Chanaiwa</em> 2007 (2) ZLR 1 at 6A-B.” [My emphasis]</p> <p>A disciplinary committee must be comprised of representatives of the employer and the employees. This was not the case during the respondent’s hearing. This case also recognizes that certain liberties can be taken in conducting hearings. However, such flexibility must not operate against the rights of the employee to a fair and procedurally just hearing.  (See also <em>Chataira v ZESA</em> HH9/2000).  In my view, the facts of this case show that the respondent was clearly prejudiced by the irregularities.</p> <p>The appellant also invited this Court to set aside the decision of the court <em>a quo</em>, which was based on findings of fact. It is trite that for an appellate court to interfere with the judgment of a court <em>a quo</em> based on factual findings gross misdirection must be alleged and established. The case of <em>Hama v National Railways of Zimbabwe</em> 1996(1) ZLR 664 (S) states in this regard as follows:</p> <p>“In other words, the decision must have been irrational, in the sense of being outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who applied his mind to the question could have arrived at such a conclusion.” [My emphasis]</p> <p>This cannot be said of the decision of the court <em>a quo. </em> It cannot be said that the court <em>a quo</em> erred. In fact, the court <em>a quo</em> correctly applied the principles in <em>Dalny Mine v Banda</em> 1999(1) ZLR 220 which states that:</p> <p><strong>“</strong>As a general rule it seems to me undesirable that labour relations matters should be decided on the basis of procedural irregularities. By this, I do not mean that such irregularities should be ignored. I mean that the procedural irregularities should be put right. This can be done in one of two ways:</p> <ul><li>by remitting the matter for hearing <em>de novo</em> and in a procedurallycorrect manner;</li> <li>by the Tribunal hearing the evidence <em>de novo</em>.”</li> </ul><p>                        It is the finding of this Court that the court <em>a quo</em> therefore correctly remitted the appeal back to the disciplinary committee.</p> <p>                        Accordingly it was for the above reasons that the court found against the appellant.</p> <p>                        <strong>GOWORA JA:                      </strong>I agree</p> <p><strong>MAVANGIRA JA:               </strong>I agree</p> <p><em>Gwaunza &amp; Mapota, </em>appellant’s legal practitioners</p> <p><em>Mangwana &amp; Partners, </em>respondent’s legal practitioners</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:39:17 +0000 Anonymous 10085 at http://zimlii.org ZIMRA v Mudzimuwaona (SC 4 of 2018, Civil Appeal 176 of 2013) [2014] ZWSC 4 (28 July 2014); http://zimlii.org/zw/judgment/supreme-court-zimbabwe/2014/4 <span class="field field--name-title field--type-string field--label-hidden">ZIMRA v Mudzimuwaona (SC 4 of 2018, Civil Appeal 176 of 2013) [2014] ZWSC 4 (28 July 2014);</span> <div class="field field--name-field-flynote field--type-entity-reference field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Flynote</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2125" hreflang="x-default">CONTRACT</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2377" hreflang="x-default">Termination</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2378" hreflang="x-default">fixed term contract</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2102" hreflang="x-default">EMPLOYMENT</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2104" hreflang="x-default">Dismissal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2119" hreflang="x-default">Lawful dismissal</a></div> <div class="field__item"><a href="/taxonomy/term/2361" hreflang="x-default">Salaries and wages</a></div> </div> </div> <span class="field field--name-uid field--type-entity-reference field--label-hidden"><span>Anonymous (not verified)</span></span> <span class="field field--name-created field--type-created field--label-hidden">Mon, 09/06/2021 - 13:39</span> <div class="field field--name-field-files field--type-file field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Download</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-vnd-openxmlformats-officedocument-wordprocessingml-document file--x-office-document"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2014/4/2014-zwsc-4.docx" type="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; length=41108">2014-zwsc-4.docx</a></span> </div> <div class="field__item"> <span class="file file--mime-application-pdf file--application-pdf"> <a href="https://media.zimlii.org/files/judgments/zwsc/2014/4/2014-zwsc-4.pdf" type="application/pdf; length=131172">2014-zwsc-4.pdf</a></span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="clearfix text-formatted field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden field__item"><p><strong>REPORTABLE</strong><strong>        (3)</strong></p> <p><strong>ZIMBABWE     REVENUE     AUTHORITY</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>CHESTER     MUDZIMUWAONA</strong></p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, GOWORA JA &amp; MUTEMA AJA</strong></p> <p><strong>BULAWAYO, </strong>28 JULY 2014</p> <p><em>T. Magwaliba</em>, for the appellant                                                                                         </p> <p><em>C. Mucheche</em>, for the first respondent</p> <p><strong>                        GOWORA JA</strong>:  This was an appeal against the whole judgment of the Labour Court delivered on 17 May 2012. After perusing the record and hearing the submissions of the parties, this Court allowed the appeal and indicated that the reasons would be availed in due course. The following are the reasons for the order.</p> <p>                        The facts arising in this matter are that in 2002, the respondent was employed by the appellant as a Revenue Trainee on a fixed term contract of three years. It specifically stated the following:</p> <p>“upon successful completion of the probation period the employment contract shall run for a further period of 24 (twenty-four) months after which the authority , may at its sole discretion offer you permanent employment on such terms and conditions as determined by it at the time.”</p> <p>                        The literal meaning of that clause is that the respondent’s contract was subject, first to the successful completion of the probation period and then would terminate at the end of 36 month. </p> <p>                        In 2005, the respondent was based at the Beitbridge Border post and was charged with failing to uphold ethical and professional standards of behaviour within the workplace as well as carrying out an act inconsistent with the express or implied conditions of the contract of employment. He was arraigned before a disciplinary committee and was found guilty of both charges. He was as a consequence dismissed from employment. He appealed to the appeals committee without success.</p> <p>                        The respondent appealed against that decision to the Labour Court which upheld the appeal and held that the he had been unlawfully dismissed. The court <em>a quo</em> ordered the appellant to reinstate the respondent without loss of salary or benefits and, in the event that reinstatement was no longer tenable, to pay damages in <em>lieu</em> of reinstatement. This decision was not appealed against. Instead, the parties decided to negotiate the <em>quantum</em> of damages but failed to agree resulting in the respondent applying to the Labour Court for quantification. He claimed that when he was dismissed he had not completed his training period but it was common cause that he was going to continue with his job after training and thus he was entitled to compensation as if he was a permanent employee. The appellant opposed the quantification on the basis that the respondent was employed on a fixed term contract and he had failed his examinations and thus the contractual relationship would have ended at the expiry of the 36 months provided in the contract. The Labour Court ruled in favour of the respondent and ordered the appellant to pay:</p> <ul><li>US$ 19 740.16 as back-pay and benefits</li> <li>Twelve (12) months’ salary that the respondent would have earned in August 2011 minus US$150.00 earned by the respondent per month for a period of twelve months.</li> </ul><p>The appellant was aggrieved by the decision and with the leave of this court has appealed the order of the court <em>a quo</em>. It is criticized for the following reasons:</p> <ul><li> </li> </ul><p>-           failing to give proper weight to the fact that when the respondent was dismissed he was left with a period of 6 (six) months before expiration of the contract.</p> <ul><li> </li> <li> </li> </ul><p>-           failing to distinguish between a permanent employee and an employee on a fixed term contract in its quantification of damages, especially after finding that the respondent did not have a legitimate expectation to be offered permanent employment.</p> <ul><li> </li> </ul><p>-           in failing to deduct the US$150.00 earned by the respondent per month for a period of twelve (12) months from the total amount awarded as back pay and benefits.</p> <ul><li> </li> </ul><p>-           in rejecting the evidence of the appellant’s expert witness on the factual issues and accepting that of the respondent and his witness on unclear grounds.</p> <p>                        The respondent raised three preliminary objections to the appeal. The objections were respectively that, the notice of appeal did not state the correct date of judgment, the grounds of appeal were not clear and concise and, lastly, that the grounds of appeal did not raise questions of law. The respondent abandoned the first objection after conceding that the notice of appeal in point of fact reflected the correct date of judgment.</p> <p>                        The other two points were dismissed by the court.  Quite apart from the fact that in mounting the objections, the respondent sought to rely on the Supreme Court Rules, 1964 which are not applicable to appeals from the Labour Court, in attacking the grounds of appeal, the point that the grounds of appeal were not clear and concise had no merit. The respondent was unable to show to this court in what way the grounds of appeal were not clear and concise. The grounds set out by the appellant may have been inelegantly drafted but they articulate the basis upon which the appeal is founded.</p> <p>                        Regarding the point taken that the grounds of appeal were not on a question of law, the court was of the view that the point was improperly taken. The issue of what is a question of law has been addressed in a plethora of cases. See for example, <em>Muzuva v United Bottlers (Pvt) Ltd </em>1994 (1) ZLR 217 (S) and <em>Hama v National Railways of Zimbabwe </em>1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S).</p> <p>                        The respondent submitted that the appellant should have expressly stated in its grounds of appeal that the factual findings of the court <em>a quo</em> are gross as to amount to a question of law.  In <em>Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe v Granger and Anor</em> SC 34/01, MUCHECHETERE JA (as he then was), at page 5 to 6 of the cyclostyled judgment, said:</p> <p>“An appeal to this Court is based on the record. If it is to be related to the facts there must be an allegation that there has been a misdirection on the facts which is so unreasonable that no sensible person who applied his mind to the facts would have arrived at such a decision. And a misdirection of facts is either a failure to appreciate a fact at all or a finding of fact that is contrary to the evidence actually presented.”</p> <p>These remarks were qualified by GARWE JA in <em>Zvokusekwa v Biita Rural District Council</em> SC-44-15 as follows:</p> <p>“In my view, the remarks made in Granger’s case (supra) need to be qualified, to the extent that they may be interpreted as saying that, to constitute a point of law, in all cases where findings of fact are attacked, there must be an allegation that there was a misdirection on the facts which was so unreasonable that no sensible person properly applying his mind would have arrived at such a decision.  One must, I think, be guided by the substance of the grounds of appeal and not the form.  Legal practitioners often exhibit different styles in formulating such grounds.  What is important at the end of the day is that the grounds must disclose the basis upon which the decision of the lower court is impugned in a clear and concise manner.” </p> <p>                        The essential principle outlined above is that regard must be had to the substance of a ground of appeal as opposed to its form in order to determine whether it raises a question of law. The court was of the view that the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant in essence attacked the alleged failure by the court <em>a quo</em> to consider relevant facts which failure led to an error at law. The grounds complied with the requirements of s 92F of the Labour Act [<em>Chapter 28:01</em>] and therefore the point <em>in limine</em> was dismissed.</p> <p>                        On the merits the issues which are pertinent in the determination of the appeal are the following:</p> <ul><li>Whether or not the court <em>a quo</em> correctly applied the principles on fixed term contracts;</li> </ul><p>(b) Whether or not the respondent had a legitimate expectation of being offered employment on a permanent basis;</p> <ul><li>Whether or not the court drew a distinction between a permanent employee and one on a fixed term contract in its quantification of damages; and</li> <li>Whether or not the court grossly misdirected itself in respect of the factual findings it arrived at on the evidence presented.</li> </ul><p>                        It was the appellant’s contention that the court <em>a quo</em> erred in law by quantifying damages as if the respondent was a permanent employee prior to his dismissal, yet it is clear from the contract of employment that he was on a fixed term contract. One of the first categoric statements on the assessment of damages for unlawful dismissal was enunciated by GUBBAY CJ in <em>Gauntlet Security Services v Leonard</em> 1997 (1) ZLR 583 (S) in which he said:</p> <p>“The employee is entitled to be awarded the amount of wages or salary he would have earned save for the premature termination of his Contract by the employer. He may also be compensated for the loss of any benefit to which he was contractually entitled and of which he was deprived in consequence of the breach.”</p> <p>The remarks by the learned judge show that in assessing damages for unlawful termination of an employment contract,  the court has to place the employee in the position he would have been save for the premature termination of the contract. This is in line with the object of damages which is to place a party in the position he or she would have been save for the premature termination of the contract . This position was aptly captured in <em>Goedhals v Graaff-Reinet Municipality</em> 1955 (3) S.A 482 in which HALL J, at 487C-E said;</p> <p>“The general principle upon which damages are to be assessed was laid in <em>Victoria Falls and Transvaal and</em> <em>Power Co. Ltd v Consolidated Langlaate Mines Ltd</em> 1915 A.D. at p 22, where it is stated that, so far as possible, the person injured must be placed in the same position as he would have been if the contract had been performed. On this principle it appears to me that the question which the trial court would have to decide in order to assess damages in this case is what would the opportunity of finding water be worth to the plaintiff under the circumstances of the case.”</p> <p>                        What is derived therein is that damages are awarded for what can be termed as expectation loss. There was no dispute between the parties regarding the nature of the respondent’s contract of employment with the appellant. Thus his status was never in issue. His was a fixed term contract. Further, it was not in dispute that when he was dismissed his contract only had six months before it was due to expire.</p> <p>                        Mr <em>Mucheche</em> conceded, properly in my view, that a distinction had to be drawn between reinstatement to a contract without limit of time and one that was of fixed duration. He however, detracted from this concession by submitting that there should be no distinction between the two when considering consequential damages arising out an unlawful termination of a contract of employment.</p> <p>                        <em>In casu</em>, the contract of employment signed by the parties as outlined above, was for a duration of 36 months, which point was conceded by the respondent.  This means that the relationship between the parties was expected to expire on the last day of the 36th month. The appellant submitted that based on the principles of law that one is compensated for the loss he suffered as a result of the breach, the respondent was entitled to be awarded the amount of wages or salary he would have earned save for the premature termination of the contract. This is the correct position.  Damages for unlawful termination in relation to an employee who was on a fixed term contract ought to be calculated in relation to unexpired period of that contract. This position is fortified in <em>Myers v Abramson</em> 1952 (3) SA 121 (C) in which, in relation to damages for breach of a fixed term contract of employment, the court stated the following:</p> <p>“The measure of damages accorded such employee is, both in our law and in the English law, the actual loss suffered by him represented by the sum due to him for the unexpired period of the contract less any sum he earned or could reasonably have earned during such latter period in similar employment.’ (at 127 D-E).”</p> <p>The standard in <em>Myers v Abramson</em> intimates that an employee will be entitled to his proven actual damages, which is the loss of income for the unexpired period. The court <em>a quo</em> awarded the respondent damages in <em>lieu</em> of reinstatement for a period of 12 months yet the remaining period was six months. The court <em>a quo</em> failed to take cognisance of the fact that damages in lieu of reinstatement, are in fact, a substitute of reinstatement. The question that ought to have exercised its mind is; if the respondent were to be reinstated, what would be the period of his engagement in terms of the contract? The answer is obviously six months because it is clearly stated in the contract that it was for the duration of 36 months.</p> <p>The court also accepted the appellant’s reasoning that the court <em>a quo</em> in making the order it made, actually created a new contract for the parties. That was a violation of the principle of sanctity of contracts. In <em>Book v Davidson</em> 1988(1) ZLR 365(S), the sanctity of contracts was discussed as follows:</p> <p>“There is however another tenet of public policy, more venerable than any thus engrafted onto it under recent pressures, which is likewise in conflict with the ideal of freedom of trade. It is the sanctity of contracts ...  If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider - that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract ... to allow a person of mature age, and not imposed upon, to enter into a contract, to obtain the benefit of it, and then to repudiate it and the obligations which he has undertaken is, prima facie at all events, contrary to the interests of any and every country.”</p> <p>The above dictum shows that the principle of sanctity of contracts confines the court only to interpreting a contract and not creating a new contract for the parties. It entails that the court should respect the contract made by the parties and give effect to it.</p> <p>                        The dispute between the parties does not and cannot extend beyond the life span of the contract. Clearly, the court a quo misdirected itself in extending the dispute beyond the life of the contract. If a contract is for a fixed term it automatically expires at the end of the specified period unless the parties thereto mutually agree to its termination. So too do any obligations entered into for performance by the parties to the contract. By accepting that the dispute of the parties did not extend beyond the life of the contract, Mr <em>Mucheche</em> was in effect conceding that there was no place for a claim for consequential damages. Such claim could only properly arise if there was a legitimate expectation that the respondent would be offered permanent employment, which was never the contention.</p> <p>                        What is at issue is the computation of damages for the unexpired period of the contract. In terms of clause 3.1 of the contract the appellant had the sole discretion in deciding whether or not to offer the respondent a permanent position. When the respondent was dismissed the appellant had not exercised that discretion. As a consequence the court a quo ought to have given effect to that clause. Its failure to do so meant that it was extending the period of the contract on its own volition contrary to the wishes of the parties as expressed in the contract. It was therefore a serious misdirection on its part to award damages for a period beyond the date of termination as stipulated in the contract. The court a quo completely ignored the agreement that had been entered into between the parties which stipulated the duration of the relationship between the parties.</p> <p>It should also be noted that in the absence of a finding that the respondent had a legitimate expectation that he would be given a permanent contract, there was no justification for the method it used to quantify damages. The respondent had not completed his training period at the time that he was dismissed and he had failed two core courses which he resat for examinations in 2005 and failed. He would only be competent to be employed on a permanent basis after successfully completing the training. Paragraph 9 of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority Staff Training and Development Policy provides:</p> <p>A Revenue Trainee who fails to successfully complete level 2 and has a negative mentor’s report will have his/her contract of employment terminated at the end of the prescribed traineeship period. However, in exceptional cases or on recommendation by a mentor/supervisor, he/she may be given one chance to re-sit the failed subject<em>.</em></p> <p>He did not deny that he had rewritten the required examinations and that he had failed a second time. His explanation upon being shown the examination scripts was that he had forgotten having written the said examinations. Against these clear admissions it was therefore a serious misdirection on the part of the court to accept a contention from the respondent that he had only seen the 2005 examination scripts for the first time in court when the appellant produced them. From what is stipulated in the policy, it is clear that the respondent’s employment would have been terminated at the end of the 36 months because he had failed the examinations.</p> <p> </p> <p>There was no basis upon which the respondent could have at law been entitled to more than what he would have earned during the unexpired period of his contract with the appellant and thus there was no legal basis upon which the court <em>a quo</em> made the order it did. It is for the above reasons that we allowed the appeal and made the following order:</p> <ol><li>The appeal be and is hereby allowed with costs.</li> <li>The order of the Labour Court is set aside and the following is substituted:</li> </ol><ul><li>The appellant shall pay the respondent the amount of US$1 470.00 as back-pay and benefits less US$900.00 earned by the respondent from informal jobs over a period of six months.</li> </ul><p><strong>CHIDYAUSIKU CJ (Deceased)                  </strong>I agree</p> <p><strong>MUTEMA AJA         (Deceased)                  </strong>I agree</p> </div> <div class="field field--name-field-law-report-citations field--type-string field--label-above"> <div class="field__label">Law report citations</div> <div class='field__items'> <div class="field__item"> </div> </div> </div> <div class="views-element-container"><div class="view view-eva view-download-conditional view-id-download_conditional view-display-id-entity_view_1 js-view-dom-id-60500fc085a30c71196ef28089e5227c21851ed0c63fbb5ec3273f3f0c226706"> <div><div class="views-field views-field-views-conditional-field"><span class="field-content"><p><strong>REPORTABLE</strong><strong>        (3)</strong></p> <p><strong>ZIMBABWE     REVENUE     AUTHORITY</strong></p> <p><strong>v</strong></p> <p><strong>CHESTER     MUDZIMUWAONA</strong></p> <p><strong>SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE</strong></p> <p><strong>CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, GOWORA JA &amp; MUTEMA AJA</strong></p> <p><strong>BULAWAYO, </strong>28 JULY 2014</p> <p><em>T. Magwaliba</em>, for the appellant                                                                                         </p> <p><em>C. Mucheche</em>, for the first respondent</p> <p><strong>                        GOWORA JA</strong>:  This was an appeal against the whole judgment of the Labour Court delivered on 17 May 2012. After perusing the record and hearing the submissions of the parties, this Court allowed the appeal and indicated that the reasons would be availed in due course. The following are the reasons for the order.</p> <p>                        The facts arising in this matter are that in 2002, the respondent was employed by the appellant as a Revenue Trainee on a fixed term contract of three years. It specifically stated the following:</p> <p>“upon successful completion of the probation period the employment contract shall run for a further period of 24 (twenty-four) months after which the authority , may at its sole discretion offer you permanent employment on such terms and conditions as determined by it at the time.”</p> <p>                        The literal meaning of that clause is that the respondent’s contract was subject, first to the successful completion of the probation period and then would terminate at the end of 36 month. </p> <p>                        In 2005, the respondent was based at the Beitbridge Border post and was charged with failing to uphold ethical and professional standards of behaviour within the workplace as well as carrying out an act inconsistent with the express or implied conditions of the contract of employment. He was arraigned before a disciplinary committee and was found guilty of both charges. He was as a consequence dismissed from employment. He appealed to the appeals committee without success.</p> <p>                        The respondent appealed against that decision to the Labour Court which upheld the appeal and held that the he had been unlawfully dismissed. The court <em>a quo</em> ordered the appellant to reinstate the respondent without loss of salary or benefits and, in the event that reinstatement was no longer tenable, to pay damages in <em>lieu</em> of reinstatement. This decision was not appealed against. Instead, the parties decided to negotiate the <em>quantum</em> of damages but failed to agree resulting in the respondent applying to the Labour Court for quantification. He claimed that when he was dismissed he had not completed his training period but it was common cause that he was going to continue with his job after training and thus he was entitled to compensation as if he was a permanent employee. The appellant opposed the quantification on the basis that the respondent was employed on a fixed term contract and he had failed his examinations and thus the contractual relationship would have ended at the expiry of the 36 months provided in the contract. The Labour Court ruled in favour of the respondent and ordered the appellant to pay:</p> <ul><li>US$ 19 740.16 as back-pay and benefits</li> <li>Twelve (12) months’ salary that the respondent would have earned in August 2011 minus US$150.00 earned by the respondent per month for a period of twelve months.</li> </ul><p>The appellant was aggrieved by the decision and with the leave of this court has appealed the order of the court <em>a quo</em>. It is criticized for the following reasons:</p> <ul><li> </li> </ul><p>-           failing to give proper weight to the fact that when the respondent was dismissed he was left with a period of 6 (six) months before expiration of the contract.</p> <ul><li> </li> <li> </li> </ul><p>-           failing to distinguish between a permanent employee and an employee on a fixed term contract in its quantification of damages, especially after finding that the respondent did not have a legitimate expectation to be offered permanent employment.</p> <ul><li> </li> </ul><p>-           in failing to deduct the US$150.00 earned by the respondent per month for a period of twelve (12) months from the total amount awarded as back pay and benefits.</p> <ul><li> </li> </ul><p>-           in rejecting the evidence of the appellant’s expert witness on the factual issues and accepting that of the respondent and his witness on unclear grounds.</p> <p>                        The respondent raised three preliminary objections to the appeal. The objections were respectively that, the notice of appeal did not state the correct date of judgment, the grounds of appeal were not clear and concise and, lastly, that the grounds of appeal did not raise questions of law. The respondent abandoned the first objection after conceding that the notice of appeal in point of fact reflected the correct date of judgment.</p> <p>                        The other two points were dismissed by the court.  Quite apart from the fact that in mounting the objections, the respondent sought to rely on the Supreme Court Rules, 1964 which are not applicable to appeals from the Labour Court, in attacking the grounds of appeal, the point that the grounds of appeal were not clear and concise had no merit. The respondent was unable to show to this court in what way the grounds of appeal were not clear and concise. The grounds set out by the appellant may have been inelegantly drafted but they articulate the basis upon which the appeal is founded.</p> <p>                        Regarding the point taken that the grounds of appeal were not on a question of law, the court was of the view that the point was improperly taken. The issue of what is a question of law has been addressed in a plethora of cases. See for example, <em>Muzuva v United Bottlers (Pvt) Ltd </em>1994 (1) ZLR 217 (S) and <em>Hama v National Railways of Zimbabwe </em>1996 (1) ZLR 664 (S).</p> <p>                        The respondent submitted that the appellant should have expressly stated in its grounds of appeal that the factual findings of the court <em>a quo</em> are gross as to amount to a question of law.  In <em>Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe v Granger and Anor</em> SC 34/01, MUCHECHETERE JA (as he then was), at page 5 to 6 of the cyclostyled judgment, said:</p> <p>“An appeal to this Court is based on the record. If it is to be related to the facts there must be an allegation that there has been a misdirection on the facts which is so unreasonable that no sensible person who applied his mind to the facts would have arrived at such a decision. And a misdirection of facts is either a failure to appreciate a fact at all or a finding of fact that is contrary to the evidence actually presented.”</p> <p>These remarks were qualified by GARWE JA in <em>Zvokusekwa v Biita Rural District Council</em> SC-44-15 as follows:</p> <p>“In my view, the remarks made in Granger’s case (supra) need to be qualified, to the extent that they may be interpreted as saying that, to constitute a point of law, in all cases where findings of fact are attacked, there must be an allegation that there was a misdirection on the facts which was so unreasonable that no sensible person properly applying his mind would have arrived at such a decision.  One must, I think, be guided by the substance of the grounds of appeal and not the form.  Legal practitioners often exhibit different styles in formulating such grounds.  What is important at the end of the day is that the grounds must disclose the basis upon which the decision of the lower court is impugned in a clear and concise manner.” </p> <p>                        The essential principle outlined above is that regard must be had to the substance of a ground of appeal as opposed to its form in order to determine whether it raises a question of law. The court was of the view that the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant in essence attacked the alleged failure by the court <em>a quo</em> to consider relevant facts which failure led to an error at law. The grounds complied with the requirements of s 92F of the Labour Act [<em>Chapter 28:01</em>] and therefore the point <em>in limine</em> was dismissed.</p> <p>                        On the merits the issues which are pertinent in the determination of the appeal are the following:</p> <ul><li>Whether or not the court <em>a quo</em> correctly applied the principles on fixed term contracts;</li> </ul><p>(b) Whether or not the respondent had a legitimate expectation of being offered employment on a permanent basis;</p> <ul><li>Whether or not the court drew a distinction between a permanent employee and one on a fixed term contract in its quantification of damages; and</li> <li>Whether or not the court grossly misdirected itself in respect of the factual findings it arrived at on the evidence presented.</li> </ul><p>                        It was the appellant’s contention that the court <em>a quo</em> erred in law by quantifying damages as if the respondent was a permanent employee prior to his dismissal, yet it is clear from the contract of employment that he was on a fixed term contract. One of the first categoric statements on the assessment of damages for unlawful dismissal was enunciated by GUBBAY CJ in <em>Gauntlet Security Services v Leonard</em> 1997 (1) ZLR 583 (S) in which he said:</p> <p>“The employee is entitled to be awarded the amount of wages or salary he would have earned save for the premature termination of his Contract by the employer. He may also be compensated for the loss of any benefit to which he was contractually entitled and of which he was deprived in consequence of the breach.”</p> <p>The remarks by the learned judge show that in assessing damages for unlawful termination of an employment contract,  the court has to place the employee in the position he would have been save for the premature termination of the contract. This is in line with the object of damages which is to place a party in the position he or she would have been save for the premature termination of the contract . This position was aptly captured in <em>Goedhals v Graaff-Reinet Municipality</em> 1955 (3) S.A 482 in which HALL J, at 487C-E said;</p> <p>“The general principle upon which damages are to be assessed was laid in <em>Victoria Falls and Transvaal and</em> <em>Power Co. Ltd v Consolidated Langlaate Mines Ltd</em> 1915 A.D. at p 22, where it is stated that, so far as possible, the person injured must be placed in the same position as he would have been if the contract had been performed. On this principle it appears to me that the question which the trial court would have to decide in order to assess damages in this case is what would the opportunity of finding water be worth to the plaintiff under the circumstances of the case.”</p> <p>                        What is derived therein is that damages are awarded for what can be termed as expectation loss. There was no dispute between the parties regarding the nature of the respondent’s contract of employment with the appellant. Thus his status was never in issue. His was a fixed term contract. Further, it was not in dispute that when he was dismissed his contract only had six months before it was due to expire.</p> <p>                        Mr <em>Mucheche</em> conceded, properly in my view, that a distinction had to be drawn between reinstatement to a contract without limit of time and one that was of fixed duration. He however, detracted from this concession by submitting that there should be no distinction between the two when considering consequential damages arising out an unlawful termination of a contract of employment.</p> <p>                        <em>In casu</em>, the contract of employment signed by the parties as outlined above, was for a duration of 36 months, which point was conceded by the respondent.  This means that the relationship between the parties was expected to expire on the last day of the 36th month. The appellant submitted that based on the principles of law that one is compensated for the loss he suffered as a result of the breach, the respondent was entitled to be awarded the amount of wages or salary he would have earned save for the premature termination of the contract. This is the correct position.  Damages for unlawful termination in relation to an employee who was on a fixed term contract ought to be calculated in relation to unexpired period of that contract. This position is fortified in <em>Myers v Abramson</em> 1952 (3) SA 121 (C) in which, in relation to damages for breach of a fixed term contract of employment, the court stated the following:</p> <p>“The measure of damages accorded such employee is, both in our law and in the English law, the actual loss suffered by him represented by the sum due to him for the unexpired period of the contract less any sum he earned or could reasonably have earned during such latter period in similar employment.’ (at 127 D-E).”</p> <p>The standard in <em>Myers v Abramson</em> intimates that an employee will be entitled to his proven actual damages, which is the loss of income for the unexpired period. The court <em>a quo</em> awarded the respondent damages in <em>lieu</em> of reinstatement for a period of 12 months yet the remaining period was six months. The court <em>a quo</em> failed to take cognisance of the fact that damages in lieu of reinstatement, are in fact, a substitute of reinstatement. The question that ought to have exercised its mind is; if the respondent were to be reinstated, what would be the period of his engagement in terms of the contract? The answer is obviously six months because it is clearly stated in the contract that it was for the duration of 36 months.</p> <p>The court also accepted the appellant’s reasoning that the court <em>a quo</em> in making the order it made, actually created a new contract for the parties. That was a violation of the principle of sanctity of contracts. In <em>Book v Davidson</em> 1988(1) ZLR 365(S), the sanctity of contracts was discussed as follows:</p> <p>“There is however another tenet of public policy, more venerable than any thus engrafted onto it under recent pressures, which is likewise in conflict with the ideal of freedom of trade. It is the sanctity of contracts ...  If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider - that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract ... to allow a person of mature age, and not imposed upon, to enter into a contract, to obtain the benefit of it, and then to repudiate it and the obligations which he has undertaken is, prima facie at all events, contrary to the interests of any and every country.”</p> <p>The above dictum shows that the principle of sanctity of contracts confines the court only to interpreting a contract and not creating a new contract for the parties. It entails that the court should respect the contract made by the parties and give effect to it.</p> <p>                        The dispute between the parties does not and cannot extend beyond the life span of the contract. Clearly, the court a quo misdirected itself in extending the dispute beyond the life of the contract. If a contract is for a fixed term it automatically expires at the end of the specified period unless the parties thereto mutually agree to its termination. So too do any obligations entered into for performance by the parties to the contract. By accepting that the dispute of the parties did not extend beyond the life of the contract, Mr <em>Mucheche</em> was in effect conceding that there was no place for a claim for consequential damages. Such claim could only properly arise if there was a legitimate expectation that the respondent would be offered permanent employment, which was never the contention.</p> <p>                        What is at issue is the computation of damages for the unexpired period of the contract. In terms of clause 3.1 of the contract the appellant had the sole discretion in deciding whether or not to offer the respondent a permanent position. When the respondent was dismissed the appellant had not exercised that discretion. As a consequence the court a quo ought to have given effect to that clause. Its failure to do so meant that it was extending the period of the contract on its own volition contrary to the wishes of the parties as expressed in the contract. It was therefore a serious misdirection on its part to award damages for a period beyond the date of termination as stipulated in the contract. The court a quo completely ignored the agreement that had been entered into between the parties which stipulated the duration of the relationship between the parties.</p> <p>It should also be noted that in the absence of a finding that the respondent had a legitimate expectation that he would be given a permanent contract, there was no justification for the method it used to quantify damages. The respondent had not completed his training period at the time that he was dismissed and he had failed two core courses which he resat for examinations in 2005 and failed. He would only be competent to be employed on a permanent basis after successfully completing the training. Paragraph 9 of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority Staff Training and Development Policy provides:</p> <p>A Revenue Trainee who fails to successfully complete level 2 and has a negative mentor’s report will have his/her contract of employment terminated at the end of the prescribed traineeship period. However, in exceptional cases or on recommendation by a mentor/supervisor, he/she may be given one chance to re-sit the failed subject<em>.</em></p> <p>He did not deny that he had rewritten the required examinations and that he had failed a second time. His explanation upon being shown the examination scripts was that he had forgotten having written the said examinations. Against these clear admissions it was therefore a serious misdirection on the part of the court to accept a contention from the respondent that he had only seen the 2005 examination scripts for the first time in court when the appellant produced them. From what is stipulated in the policy, it is clear that the respondent’s employment would have been terminated at the end of the 36 months because he had failed the examinations.</p> <p> </p> <p>There was no basis upon which the respondent could have at law been entitled to more than what he would have earned during the unexpired period of his contract with the appellant and thus there was no legal basis upon which the court <em>a quo</em> made the order it did. It is for the above reasons that we allowed the appeal and made the following order:</p> <ol><li>The appeal be and is hereby allowed with costs.</li> <li>The order of the Labour Court is set aside and the following is substituted:</li> </ol><ul><li>The appellant shall pay the respondent the amount of US$1 470.00 as back-pay and benefits less US$900.00 earned by the respondent from informal jobs over a period of six months.</li> </ul><p><strong>CHIDYAUSIKU CJ (Deceased)                  </strong>I agree</p> <p><strong>MUTEMA AJA         (Deceased)                  </strong>I agree</p></span></div></div> </div> </div> Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:39:14 +0000 Anonymous 10084 at http://zimlii.org